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FOREWORD
 
This is the second progress report on Factors Affecting the
 
Retirement of Commercial Transport Jet Aircraft, updating an ear­
lier report of late December 1976. 'A third and, very hopefully,

final report is scheduled for December 1978. The initial report,

which is included herein, ended with the issuance on December 23,

1976, of the long awaited FAA rule 91-136 which required the re­
tirement or modification of a large portion of the existing com-­
mercial transport jet fleet in stages ending in 1985. The industry
 
was stunned by what it perceived to be a broken promise by the
 
government not to enact any such rule unless itwas accompanied by

financing legislation.
 
This report adds developments for the year 1977 during which
 
a series of efforts were made to secure financing assistance aimed
 
primarily at providing incentives for retiring existing aircraft.
 
Our analysis highlights how various seemingly small changes in the
 
proposed bills significantly changed the incentives as between
 
retrofit, re-engining and replacement. As a result, had airline
 
executives made equipment decisions during the year based on a
 
bill as it existed at a given point in time, subsequent events
 
could have made the decision a costly mistake. At the end of 1977
 
a bill did clear the House Committee of Public Works and Transpor­
tation. Itwas then sent to the Ways and Means Committee because
 
the matter involved tax changes.
 
The third and final progress report will build on the previous

reports in two significant areas. 'First, it will update whatever
 
legislative progress is made in resolving what, if any, financial
 
aid will be enacted which would affect retirement of current air­
craft. The previously mentioned Anderson Bill (officially known
 
as the Airport and Aircraft Noise Reduction Act) as approved by

the House Committee was acceptable to the airlines, but, as written,
 
not to the House Ways and Means Committee. The number one legis­
lative objective for the Air Transportation Association in 1978 is
 
to recast the House version of the Airport and Aircraft Noise Re­
duction Act in more acceptable language without losing the benefits.
 
As 1978 begins, the concept seems to be an excise tax with pass­
through provisions with the carrier being given credit against its
 
tax liability.
 
Secondly, the next report will deal .more specifically with
 
the interaction of economics and technology between current gen­
eration turbojet and turbofan aircraft and derivative or new tech­
nology transport jet aircraft as this interaction affects the
 
retirement of the earlier planes.
 
- iii ­
Of one thing we can be sure: Uncertainty as to government
 
actions on aircraft noise requirements and the financing thereof
 
over the past several years have, in many cases, put a freeze on
 
normal economic retirements.
 
Frank A- Spencer
 
February 15, 1978
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FACTORS AFFECTING THE RETIREMENT
 
OF TRANSPORT JET AIRCRAFT
 
ABSTRACT
 
Prejet Era The thousands of aircraft built in World War II and
 
in particular their use in carrying passengers and ca'rgo focused at­
tention of the public on air transportation. Large sums of federal
 
money were fed into the manufacturing industry thus providing finan­
cial support to develop more efficient technology for the commercial
 
air transport industry. This technological development, combined
 
with pent-up demand, an increase in disposable income, and an in­
crease in leisure time led to high growth rates in air travel which
 
quickly absorbed the products of the new technology characterized by
 
the more efficient planes. Airlines were able to dispose of their
 
existing aircraft as fast as they acquired new larger craft. Such
 
disposal was above the book value and provided substantial funds for
 
new equipment.
 
Jet Era The jet age was born in 1958 with the introduction of
 
the Turbojet Boeing 707 and Douglas DC-8. Quickly there followed a
 
period of high growth rates fed by lower fares which in turn were
 
made possible by the lower operating costs of these new technology

aircraft. As a result, the industry was enveloped with optimism for
 
the future. Accentuating this optimism was the fact that the new
 
jets innediately began to stretch in size and improve in power­
plants. There seemed to be every reason to expect the prejet cycle
 
of retirement and replacement long before useful life expired to
 
repeat itself. On this basis a new series of wide-bodied airplanes
 
were designed and marketed. The first such craft was the jumbo 747.
 
With a capacity of 375 to 500 seats, it represented a quantum jump
 
in seats offered, as compared with existing jets with normal seating
 
of from 100 to 160. The second series wide-bodies were the DC-10
 
and L1OI which were delivered with 225 to 250 seats in normal con­
figuration. Unanticipated escalation of all categories of costs, a
 
business recession, and the Arab oil embargo, contributed to a dram­
atic decrease in the rate of travel growth, a swing from profit to
 
loss for many in the airline industry, and the failure of orders of
 
new equipment to materialize.
 
New Factors Affecting Retirement In the past the factors af­
fecting the retirement of aircraft have been very similar to those
 
affecting the replacement of machines in industry generally. Roughly
 
they include: (1)the need to replace because machines are worn out
 
or. economically obsolete, (2)the ability to finance replacement,
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(3)the availability of a more efficient substitute of the correct
 
size and market appeal, and (4)the availability of a substitute
 
which has lower operating costs, including the costs of ownership,
 
than the existing machine. However, in the current airline equip­
ment retirement situation, four entirely new factors have emerged
 
which have added further uncertainty for the decision makers, not
 
only in the airlines but in the airframe and engine manufacturing
 
companies as well. These factors are:
 
(1) "Deregulation" or "Regulatory Reform"
 
(2)Aircraft noise regulations and the financing of
 
compliance
 
(3)Availability and price of jet fuel
 
(4)Inflation to the degree that costs may offset tech­
nological efficiencies
 
With regard to "deregulation" or "regulatory reform" this
 
study concludes true deregulation is not a real threat. Therefore,
 
the initial position taken by the industry that "chaos" isaround
 
the corner is not valid. Similarly, although there is still con­
siderable rhetoric emanating from some industry quarters to the
 
effect that the U.S. has the best air transport system so let's
 
not change the regulatory system, it is perceived that, in general,
 
the industry recognizes the inevitability of a change,,and will
 
work for some sort of legislation along the lines of a Kennedy-

Cannon or Levitas bill. Finally, CAB action under the new aggress­
ive Chairman Alfred E. Kahn has convinced many carrier executives
 
that change is at hand either with or without reform legislation.
 
Therefore, it is concluded that while the uncertainty of regula­
tory reform legislation is not helpful to the decision makers, in
 
fact managements are,not holding up equipment plans for this
 
reason.
 
The second new factor is the noise controversy. In 1974, the
 
FAA proposed an amendment to FAR 36 requiring all existing jet air­
craft to meet new stricter noise emission standards which over 80%
 
of the jet fleets do not now meet. A segment of the population liv­
ing-near airports have asserted a loss in property values, a deter­
ioration in the quality of life and adverse effects on the education
 
of their children - all due to jet noise. Buttressed by favorable
 
court decisions airport neighbors have pressed for more stringent
 
federal rules. Late in 1976 the FAA adopted the proposed amendment
 
with a near term cost estimate of between one and five billion
 
dollars.
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The opponents of the rule argue that installation of retro­
fit kits of sound absorbent material would not make a perceptible

difference for the current non-FAR 36 planes with the JT8D engine.

They also argue that while application of SAM to the 707 and DCZ8
 
series with JT3D powerplants would provide significant relief on
 
approach, modification is not warranted because: (a)the greater
 
problem is on takeoff where there is little benefit, and (b)more
 
importantly, because the planes are not only old and approaching

the end of their design life but are also extremely fuel ineffi­
cient. Therefore, these latter craft are almost, if not already,

economically obsolete. Finally, it is clear that the expenditures

of large sums on retrofit will decrease funds available for pur­
chasing new aircraft which themselves will reduce noise to a
 
greater degree and will also use less of a scarce resource - petro­
leum. Prior to November 18, 1976, the evidence is that the FAA had
 
no intention of promulgating new noise rules absent a legislative
 
plan to assist inthe financing. The-November 18th Aviation Noise
 
Abatement Policy statement was a reversal of this position.
 
Just before leaving office President Ford reversed administra­
tion policy and proposed legislation to assist in financing.

Throughout 1977 there were a series of bills purportedly aimed at
 
replacement. However, the emphasis, in fact, varied between retro­
fit, replacing engines, and replacing the airplane. After consid­
erable political maneuvering a bill known as H.R. 8729, Airport and
 
Aircraft Noise Reduction Act, was reported out of the House Commit­
tee on Public Works and Transportation on December 13, 1977. This
 
bill emphasized replacement and currently is the number one prior­
ity item of the Air Transport Association for legislative action
 
in 1978.
 
In sum, the controversy over the desirability of retrofit
 
versus re-engining or replacement, plus the uncertainty of who
 
will bear the cost, has, and continues to muddy the decision pro­
cess on retirement of existing aircraft. The provisions of a fi­
nancing bill can markedly affect not only the timing but also the
 
direction of retrofit, re-engine, or replacement.
 
The third new factor relating to the replacement of current
 jets is availability and price of jet fuel. Short run availability

became an issue at the time of the oil embargo and present energy

forecasts indicate increasing shortages shortly after the turn of
 
the century. Presently availability is not a factor in the minds
 
of those making equipment decisions. However, price is. The price

of jet fuel has more than tripled from about 1I% per gallon to over
 
38 domestically with a general agreement that escalation will
 
continue. International fuel costs are higher. The rise has done
 
much to render certain aircraft models economically obsolete.
 
While new or derivative technology aircraft are significantly more
 
fuel-efficient than the narrow-bodies, a diffic6lty arises in op­
timizing fuel costs unless a stable price is known. NASA and
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industry studies indicate that aircraft designs are different for
 
10/, 30% and 60% fuel. Designers have been successful in reducing
 
specific fuel consumption from early jets by about one third.
 
The fourth factor affecting the retirement of aircraft is infla­
tion. In the 60's, with a stable price level, the increasing profit­
ability of new more efficient aircraft, together with cash flow from
 
depreciation, enabled carriers to finance equipment purchases. Cur­
rently year-to-year price increases for the same equipment are run­
ning 8 to 9%. Finally, the rising cost of the technology can offset
 
the increased efficiency to the point that carriers see no financial
 
advantage to replacing their current aircraft.
 
Age As a Factor: Age was examined in the context of chrono­
logical age, age in hours of service, age in cycles (landings or
 
pressurization) with the conclusion that none of these are ctitical
 
in the retirement problem.
 
End of Book Life: The investigation revealed that there has
 
been considerable variance in rates of depreciation charges. The
 
variance is due primarily to "financial management" policies and
 
hence has no necessary direct relationship to actual retirement
 
policies on aircraft.
 
Financial Perspectives: The financial capabilities of the air­
lines in general and more particularly of the airlines who histor­
ically have been leaders in the reequipment cycle were, in the 1970­
1975 period, such as to pose extremely serious problems in raising
 
funds for launching a new technology or derivative airplane. As a
 
result of high debt/equity ratios and poor earnings records, long
 
term financing by insurance companies had become an unlikely event.
 
In 1976 there were a limited number of what may be described as
 
interim aircraft equipment purchases financed by' comnerical banks,
 
manufacturers, and other lenders under imaginative contractual
 
procedures. With new technology or derivative aircraft estimated
 
to cost from $20 to $30 million each in the 200 seat category and
 
with the quantities needed for individual airlines, lending insti­
tutions could not justify financing for some needy airlines.
 
Ilt should be pointed out that the very lines which had
 
laundhed the jet era are the ones with the largest fleets of old
 
noisy fuel-inefficient aircraft. The return on investment of TWA,
 
PAA, American and United over recent years has been such that
 
equity investors can find other investments of.much less risk.
 
United with over $550 million in cash and short-term securities
 
was currently stronger than any of the others mentioned above.
 
However, with a commitment of over $500 million for 46 727-200
 
series and not one new type on order the question of how to fi­
nance a need of $6 billion is not easily answered.
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The year 1977 showed a resurgence of profitability. Balance
 
sheets evidenced considerable "corrections." At least one carrier,
 
though not a candidate for launching new large scale equipment pur­
chases, obtained a long term unsecured financing from insurance
 
companies. Notwithstanding these favorable developments, one must
 
consider that a significant portion,of the earnings and balance
 
sheet corrections came from accounting adjustments which cannot
 
continue without limit. There are bullish and bearish airline'fi­
nancial forecasts for the future. Consistently strong operatfng
 
earnings are not yet in sight.
 
Conclusion: An examination of the technological advances
 
recently made and in prospect lead to the conclusion that each
 
unit of technology has become more and more expensive to the point
 
where costs have offset economic benefits. No quantum jump such
 
as occurred when the jets were introduced or when the more effi­
cient fanjets were developed seems in prospect. To provide ade­
quate return for investors such that capital can be attracted,
 
higher fares may be necessary as costs escalate further. This
 
implies a slower growth rate than many have projected. An alter­
nate solution under current experimentation is imaginative pro­
motional fares carefully tailored to avoid diversion and at rates
 
above marginal costs. This further suggests the importance of
 
focusing research in the area of cost reduction rather than in
 
performance and the amenities of flight.
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FACTORS AFFECTING THE RETIREMENT
 
OF TRANSPORT JET AIRCRAFT
 
A. 
!'INTRODUCTION
 
A.l RESEARCH TASK
 
In June 1975 representatives of airlines, aircraft manufac­
turers, the investment community, the government, and academia met
 
inWashington under the sponsorship of NASA for an Air Transporta­
tion Demand and Systems Analysis Workshop. Various participants
 
pointed out that because historically there had been a relationship
 
between the demand for air travel 
and the type of equipment and
 
service offered, there was a need to 
know more about retirement
 
plans for current aircraft. Both the engine manufacturers and the
 
aircraft manufacturers suggested an investigation into what elements
 
went into the retirement decisions of management. The airline
 
representatives themselves expressed interest in further studies of
 
the length of life of existing jets and the possibilities and costs
 
of extending this life. 
Both the airlines and the manufacturers
 
were concerned about new factors entering the replacement equation,
 
such as (a)noise regulations, (b) fuel prices and fuel availability
 
and (c)inflation. Finally, the lending institutions who had a
 
large stake in financing previous airline equipment as well as finan­
cing the large aircraft manufacturers and their suppliers were inter­
ested in what type of commitments would be sought by their customers.
 
At that time, when a numberof major airlines were in serious
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difficulties, figures in the area, depending on the time span consid­
ered, of from 20 to 60 billion dollars were mentioned.
 
As an outgrowth of the concerns and questions raisedthe cur­
rent study was sponsored by NASA to investigate the technological and
 
economic factors affecting the retirement dates of commercial jet air­
craft. As time went on it became necessary to add-to the area of
 
investigation the effect of legislation and environmental forces. It
 
was hoped that perhaps some specific predictions could quantify re­
tirement dates.
 
A.2 RESEARCH PROCEDURE AND FOCUS
 
Early research satisfied us that because of varying dynamic
 
forces a meaningful mechanistic model is not possible. As the text
 
will demonstrate, there is no reason to retire current jets in the
 
next several years because of chronological age, hours of service,
 
number of cycles (whether they be landings or pressurization cycles):
 
Therefore, retirement decisions are economic, or even political, on
 
various perceptions of future demand and costs flavored by voluntary
 
or involuntary induced ideas as to timing of replacements or environ­
mental reasons. These decisions are the results of interreaction be­
tween the engineering departments of the airlines and manufacturers
 
as well as fleet planners and the high echelon corporate officials
 
who deal not only with market factors, plane economics, and financing
 
but also with regulatory authorities.
 
Therefore the research procedure determined upon was field trips
 
to the headquarters of the three major aircraft manufacturers, the two 
primary engine manufacturers, most of the major trunk airlines, the
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FAA, DOT, ATA, CAB and lending officials of Insurance Companies, 
Commercial Banks, and Institutional Lenders. Additionally, invest­
ment analysts and members of the staff of the Subcommittee on
 
Aviation of the House Committee on the Public Works and Transportation
 
were consulted.
 
To provide an underpinning for the study as well to develop
as 

the broad dimensions of the problem a complete inventory of the free
 
world commercial jet fleet, focused on various parameters of age,
 
was developed covering 1958 thru 1975. (Appendixes A and B) This
 
large data base includes categorization by airline, by equipment
 
type, age in year, age in hours, and cycles of high time aircraft
 
as well as whether the aircraft were purchased new from the manufac­
turer, or purchased used.
 
Generally speaking the interviews with the aircraft manufactur­
ers lncompassed several visits of more than one day each. 
 Interviews
 
with airlines ranged from several hours to several days. 
 A sample
 
list of questions and issues discussed is found in Appendix C. A par­
tial list of the companies and agencies visited and persons consulted
 
is found in Appendix D.
 
A.3 1REPORT STRUCTURE
 
The report is structured to present first a brief historical
 
background of the technology and economics of aircraft replacement and
 
retirement in the prejet era 
to see whether useful insights can be ob­
tained applicable to the jet area. As the text demonstrates there
 
are very significant differences between the two periods with several
 
entirely newi factors being present currently. These new factors are 
- 4 ­
identified and explored. Secondly, the report proceeds with an inyes­
tigatton of current technological and operational economic perspec­
tives. Decisions are made by humans not by computers and hence it is
 
the interpretation of technological and economic data against certain
 
past experiences, prejudices and attitudes that result in ultimate
 
equipment decisions. Therefore, in the body of the report there is
 
an attempt to flavor the pure technical and economic factors with
 
the qualifications put upon them by the corporate decision makers.
 
The final main section of the report deals with the financial
 
perspectives. To be sure, this is an economic element. However,
 
because of the adverse financial results for many of the carriers in
 
the early 1970's the financial perspectives emerged as a focal point
 
in our investigations. Therefore, a separate section is necessary
 
for its treatment.
 
To complete the report some conclusions are drawn as to air­
craft retirement policies.- These are followed by observations on
 
future research needs.
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B.
 
THE SETTING: THE AIRLINES AND AEROSPACE THEN AND NOW
 
B.1 THE PREJET ERA, 1934 - 1958 
A brief'survey of the prejetera was made seeking clues'which
 
would be helpful as to factors affecting current retirements. In
 
1934 Commission type regulation of the airlines began under the ICC.
 
Thus this period is the first in which public records are available.
 
At that time there were 56 different aircraft models built by 21
 
different manufacturers. By today's standards capital costs were
 
amazingly low. Some models cost from $30,000 to $50,000 with the
 
first DC-2 being considered expensive at $73,000. Carriers depreci­
ated aircraft to zero in one to three years. Some used depreciation
 
based upon hours using a life of from 1,500 to 6,000 hours. By 1938,
 
a 5-year depreciation was considered standard for the DC-3. As time
 
went on service life of the DC-3 which between 1936 and 1941 sold for
 
from $90,000 to $100,000 was computed for depreciation purposes at
 
7 years.1 / Airlines were indeed an infant industry struggling with
 
subsidies to stay afloat.
 
The post World War II period of prejet operation from 1946 to
 
1958 was one of rapid growth. Traffic growth made larger size more
 
practical, and the larger size was accompanied by lower operating
 
costs which in turn, as a result of decreased fares, developed further
 
growth. Among the reasons for this rapid growth were an increase in 
GNP, an increase in disposable income, an increase in leisure time,
 
l/	Spencer, F.A. Air Mail Payment and the Government, Washington,
 
D.C., 1941,The Brookings Institution. Chapter IX.
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an increase in the frequency of airline service and a declining fare
 
level. Not to be overlooked was the development of the pressurized,
 
4-engined long-range faster transport which -comblned increased com­
fort with a more efficient use of leisure time.
 
From 1946 on there were incremental technological advances in­
volving, with one or two well known exceptions, superior economics
 
which served as an incentive to carriers to replace portions of their
 
fleets. A further contributing factor was the price of used aircraft 
during this period. An examination of capital costs of new aircraft
 
versus used aircraft prices is found in Gellman's study.! While
 
certain prices did fluctuate widely, ingeneral itwas a period in
 
which significant amounts of capital could be secured from the us.ed
 
aircraft to apply to the purchase of new. Although there was an es­
calation of prices for new aircraft, itwas not the quantum price jump
 
relationship which exists inthe 1975-1978 period. The following ta­
ble for the prejet era lists several examples of the cost as new and
 
selling price as used aircraft.
 
V The replacement of various commercial piston aircraft with new
(and sometimes the same) types and the reasons therefore are
 
treated more extensively in Gellman, A.J. Effect of Reulation on 
Aircraft Choice, Cambridge, Mass. 1968. MIT Ph.D. thesis. 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
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TABLE 1
 
SOME PREJET NEW AND USED PRICES
 
Model No. Year Purchased Price Year of Sale Selling Price 
L-049 1946 $ 800,000 1956 $ 900,000 
L-749 1953 800,000 
DC-4 400,000 1951 355,000, 
1952 700,000 
1956 700,000, 
DC-6B 1951 1,000,000 1954 1,400,000 
DC-6 1946-53 600,000 1953-- 1,600,000 
800,000 
DC-7 1953-55 1,700,000 1957 2,100,000 
1962 100,000 
DC-7B 1953-55 1,900,000 1962 100,000 
DC-7C 1956 2,200,000 1962 350,000 
L-1649 1957 2,300,000 1962 150,000 
CV-240 1948 225,000 1950 337,000 
1952 540,000 
CV-440 
B-377 
1956 
1949 
650,000 
1,500,000 
1958 
1960 
650,000 
Scrap 
The economic environment in which the carriers and manufacturers
 
find themselves today is quite different from that of the 1946-1958
 
prejet era. However, Table 1 above, integrated with the history of
 
carrier actions with regard to developing markets under the regulatory
 
regime of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and its successor the 
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, sheds some light on factors affecting
 
the retirement of aircraft in general. First, the table indicates
 
that in periods of substantial traffic growth airplanes with "good
 
economics" not only hold their value but may increase in value. DC-4's
 
which cost $400,000 were sold several years later for $800,000.
 
DC-6's also were successful in the used market. In the mad scramble
 
to acquire new airplanes to accommodate compound traffic growth there
 
were cases in which carriers whichhad ordered a block of airplanes 
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and had positions on the production line sold aircraft at a profit
 
to others before ever taking delivery.
 
The precipitous decline in the'price of the DC-7 is explained
 
as follows. While earlier series of planes each had lower operating
 
costs than their predecessors and hence at normal load factors were
 
more profitable, the DC-7 series was the result of individual car­
riers attempting to beat the competition in coast-to-coast nonstop
 
operation. Itwas, or should have been, quite clear to the pur­
chasers that the seat-mile costs of the DC-7 would be higher than
 
on existing aircraft. However, itwas reasoned that inasmuch as
 
the competitor did not have the speed or nonstop capability of the
 
DC-7, a carrier with a DC-7 would develop a monopoly and be able to
 
maintain a sufficiently higher load factor to be profitable while
 
awaiting the arrival of the new jets. Inother words, the DC-7 was
 
an interim airplane. The theory worked in practice for a while but
 
eventually others purchased the DC-7 or a substitute plane and the
 
uneconomic aspects of the DC-7 operation became a reality. As a re­
sult the used price fell.
 
One thing the DC-7 did demonstrate clearly was that the public,
 
aided by advertising from airline marketing departments, can be led
 
to believe for a time that a new type of plane isthe desirable one
 
on which to ride. Gellman reported several cases inwhich a carrier
 
on receiving a new route could have instituted service with a more
 
efficient DC-6B, but chose to wait and publicize the newer faster
 
(and noisier) DC-7. Using this technique, Continental was successful
 
in developing market dominance on the Denver-Los Angeles route,
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Braniff on the Los Angeles-Dallas route, and American on the New
 
York-Los Angeles route.
 
Gellman, after examining used aircraft sales for most of the
 
prejet period, concluded that airlines sold their aircraft 7 to 10
 
years after purchase and generally at or above book value.
 
B.2 THE JET ERA, 1958-1976
 
(a)Narrow-Bodies: Introduction of the long range narrow­
bodied jets, namely, the 707 and DC-8 series began with 8 deliveries
 
in 1958. In 1959 the figure rose to 98. With the addition of the
 
Convair line in 1960, deliveries rose t.o 195. Table 2 provides a
 
complete rundown for the free-world of deliveries by years and by
 
type from 1958 to 1975 of all domestically produced jet aircraft.
 
The number of those still in commercial service at the end of 1975
 
are listed below.
 
Number of Jet Transports in Service Dec. 1975
 
Boeing
 
707 & 720 ------ -­ 724 
727--------- 1,130 
737 -- --- --­ 407 
*747 ---- ----- 243 
Douglas 
DC-8 --- --- -­ 463 
DC-9 - -- --- -­ 687 
*DC-10--- --- -- -­ 211 
Convair 
880 & 990 ------ -­ 17 
Lockheed 
*L-l01l- -l- -- ­ - -­ 118 
4,000
 
*Wide-Bodies
 
Table 2
 
Free World Active Jet Aircraft Fleet
 
Total Production By Year of Original Delivery
 
U.S. Manufacturers 1958-Year End 1975
 
Boeing 
 Douglas Conair Lockheed
Year 70/ & 720 727 
 737 747 fl-8 tDC- DC-10 880 & 990 L-1O11 Total
 
1958 8 
 8
 
1959 77 
 21 
 98
 
1960 91 
 89 
 is 195
 
1961 80 
 44 
 27 151
 
1962 68 
 22 
 30 120
 
1963 34 6 19 
 19 78
 
1964 38 95 
 20 
 9 162
 
1965 62 111 31. 5 
 2 211
 
1966 182 135 
 32 69 . 318
 
1967 118 155 
 4 41 158 
 476
 
1968 111 160 107 102 202 
 682
 
1969 59 .115 112 4 85 122 
 497 

.0283
1970 19 54 36 92 33 49 

1971 10 33 30 
 69 13 46 13 
 214
 
1972 6 41 22 30 4 32 52 
 187
 
1973 11 92 23 30 - 29 
 57 56 293
 
1974 21 91 55 22 ­ 48 47 
 41 325
 
1975 9 9 21 
 42 45

___551 91284_ 
_ 
25 284
 
Total 904 1,179 
 440 268 556 802 214 102 122 4,587
 
*1976 2 61 41 
 29 0 47 19 
 0 16 215
 
*1977 5 67 25 20 0 
 22- 15 ,' 0 
 II 165
 
Total 911 1,307 606 317 589 894 247 
 102 149 4,967
 
Active in
 
Airline
 
Service(1975) 724 1,130 407 243 463 687 211 
 17 118 4,000
 
Source: "Ross, Conmercial Jet Replacement Process", MST Thesis. Transportation Center, Northwestern Univ.
 
*Update from manufacturers
 
It is to the factors affecting the retirement of these aircraft
 
that study is addressed. Appendix A contains a breakdown by carrier
 
(trunks, regional/local service and supplemental/cargo) for the
 
United States. The breakdown includes the number in service, the
 
first year operated, whether any in the fleet were purchased new,
 
the age of the oldest planes of the type, the highest hour plane and
 
the highest cycle (landing) plane. Table 2 indicates that of the
 
4,000 in service in 1975 3,428 were narrow-bodies.
 
The early 1958-1959 707's and DC-8's "flyaway"3 / cost was in
 
the neighborhood of $4.8 million each. By 1969 the craft had been
 
"stretched" and new models were priced as 
high as $10.2 mill-ion for
 
the largest versions. Deliveries of the 727-100 series began in
 
1969 "flyaway" at $5.8 million. By 1976 the price escalated to
 
$11.0. The early Boeing 737 series entered the books at about
 
$3,400,000 in 1969. A 1976 new purchase was reported as $6 million,
 
and American Aviation Daily 9/23/76 reported a sale for 1977 deliv­
ery at $7.5 million.
 
(b)Wide-Bodies: The same type of price escalation has
 
occurred on the wide-bodies. The early 747-100 series were sold for
 
$21.9 million each with the freighters running about $5 million more.
 
By 1976 prices had risen to about $35 million for the regular 747
 
with a recent announcement of a 747 combination passenger/cargo air­
craft for 1977 delivery at $45 million. A 1978 delivery purchase
 
has been reported as $54 million. Lumping the DC-10 and the L-10ll
 
"Flyaway" means airframe, furnishings, avionics and engines.
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together we find 19.72 and 1973 introductory prices of around $17
 
million. Since that time prices have moved upward to the $22 million
 
area for the lower pricedimodels and $30miIlion for the higher.
 
The first order for the new long range version L-1011-500 was re­
ported as $37 million each.
 
The above figures, dealing as they do with a general model and
 
not with specific series of each model, are misleading to the extent
 
they mask the increase in the number of seats and changes inrange
 
and missions of the specific series. However, the above figures
 
may be generalized by referring to the U.S. Department of Commerce,
 
National Income and Wealth Division, Bureau of Economic Analysis
 
table of the relative increases.in new aircraft prices on the basis
 
of the "GNP Deflator" which shows index numbers indicating a 22%
 
rise between 1956-1967, a 12-year period, followed by a 20% rise in
 
the next 5 years to 1972. Escalation has proceeded at a faster
 
pace since that time and, according to the Department of Commerce,
 
rose another 41% in the next 3 years to 1975. Our talks with poten­
tial customers indicate their perceptions are for an increase of
 
8 to 9% compounded annually for the near term.
 
To summarize, the jet era began at a time of surging demand
 
and adequate profits. Further, itwas initiated by planes requir­
ing unit capital expenses of about $4.5 million for the 707 and
 
DC-8. The first Fanjet 707-300 series began in 1962 at $6million.
 
Price escalation increased the price to $10 million in 1972 and to
 
$15 million in1976. These aircraft are now no longer produced
 
for domestic use because of high fuel consumption and their failure
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to meet federal government's noise regulations for current produc­
tion aircraft. In the middle 60's the'intermediate range 727
 
initially sold at $4.5 million and, after being stretched in length
 
in the 200 series have now escalated in price to about $11.5 million
 
each. The shorter range 737 and DC-9 deliveries began in 1968 with
 
a price tag of $3.4 million and by 1976 had about doubled in price.
 
The larger DC-bO, L-l0ll and 747 have, in a shorter time, exper­
ienced similar increases to the point where commitments made in 1976
 
will result in capital outlays of $25-35 million for each of the
 
smaller wide-bodies to $45 to $55 million for the jumbo 747 combina­
tion passenger/cargo version. In a period of no or small growth, or
 
in a period of some excess capacity and particularly in a period of
 
unsatisfactory capital formation, this substantial increase in the
 
"lumpiness" of capital has a dampening effect on retirement of cur­
rent jets. In a period of excess capacity additional units can be
 
supplied by aircraft carried on the books at low or zero value in­
stead of expending $12 million to $40 million per unit. Unless the
 
carriers see a replacement aircraft with significant economies
 
(including ownership costs) or which can be used as a product differ­
entiation marketing factor, the incentive for retirement is limited.
 
Government mandated noise regulations, as will be seen in another
 
section, can significantly affect management',s equipment plans.
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CURRENT POLICY CONCERNS
 
Generally speaking, retirement of one aircraft for another de­
pends upon finding a "bettermousetap." Translated into economic 
terms this means finding a replacement which is the correct size for
 
the mission, which has lower operating costs including ownership
 
costs, and which has attractive features to sell to the passengers,
 
i.e. revenue generatingpossibilities.. Of course, additionally the
 
availability of capital at'a satisfactory price must be present.
 
However, at the present time three other factors have surfaced which
 
have been alleged to affect the investment decision even if the
 
other factors were satisfactory. They'are (1)the spectre of "de-.
 
regulation" or "regulatory reform," (2) government policies on air­
craft noise control, and (3) the existence or non-existence of, as
 
well as the tilt of, special legislative financial assistance or
 
incentives for retirement provided by Congress.
 
C.l DEREGULATION OR REGULATORY REFORM
 
For several yearsa segment of the academic community has argued
 
'that because of the economic characteristics of airlines the type of
 
Iregulation provided by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 as amended
 
by the Federal Aviaition Act of 1958 has resulted in the protection
 
of inefficient carriers, competition in service, and higher than neces­
sary fares to the detriment of the public. The story has been de­
tailed extensively in the literature in recent years.4
 
N Richard E. Caves, Air Transport and Its Regulators-: An Industry
 
_Study, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1962. Lawrence J. White,
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On October 8, 1975, President Ford announced a legislative
 
reform program encompassed by a bill known as tKe Federal Aviation
 
Act of 1975. This bill if enacted would haVe been a major policy
 
change in regulating the airlines. The Act, among other things,
 
would make pricing more flexible, provide for a much freer system
 
of entry and exit, relax rules on mergers and consolidations, and
 
remove constraints from Supplemental carriers. The announcement of
 
this proposed legislation triggered an avalanche of hearings, / 
"Quality, Competition and Regulation: Evidence from the Airline
 
Industry," in Regulating the Product: Quality and Variety, Richard E.
 
Caves and Marc J. Roberts, eds., Ballinger, Cambridge, 1975. George
 
W. Douglas and James C. Miller III, Economic Regulation of Domestic
 
Air Transport: Theory and Policy, The Brookings Institution,
 
Washington, D.C., 1974. George C. Eads, The Local Service Airline
 
Experiment, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1972.
 
Richard E. Caves and Elisha Pazner, "Value of Options, Value of Time
 
and Local Airline Subsidy" in Regulating the Product: Quality and
 
Variety, Richard E. Caves and Marc J. Roberts, eds., Ballinger,
 
Cambridge, 1975.
 
George C. Eads, "Competition in the Domestic Trunk Airline Indus­
try: Too Much or Too Little?" in Promoting Competition in Regulated
 
Markets, Almarin Phillips, editor, The Brookings Institution,
 
Washington, D.C., 1975. Sidney L. Carroll, "The Market for Commercial
 
Airliners," in Regulating the Product: Quality and Variety, Richard E.
 
Caves and Marc J. Roberts, eds., Ballinger, Cambridge, 1975. William
 
A Jordan, Airline Regulation in America: Effects and Imperfections,
 
Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore 1970. George W. Douglas and James C.
 
Miller III, Economic Regulation of Domestic Air Transport: Theory and
 
Policy, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1974.
 
5/ U.S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee on Aviation, Regulatory Reform
 
in Air Transportation, Hearings before Subcommittee on Aviation of
 
Committee on Commerce. 94th Cong. 2nd Session, Apr., 1976, 1314 pp.
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proposals, seminars and workshops throughout the country.-/ Sub­
sequently other proposals and bills wAee drafted such. as the
 
Kennedy bill, the Bureau of Operating Rights of the CAB proposal,
 
the CAB proposal, the Anderson-Snyder bill, and bills carrying
 
Senator Cannon's and Rep. Levitags names. Despite numerous hearings
 
and pressure by both the Ford and Carter administrations, none have
 
as yet (February 1978) been adopted by the Congress. However, the
 
financial condition of the airlines which some attribute to faulty
 
regulatory legislation, plus complaints by the "have not" airlines,
 
plus a heavy thrust by the Department of Transportation lead to
 
the conclusion that there will very likely be substantial changes
 
liberalizing the provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938
 
as amended by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. Even if such legis­
lation does not pass, public pressure plus new members of the Civil
 
Board who have different philosophies than the old indicate that,
 
under the CAB, there will be a large measure of de facto regulatory
 
change. Under Chairman Kahn this is well under way.
 
The initial reaction of'the airlines and the financial community
 
to the bills, particularly the original DOT bill,was negative to the
 
point of predicting chaos and bankruptcy. Publicly the airlines and
 
the financial community maintained that the prospect of any such legis­
lation increased the risk of doing business so much that all thoughts
 
Regulatory Reform and the Federal Aviation Act of 1975, A Work­
shop held at the Transportation Center, Northwestern University,
 
Evanston, Ill., Feb. 29 and March 1, 1976. Sponsored by North­
western and the Program of University Research of the Department
 
of Transportation.
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of purchasing replacement equipment were put aside. Until the fear
 
of "deregulation" or "regulatory reform" had disappeared the airlines
 
could not consider replacing aircraft, and if they did, the financial
 
community would not loan the funds for new equipment. The strategy
 
of the airlines that could afford to consider new equipment was to­
husband their cash to be ready to outlast the weaker airlines whene
 
freer entry became effective. Some airlines woul'd survive, would
 
then be monopolists and recoup their fortunes.
 
Our interviews with airline managements, aircraft and engine
 
manufacturers, and the financial community began in June 1976. By
 
this time there had not been much change in the rhetoric, publicly,
 
but privately we discerned a growing feeling that some change,
 
though substantially different from the DOT bill, would not only
 
be forthcoming but actually could be beneficial. At the present
 
time, the industry,with some striking exceptions, seems ready for
 
less restrictive legislation. Our most recent surveys lead us to
 
conclude that the horror with which regulatory change was first
 
approached has dissipated. When we investigate the factors in­
volving the retirement of current aircraft, the fear of regulatory
 
change is not a significant factor impeding their retirdment.
 
C.2 NOISE CONTROL AS FACTOR IN RETIREMENT DETERMINATIONS
 
This subsection deals with the environmental concerns of air­
craft noise control and concludes that changes not only inthe 
federal government's FAR 36 noise regulations, but also in airport 
and municipal regulations dealing with sound emissions have both a 
positive and negative effect in the minds of airline managements
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making judgments on whether to retire 6ld jet aircraft. Whereas
 
promulgation of noise rules mak(nmanagement focus attention on re­
tirement, the uncertainty of government policy has tended to delay
 
decision making for retirement, particularly where financing was also
 
a problem. To put the situation in proper perspective a summary of
 
the history and present state of the noise regulation is in order.
 
(a)History of the problem and attempts to deal with it.
 
The first jets introduced were the Boeing 707 and Douglas DC-8 powered
 
by very noisy JT3 and JT4 turbojet engines. Shortly thereafter, a
 
somewhat quieter and much more fuel efficient engine, the JT3D low­
bypass turbo fan, was introduced. Some carriers immediately re­
equipped their fleets with this power plant and the JT3D shortly
 
became standard on all new production aircraft. However, these
 
craft were still objectionably noisy and the affected public pressed
 
for relief in various ways at various levels of government. Pressure
 
was also applied to private airport owners.
 
In 1966 President Johnson asked his Office of Science and
 
Technology to develop a noise abatement and sonic boom program. The
 
new DOT Act of 1966 established an Office of Noise Abatement but did
 
not provide regulatory authority for noise control. Legislative au­
thority to regulate noise was given to the FAA in 1968 by an amendment
 
to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, in Section 611. The authority
 
was not unlimited but was subject to (1)safety considerations,
 
(2)the economics of reasonableness, (3)the requirements of being
 
technically practical and C4) the requirement being appropriate for
 
the type of aircraft to which it would be applied.
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1969 saw the FAA promulgate FAR 36 as the basic noise control
 
regulation.7/ Its thrust was aimed not at the then current fleet of
 
jet aircraft but at future design aircraft. The new wide-bodied
 
747, DC-10 and L-l0ll jets come under and meet this rule. Early
 
747's did not. The rule*(App. E) limited sound emissions measured
 
at three points: (1)take off, (2)appr6ach, and (3)side line. !o
 
describe the type of sound being regulated a unit known as EPNdB
 
(Effective Perceived Noise in decibels) was employed. Whether this
 
or some other unit should be used in certain situations has been the
 
source of endless debate and much confusion. Various versions of
 
bills introduced in 1977 addressed this point in particular. Addi­
tionally, heavier transport jet planes were permitted higher EPNdB
 
than lighter ones. This, too, has been a source of controversy.
 
The preamble of FAR 36 in 1969 put the aviation industry on
 
notice that the FAA in the future planned to regulate the noise
 
levels of the then current 707, 727 and DC-8 jet fleet under its
 
congressional mandate to provide present as well as future noise
 
relief. Public pressure continued and Congress in its 1972 Noise
 
Control Act amended Section 611 in an attempt to ha.sten FAA action
 
by declaring it to be the policy of the United States "to promote an
 
environment for all Americans free from noise that jeopardizes their
 
health or welfare." Federal agencies were directed to carry out the
 
programs within their control in such a manner as to further that
 
declared policy of the United States "to the fullest extent
 
7-Shortly thereafter ICAO Annex 16, essentially a similar require­
ment, became an international standard.
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consistent with their authority under Federal laws administered by
 
them." The Environmental Protection Agency was authotized to propose
 
noise regulations to the FAA.
 
In 1973 the building ofj2 or 3-engined jet transport over 75,000
 
pounds in gross weight, regardless of when the design was certifi­
cated, was prohibited unless it met FAR 36 on and after December 31,
 
1973 (December 31,, 1974, for 4-engined aircraft). However, no rule
 
was established to require a "retrofit" of the existing fleet. From
 
that point on there has been a continuous battle inside and outside
 
the government between environmentalists and the air transport indus­
try over both the need and desirability of "retrofit" versus gradual
 
replacement and also how the costs should be borne.
 
The record shows a long history of attempts by different groups
 
to have the FAA cover already built jet aircraft, i.e., "retrofit."
 
An extensive but not complete list of those efforts at the federal
 
level isgiven following.
 
Attempts at Covering the Already Built Planes, i.e. "Retrofit"
 
1. 11/4/70 Advanced notice of proposed rule making (ANPRM 70-44) 
.2. 1/3/73 ANPRM 73/3 
:' 3/22/74 NPRM 74-14 mandating 100% compliance with FAR over 
4-year period 
-Oct. 1974 DOT 23 airport study 
-Dec. 1974 Draft environmental impact statement 
4. 1/75 NPRM 75-5 proposal by EPA 
5. 7/75 FAA, before the Subcommittee on Aeronautics and Space 
Technology, endorsed retrofit of the commercial fleet 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS 
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6. 8/12/75 FAA recommended to.Setretary of DOT that e send retro­
fit plan to OMB and the.Wkite [ouse.'
 
7. 12/3/75 FAA, before House Committee on Public Works Ayiation

Subcommittee, endorsed retrofitting.
 
8. 1/76 FAA produced two new studies for retrofit:
 
(1)Aircraft Noise Reduction Approaches to Mitigati"on
 
(2)International Implications to Retrofit
 
9. 2/76 FAA again, before the same committee, endorsed retro-"
 
fit.
 
10. 	 2/10/76 Secretary Coleman made commitment to decide retrofit
 
question in 60 days.
 
11. 	 4/6/76 Secretary Coleman announced he could not meet the dead­
line - he needed time to analyze an ATA proposal.
 
12. 	 6/1/76 Secretary Coleman completed his "Airport Noise Policy

Statement" and forwarded itto OMB. Itwas 'not made
 
public.
 
13. 	 7/76 The Attorney General of the State of Illinois served
 
notice he would sue the FAA for violating the Noise
 
Control Act of 1972 because FAA has failed to carry
 
out its non-discretionary duty. It was now 7 years
 
since FAA was given the authority (1968 Sec. 611) and
 
4 years since it was directed to act.
 
14. 	9/4/76 Secretary Coleman was scheduled to present his "retro­
fit" policy to the Subcommittee on Aviation of the
 
House Committee on Public Works. Secretary Coleman
 
postponed meeting because he needed "a few more days."
 
15. 	 9/9/76 Secretary Coleman again was scheduled to present his
 
noise policy to the House subcommittee. At the last
 
minute, the Secretary reported he was unable to get
 
clearance from OMB and the White House.
 
16. 9/21/76 	 Secretary Coleman was once again, a fourth time,
 
scheduled to present the administration's plan on
 
'retrofit-replacement"' Hearing cancelled.
 
17. 	 9/30/76 Secretary Coleman, a fifth time, asks "indulgence"
 
over noise delay (Aviation Daily).
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18. 	10/18/76 "President Ford indicates.Early Noise Policy Un­
likely" (Aviation Daily).
 
19. 	 10/21/76 "President Ford has insttucted'the FAA and DOT
 
to extend the 1969 and 1973 noise standards- 'to
 
all domestic U.S. commercial aircraft...to become
 
effective Jan. 1, 1977, and be phased in over the
 
next eight years'." More hearings on financing
 
were ordered to be held.CAviation Daily).
 
20.- 10/22/76 	 Announcement was made that the States of Illinois,
 
New York and Massachusetts jointly filed suit in
 
U.S. District Court, Washington, D.C., against

Secretary Coleman, the Administrator of the
 
Federal Aviation Administration John McLucas, and
 
the Administrator to the Environmental Protection
 
Agency, Russell E. Train, for failure to perform

their non-discretionary duties of promulgating
 
airport and aircraft noise regulations under
 
Section 7 (b)of the Noise Control Act of 1972.
 
21. 	 11/18/76 Secretary Coleman announced that the FAA would
 
shortly promulgate a noise control rule involving
 
a phased retrofit program in steps over a maximum
 
eight-year period. Hearings on methods of finan­
cing were confirmed for December 1.2_/
 
22. 	 12/1/76 A one-day hearing before Secretary Coleman was held
 
in Washington, D.C., on the issues of financing.

aircraft noise reduction requirements.
 
23. 	12/23/76 The FAA published in the Federal Register an
 
amendment to Part 91 of the Code of Federal Regula­
tions (14CFR91) which added subpart E requiring

airplanes of over 75,000 pounds to meet the current
 
Federal noise standards in accordance with a phased

time schedule of not more than eight years beginning

January 1, 1977, and ending January 1, 1985. Con­
trary to previous understandings, implementation was
 
not tied to any financing legislation.
 
To summarize: The FAA, under pressure for several
 
years by environmentalists to require commercial jet

aircraft manufactured before 1974 to be retired or
 
comply with FAR 36 as promulgated in 1969, and
 
under pressure from the airline industry to take no
 
retroactive action, finally, in the last days of the
 
8 	Aviation Noise Abatement Policy, Office of the Secretary, FAA,
 
Nov. 18, 1976. 61 pp.
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Ford Administration, notwithstanding a public
 
commitment to take no action unless it were tied to
 
financing~legislation, promul gated a rule requiring
 
retrofit, re-engining, or replacement to be effective
 
in eight days but with a phase-in by steps. In the
 
absence of a provision for financing, the airline
 
industry felt betrayed.
 
How this breaking of faith came about in such a
 
fashion that the responsible persons were not ac­
countable is a fascinating story on the vagaries of
 
politics at the time of an outgoing administratibn.
 
The noise regulation was being handled by the Admin­
istrator of the FAA, Dr. John L. McLucas, while the
 
companion financing proposal was'being developed by
 
the Secretary of Transportation, William T. Coleman,
 
Jr. As is explained in more detail later, both the
 
proposed noise rule and the financing proposal be­
came hot political issues. Both were sent to the
 
Office of Management and Budget in the Executive
 
Office. After several meetings, some attended by
 
President Ford, no agreement was reached. Finally,
 
the President asked Messrs. McLucas and Coleman to
 
the White House to determine the final policy.
 
McLucas supported the noise rule with the financing
 
and Coleman presented and supported a financing pro­
posal involving a reduction in the ticket tax by 2%
 
and a concommitant surcharge of 2% with such monies
 
to be used only for retrofit, re-engining, or
 
replacement.
 
President Ford did not make a decision in their
 
presence but asked them to go back to their offices
 
and he would advise them of his conclusion. Some­
time later Dr. McLucas received a letter from Ford
 
telling him to promulgate the noise rule. The "
 
President at the same time also wrote to Secretary
 
Coleman telling him that the financing proposal was
 
not approved. Thus each man received a different
 
letter and each could say he did not break his word
 
to the industry. In a few days all three partici­
pants were out of office and had no responsibility
 
for the future.1/
 
Explanation of FAA Administrator John L.McLucas at AIAA Forum
 
"The Future of Transportation" Washington, D.C., Jan. 13, 1977.
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Airline managements are in a difficult position in the noise 
controversy. On the one hand, the&Kcafinot be against lower'noise 
levels- for three reasons: Cl) it is-akin to being against motherhood, 
(2)quieter planes attract more Oassengers, and C3) the consequences
 
of failing to reduce noise may result in curfews, or even outright
 
bans locally on jet operations. In essence, the failure to deal with
 
noise satisfactorily from society's viewpoint may place serious con­
straints upon the industry. On the other hand, should the costs of
 
retrofit or replacment by jets with acceptable noise levels exceed
 
the ability of the industry to pay for them either alone or with such
 
assistance as society is willing to give through legislation, then the
 
industry is also constrained. Thus, for those carriers which have sig­
nificant numbers of non-complying jet aircraft (about 1,600 in num­
ber), whether to keep, retrofit, or retire and replace, absent a known
 
government policy, complicates and delays their equipment planning.
 
The current noise problem will not go away. The question is not
 
whether special interest groups may be able to prevent federal legis­
lation, but how can the differing interests of the population close
 
to-airports, the traveling public, the public at large, airlines and
 
the manufacturers be accommodated in the manner best suited to soci­
ety?
 
During the past several years countless hearings on noise rules
 
have been held not only in Washington, D.C. but all over the United
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States. O/ 
 Even a summary would be too long to include here. However,
 
to understand the delays and some of the'.omplexities of the problem
 
which make for uncertainty in theminds of the decision maker a few
 
points are in order.
 
(b)Impact of Legal Problems: Complaints about noise led to
 
lawsuits. The Supreme Court in Griggs vs. Allegheny County, 369 -US 84
 
(1962) established that airport operators are liable for noise damages
 
resulting from operations to or from their airports. Thus it was not
 
the makers of the noise that were liable. From this one would conclude
 
that each airport operator could make his own.rules. I' so, the air
 
carriers in particular could be subject to a thicket of conflicting­
regulations which would be unworkable and intolerable. The Ford admin­
istration's view was that the current Section 611 of the Federal Avia­
tion Act furnished a means of preventing such a conflict by providing
 
the FAA with authority to preempt noise regulation of air carriers.
 
However, until the FAA acted the airport proprietors were free to make
 
their own rules, subject to being nondiscriminatory and not being un­
duly burdening on interstate commerce. As long as the FAA did not
 
make a regulation covering existing non FAR 36 aircraft, the carriers
 
through their Air Transport Association would be kept busy putting out
 
-LO 	 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, 
Current and Proposed Federal Policy on the Abatement of Aircraft 
Noise, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the House 
Committee on Public Works and Transportation. 94th Cong. Ist and 
2nd sessions, 1975, 1976. 1439 pp. See also the same subcommittee 
.hearings titled Airport and Arcraft'Noise Reduction, Hearings be­
fore the Subcommittee on Aviation of the House Committee on Public
 
Works and Transportation on H.R..4539 and Related Bills. 95th
 
Cong., Ist session, 1977, 567 pp.
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fires around the country iikere aggressjive local groups pressured
 
airport authorities to propose Pegulations involving curfews and
 
outright banning or progressive banning'of operations by noncon­
forming aircraft.
 
The pressures locally are far more than mere strong expressions
 
of desires. As a result of legal proceedings Los Angeles has been
 
ordered to pay more than $1.7 million in damages because of noise.
 
In addition, $24 million has been paid in negotiated settlements.
 
What is more, the California courts have held that noise damages may
 
be not only for loss in property values but for mental and emotional
 
distress (Greater Westchester Homeowners Association, et. al., vs.
 
City of Los Angeles, et. al. Self-supporting airport authorities
 
must face the payments by increasing their landing fees and rentals
 
from airlines. This will, of course, further increase fares and
 
thus decrease the demand for air transportation. One attempt to
 
minimize the problem has been to employ land use planning inwhich
 
homes near the noise path are acquired and the land re-zoned for
 
other uses. Because land acquisition is very expensive (Los Angeles
 
has spent $160 million in 5 years) airport authorities push hard for
 
a "retrofit" or "replacement" solution.
 
As indicated by items 13 and 20 shown on pages 21 and 22, local
 
pressures intensified and were aggregated first to individual state
 
pressure and ultimately to the point where three powerful state gov­
ernments (Illinois, New York and Massachusetts) banded together to
 
exert further pressure in the form of a suit.
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Inasmuch as the federal government had,,the authority to impose
 
noise regulations for existing non FAR 36 aircraft which constitute 
75 to 80% of the fleet, and since it is somewhat unusual for bureau­
cracy to fail to exercise authority, particularly in the face of 
public pressures, one can ask why this delay which brought such. un-

These are three prilmary
certainty to managements' decision process? 

answers:
 
(1)The time-consuming nature of the rule-making
 
structure and attendant bureaucratic infighting.
 
(2)Time for solving legal and political considera­
tions.
 
(3)Industry opposition
 
a
Rule-making Structure and Bureaucratic Infighting: Delays as 

result-of hearings are nothing new inWashington. However, in this
 
case because of the manner in which Congress has structured the pro­
cess by placing so many agencies and offices "inthe loop," the art
 
of delay through hearings has reached a new high. The bureaucratic
 
maze is somewhat as follows.
 
The FAA may promulgate a rule and in 1970 issued Advanced
 
This was followed
Notice of Proposed Rule Making (ANPRM) 70-44. 

in 1974 by NPRM 74-14 which, of course, generated comments. In
 
1975 the EPA originated NPRM 75-5. An office of Environmental
 
Quality in the FAA works on these matters. However, the FAA is
 
not an independent agency and must "consult" with the Secre­
tary of Transportation. Some space in the congressional hear­
ings was devoted to "suggesting" that in fact "consultation"
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was a euphemism. It was pointed out that even the testimony of
 
the FAA Administrator had to be approved by the Office of the
 
Secretary of Transportation before he appeared before a congression­
al committee on the subject.
 
Lack of action by the FAA caused Congress to include in the
 
Noise Control Act of 1972 further legislation affecting jet air­
craft noise control. There was some debate favoring removing
 
noise control from the FAA and giving it to EPA. However, Congress
 
finally provided the EPA with the authority to propose rule changes
 
to which the FAA must respond affirmatively or give the reasons why
 
not. The purpose was to continue the FAA "in the loop" because of
 
its expertise, but to use the EPA to keep the FAA's nose to the
 
grindstone. Under this legislation the EPA had, by the end of 1975,
 
proposed 8 rules and were working on others.1I/ Subsequently, by
 
1977, the list had grown to 11. The EPA has its own staff not re­
lated to the FAA. The process in making an EPA proposal takes
 
time. Suppose, for example, that the FAA is just about to promul­
gate a hule when it receives an EPA proposal. The FAA may quite
 
properly hold up its rule to consider the new proposal. This pro­
cedure can trigger more hearings. The process can be endless.
 
Another actor in this bargaining over what type of noise abate­
ment rules are appropriate is the Council of Wage and Price Stabil­
ity (COWPS) in the Executive Office of the President. This agency
 
II/ Hearings, Current and Proposed Federal Policy on the Abatement
 
of Aircraft Noise. 
1975, p. 123. 
House Subcommittee and Aviation, Dec. 3, 
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came into being in August 1974 (Public Law 93-387). The act, as
 
well as Executive Order 1182 of November 27, 1974, directs the Coun­
cil to review the policies, programs and activities of the depart­
ments and agencies to determine the extent to which these programs
 
and activities are contributing to inflation. COWPS has been at
 
odds with the FAA and EPA on various points. After analysis of the
 
EPA's proposal to FAA, COWPS faulted the EPA for not providing an
 
Environmental Impact Statement as required, and sided with the air­
lines that the rule was (1)unnecessary from a health and welfare
 
standpoint, (2)that the rule only accelerated benefits which
 
would come about anyway, (3) that the rule failed on a cost bene­
fit analysis, and (4)that the rule was inflationary.
 
Thousands of pages of testimony, technical reports and posi­
tion papers have reached the public view as a result of activities
 
of the EPA and FAA. When the FAA proposal leaves the FAA and be­
gins its course through the Secretary of Transportation's office,
 
the 0MB, and perhaps the State Department and other agencies and
 
departments, a curtain of secrecy descends. This iswhere the be­
hind-the-scenes maneuvering in Washington can take place. Whether
 
these subsequent "evaluations" are made only on the basis of the
 
record, or are the whole new ball game in which the "tilt" goes to
 
the actors with political skill is not clear.
 
In the present case an FAA proposal went to the Secretary of
 
Transportation. His office also has legal, technical and economic
 
staff to work on the problem. Inputs were received from the indus­
try which did not favor the FAA plan. It was reported in the press
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that the Secretary adopted in general the approach of the Air 
Transport Association and sent it on to the White House where the 
OMB became involved. The size, if any, of the specialized noise 
staff on noise control in OMB is not available. Instead of a
 
prompt decision the matter was hidden for months. What reports
 
that did come from the "usually reliable sources" were that
 
Secretary Coleman's proposal for an administration position did not
 
"fly" with the "White House OMB staff." On various occasions, not­
withstanding reported meetings with President Ford, Mr. Coleman, as
 
noted above, was forced to delay his testimony.
 
Of course rules proposed by agencies such as the FAA or FHWA 
for transport operating equipment do not normally find their in­
vestigations replicated at other higher levels of government, so 
the question iswhy in this case? The answer lies in the fact that 
the industry has successfully argued that it would be unfair if not 
unconstitutional to adopt a rule which the industry in its current 
financial situation could not afford. Support to the logic is found 
in Section 611 of the amended FAA Act which includes the statement 
that the regulation must be economically reasonable. Accordingly, 
in :the absence of available private financing, some governmental 
legislated assistance would be needed. The FAA then adopted the po­
sition that it would not promulage a regulation until appropriate 
legislation was passed.12/ However, since legislation could have an 
adverse effect on the revenues of the government by diverting taxes 
.12/ Ibid., Testimony of Frederick A. Meister, Associate Administrator,
 
FAA, Dec. 3, 1975, p. 69; also, testimony of Dr. John McLucas,
 
Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, pp. 1154 and 1159.
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from the Airport and Airway trust fund to private carrier accounts,
 
the OMB and the White House became involved. Nevertheless, if the
 
matter drags too long, Congress may move on its own.
 
Legal and Political Considerations: First is the problem of
 
federal preemption. In order to have one set of rules to live by,
 
the aerospace and airline operators have pressed for federal pre­
emption of noise control. However, wholesale transfer to the fed­
eral government might also mean transfer to it of the burden of
 
combatting countless lawsuits and perhaps, subject it to enormous
 
liability. The government is reluctant to take this big a bite of
 
the apple.
 
What rights should be left to the local governments? In July,
 
1975, there was proposed in the Federal Register for comment a
 
National Airport Policy with four options: (1)All control would
 
reside with the local authorities, (2) the local proprietor would
 
establish a policy which had to be reviewed and approved by the
 
FAA, (3)a proposal that the local operator be constrained by the
 
FAA, with a coordinated federal plan, and (4) proposed proceeding 
on a .case-by-case basis.
 
Secondly, time is required to assess a correct balance of the 
rights of various segments of citizens. On the one hand, the en­
vironmentalists testified to the decreasing quality of life near the 
airport coupled with a decrease in property values, mental and emo­
tional distress, physical damage to property, and adverse effect on 
the educational system in schools located near airports. Other 
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interests downgraded this testimony and pointed out the catastro­
phic adverse effect on not only local business but on employment,
 
business in the region and, in fact, the entire country if the en­
vironmentalists were to be satisfied.
 
Finally, when it came to outright government provision for
 
aid in retrofit or replacement, a provision which the industry and
 
ostensibly the Secretary of Transportation favored, there were sev­
eral in the industry who secretly, and perhaps not so secretly, were
 
exerting .pressure where they thoughtit would do the most good to
 
keep the proposal bottled up. Delta, with strong finances and an
 
aggressive fleet modernization program of its own, strongly felt
 
that it had a lower cost exposure to a noise regulation, whatever
 
it might be, through past sound management practices and hence, it
 
was not right for it and the public to be taxed to cover faulty man­
agement of others. Northwest was in the same position. Both
 
carriers stand to be in an enviable competitive position should a
 
rule go in without financial aid to the weaker carriers. It is not
 
inconceivablet-hat less well-situated carriers such as Eastern and
 
TWA could be driven to the wall.
 
The'financial aspects are dealt with in detail in another sec­
tion. Suffice to say while insurance companies, commercial banks
 
and investment bankers applaud successful management, nevertheless,
 
they have immense investments in the entire airline and aerospace
 
industry. Obviously, the pressures from this group are for retire­
ment of non-FAR aircraft from their client airlines and replacement
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by their client manufacturers. They favor such legislation as is
 
necessary, short of nationalization, to make this possible.
 
Industry Opposition: The various advanced notices of proposed
 
rule making resulted in a March 1974 proposal which would require­
jets over 75,000 pounds in weight to meet the FAR 36 noise rule on
 
a phase basis, with 50% compliance by July 1, 1976, and 100% by
 
July 1, 1978. The final rule made public November 17, 1976, changed
 
the four-year timetable applicable to all aircraft to six years for
 
the wide bodies and 727/737/DC-9/BAC-lll and to eight years for the
 
old 	first generation jets such as the 707/720/DC-8 and 990.
 
Industry opposition as represented in the various responses to
 
the proposed rules and in Congressional hearings were, except for
 
the well-financed carriers, identical with the points made to the
 
investigators privately by individual carrier managements as indi­
cation of a deep conviction on their part. Briefly, the arguments
 
may be enumerated as follows:
 
1. The ATA, while encouraging more stringent
 
rules on new aircraft, argued that the tech­
nology currently available for noise control
 
via retrofit resulted in minimal noise relief.
 
The extent of relief possible was vigorously
 
disputed.
 
2. The cost of accomplishing retrofit with sound­
absorbent material (SAM), given its limited
 
effectiveness, produced an inadequate benefit/
 
cost ratio.
 
3. 	Retrofit by refanning the engines was not a
 
viable approach because it was five times
 
higher in cost.
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4. The cost of replacing the engines with those of
 
newer technology on the noisy aircraft was such
 
a high multiple of straight retrofit using

Sound Absorbent Materials (SAM) that such an
 
option was clearly eliminated.
 
5. 	Those companies with the greatest number of old
 
non-FAR 36 airplanes could not afford retrofit.
 
6. 	Replacement of the old less fuel-efficient and
 
noisy airplanes by newer technology, quieter,
 
more fuel-efficient planes, while very desirable,
 
was not a viable alternative because no such
 
planes of appropriate size and economics were
 
currently available from aircraft and engine
 
manufacturers.
 
7. 	The retrofit rule at great expense would only
 
move up in time that which would take place
 
in time anyway.
 
8. 	Current noise levels are not a health hazard
 
but only an annoyance.
 
9. 	Acting favorably on retrofit would be infla­
tionary. 
The advisability of carefully evaluating these arguments con­
,tributed to the delays.
 
(c)Noise Proposal of November 1976 -Impact: A few facts 
can 	set the current retrofit replacement controversy in perspective.
 
In the free world at the end of 1976, there were approximately 4200
 
jet 	aircraft in commercial airline service (Table 2), of which 2,050
 
were in the United States. The ATA calculated that in the U.S. its
 
member airlines operated about 1601 aircraft which did not meet the
 
FAR 	36 standard and only 389, or 20%, met FAR 36. The breakdown by
 
aircraft type follows:
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Number of Number of 
Non-FAR 36 Aircraft FAR 36 Aircraft 
707 268 0 
720 18 0 
DC-8 161 0 
DC-9 330 7 
727 620 136 
737 122 2 
747 51 44 
BAC-111 31 0 
DC-10 0 122 
L-10ll 0 76 
Total 1601 387 
Source: 	 ATA, Table furnished House Subcommittee on
 
Aviation 1976. House hearings on HR 4539,
 
p. 797.
 
Various estimates have been given for the cost of retrofit per 
aircraft 	with the following figures being representative including
 
installation. The total ATA Fleet Cost was calculated at $1 billion.
 
Cost of Retrofit Per Aircraft
 
1980 Dollars
 
707 $ 2,160,000
 
720 2,160,000
 
DC-8 21/31 516,432
 
DC-8 62/63 1,678,404
 
DC-8 50/61 2,323,000
 
DC-9 273,000
 
727 195,000
 
737 432,000
 
747 483,000
 
Source: 	 ATA Table dated 2/12/76 furnished House
 
Subcommittee on Aviation.. Hearings on
 
HR 4539 p. 797
 
The impact of the rule affects each carrier differently, de­
pending on the age and composition and degree of modernization of
 
ORIGINAL PAGEI 8 
OF POOR QUALrgy 
- 36 ­
its fleet. Te number of non-FAR aircraft for selected carriers 
are depicted below: 
AAL UAL TWA PAA 
707 88 100 51 
DC-8 101 
DC-9 19 
727 99 150 35 13 
737 59 
747 11 11 0 
198 310 165 64
 
Proponents of retrofit point out that at the end of 1975 82%
 
of the jet fleet did not meet FAR 36 and, unless something were
 
done, by 1990 there still would be 48% of the aircraft not complying.
 
These carriers in the table above are the very airlines which in
 
the past have initiated the re-equipment cycle with new more effi­
cient aircraft, and indeed, the launching of a new generation of
 
more efficient craft depends upon orders for a quantity of aircraft
 
which only these carriers are of a size to purchase. Their current
 
perception, aside from their current financing problems, is that
 
the required retrofit will indeed, in many cases, make it more ad­
visable to replace, rather than retrofit, at least their 707's and
 
DC-8's with a known quantity, such as the 727-200, even though
 
such craft may not be the optimum size for their operation, and
 
even though a new technology or derivative airplane is under de­
velopment. The carriers also expressed the fear that if legisla­
tion were passed to encourage them to meet the new rule by
 
retrofitting, the end result would be that they would have spent
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their available funds and then be in no position to take advantage of
 
the next newly developed aircraft when it becomes available. Such a
 
situation could have adverse effects on the aerospace industry and
 
hence on the economy as a whole.
 
The total cost of retrofit only was first presented as 535 mil­
lion in 1974 dollars. In February 1976, the ATA presented cost
 
estimates of $1 billion for retrofitting U.S. aircraft only. These
 
figures do not include $87 million expended by NASA in efforts to
 
assist R & T for developing SAM and refan engines. Secretary
 
Coleman's mid-November 1976 press release indicated an expected
 
cost of from $5 to $8 billion for a combination of retrofit and
 
replacement.
 
Extent of Relief from Retrofit: A major source of controversy
 
between the industry and those favoring retrofit involves a dispute
 
as to whether retrofitting non-FAR airplanes with SAM would afford
 
meaningful relief. The proponents (FAA, EPA, various community inter­
est groups) pointed to testimony by a number of psychoacousticians
 
whose thrust was that the EPNdB reduction afforded by SAM was measur­
able and significant.13/ Defining meaningful noise reduction as 6
 
EPNdB as measured by sensitive instruments, the psychoacousticians
 
found reductions in noise of such magnitudes as 11 on takeoff and
 
15 on. approach for the JT3D 707's, and 244 on takeoff and 8 on ap­
proach for the JT8D smaller airplanes. Some 727's had lower
 
13/ Ibid., Testimony of Paul N. Borsky, Columbia School of Public
 
Health; Dr. Karl Kryter, Stanford Research Institute,- and Kenneth
 
Eldred, Vice President of Bolt Beranek and Newman, Cambridge,
 
Mass., pp. 1057-1150.
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values. The 707 and DC-8 constitute only 15% of operations. On the
 
other hand, the opponents of retrofit (airlines and manufacturers),
 
while submitting reasonably similar estimates for the 707's, found
 
lesser figures for other aircraft. They also vigorously pressed two
 
other points to widen the difference of opinions: First, retrofit
 
was most effective on approach for the 707 type but of little use on
 
takeoff; and takeoff was the configuration making the most noise.
 
Secondly, in general, the JT8D (727/737/DC-9) retrofitted planes
 
benefitted only by 7.9 EPNdB on approach and 2.2 on takeoff. Third,
 
the opponents disputed the meaningfulness of a threshhold of 6 EPNdB.
 
Using data from actual "flyover" experiences in the field plus an
 
audio-visual presentation of tape recorded "flyovers," an attempt
 
was made to demonstrate to the Congressmen that the human ear did
 
not register the sounds in the same way as did the instruments.14/
 
The argument was that a person hearing a retrofitted 727 cannot tell
 
the difference between it and a non-retrofitted craft. With 85% of
 
aircraft operations employing this power plantjthe whole SAM pro­
gram w& Isaid to lack justification.
 
Charts'I,2, and 3 on the-following pages, taken from the FAA
 
Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) of November 10, 1976,
 
depict graphically the extent to which selected jet aircraft deviate
 
above or below the FAR 36 standard for the three measuring points.
 
Standing out above the FAR 36 line for takeoff and approach are the
 
early Boeing 707's and DC-8's as well as the very early Boeing 747's.
 
4-/	Ibid., January 22, 1976 testimony of A.L. McPike, McDonnell
 
Douglas Corp., pp. 311-412.
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Well below the line for takeoff and approach are the wide-bodied
 
DC-IO's, Lockheed L-l011's and newer Boeing 747's. For some reason
 
the 727-100 series is not shown. If itwere, itwould be only one
 
EPNdB higher than Part FAR 36 for approach and 6.5 EDNdB high on
 
takeoff.
 
Additional comparisons as shown by the FAA under FAR 36 certi­
fication conditions are found inTable 3 on page 43
 
Conclusion: During the past several years, thousands of pages
 
of testimony have been taken; designs for retrofit have been formu­
lated; NASA has spent $87,000,000 in re-engine and refan research;
 
the EPA has presented a number of proposals and the FAA up to the
 
end of 1976 indicated that no noise rule would be promulgated un­
less satisfactory financing was tied in. Experts can be found to
 
say that the SAM program ismeaningful and others that it is not.
 
While certain airlines due to their finances, equipment, and com­
petitive posture would not be upset with a retrofit required of all
 
at each airline's'expense, such is not the case with those large
 
carriers who!umight be expected to initiate a new equipment cycle.
 
The uncertainties of what the government will do have complicated
 
their equipment plans. If only the financing of retrofit were to be
 
done with government assistance, it is quite likely that purchase of
 
new equipment would be put off. Also, if financing legislation were
 
drawn so as to make re-engining of the noisy aircraft more advan­
tageous than replacement, purchase of new planes would be held back.
 
On the other hand, if the financing of noise abatement were to be
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TABLE 3
 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
 
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
 
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
 
NOISE LEVELS UNDER FAR 36 CERTIFICATION CONDITIONS (EPNdB)
 
Aircraft 	 Condition 

707-320B 	 Takeoff 

Approach 

Sideline 

DC-8-61 	 Takeoff 

Approach 

Sideline 

727-200 	 Takeoff 

Approach 

Sideline 

737-300 	 Takeoff 

Approach 

Sideline 

DC-9 	 Takeoff 

Approach 

Sideline 

747-100 	 Takeoff 

Approach 

Sideline 

FAR 36
 
Limit 

103.7 

106.3 

106.3 

103.5 

106.2 

106.2 . 
99.0 

104.4 

104.4 

95.8 

103.1 

103.1 

96. 

103.2 

103.2 

108.0 

108.0 

108.0 

Unmodified 

113.0 

116.8 

102.1 

114.0 

115.0 

103.0 

101.2 

108.2 

100.4 

92.0 

109.0 

103.0 

96. 

107.0 

102.0 , 
115.0 

113.6 

101.9 

Fully Modified
 
102.2
 
104.0
 
99.0
 
103.5
 
106.0
 
99.0
 
97.5
 
102.6
 
99.9
 
92.0
 
102.2
 
103.0
 
95.0
 
99.1
 
101.0
 
107.0
 
107.0
 
99.0
 
Source: DOT Environmental Impact Statement in Response to
 
NPRM 74-14 and 75-5,. Staten6nt of Nov. 11, 1976.
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tilted toward replacement, one would expect retirement of the cur­
rent narrow-bodies as fast as production of new equipment would 
allow. The situation would be more uncertain than it is if, in­
deed, a satisfactory replacement airplane were "on the shelf" wait­
ing tobe purchased.- However, as will be seen in the technology 
and economic sections, a plane (or planes) of the right size and 
right economics is (or are) not yet currently available: nor is the 
financing for such aircraft settled. In any event, until the car­
riers and manufacturers have a clear notion of the noise rule appli­
cation, its cost and who pays for the modification, intelligent 
decisions cannot be made. Thus, it can be said that the FAR 36 con­
troversy is a significant factor affecting the retirement of current 
jet aircraft. 
- 45 -
D.
 
FINANCING LEGISLATION: "ITS EFFECTS ON THE RETIREMENT
 
OF JET AIRCRAFT
 
The preceding section dealt primarily with the controversy ­
over retroactive application of the 1969 noise rule to previously 
built planes. The point was made that the uncertainty which the 
controversy engendered served only to delay retirement decisions. 
On December 23, 1976, the announcement of the implementation of a
 
retroactive rule for 2,3, and 4-engined transports weighing over
 
75,000 pounds removed the uncertainty of whether there would be a
 
rule and what itwould be. However, absence of the promised com­
panion financing bill coupled with the departure from office of
 
those promulgating the rule created further confusion for a few
 
months. This subsection traces the changing attitudes and policies
 
of the airlines and the ATA from consternation and defiance to ac­
ceptance, though less than unanimously, of the rule inconcert with
 
a determined push to obtain special legislative interim financing
 
arran-qements., We begin with the rule and its time span.
 
D.1 AMENDMENT 91-136 SUBPART E
 
Amendment 91-136 extended FAR 36 to cover earlier produced
 
aircraft in accordance with the following time scale.
 
Percent of Compliance Required

Number of Engines: . 2&3 engines 4 engines 
Airplane Type: .. .727/737/DC-9. 707/DC-8/880/990 
Engine Type: . . . . . .,JT8D JT3D
 
Jan, 1,1981 50% 25%
 
Jan. 1,1983 100% 50%
 
Jan. 1,1985 100%
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According to the Policy Statement, in establishing these
 
dates the Administration took into account the length of time
 
needed to develop, certificate, produce, and install retrofit kits
 
for those airplanes for which the operators would decide that ret­
rofit was the best course of action. Since the 747's, 727's,
 
737's and DC-9's were newer and closer to meeting FAR 36, these
 
would be the prime candidates for retrofit, other things being
 
equal. The longer time from the estimated time of production de­
cision to first kit delivery for the 707 and DC-8 was said to be
 
2-1/3 and 3 years respectively. A more potent reason was the be­
lief that certain models of the 707 and DC-8 were old, noisy,
 
and inefficient so that replacement would be the best course of
 
action. The passage of time from go-ahead to introduction could
 
easily be four years. Since no designs satisfactory to the air­
lines had been completed, and since financing currently would be a
 
difficult problem, time was needed.
 
Initial Reaction to Part 91 Amendment 136
 
Prior to President Ford's October 21 , 1976, acceptance of the 
proposal of the FAA Administrator and Secretary, which later be­
came 91-136, the industry was reasonably well resigned to some new 
noise rule coupled with a means of financing compliance. Addition­
ally, there was cautious 'optimism that the rule would not affect
 
the 2 and 3-engine jet aircraft. The promulgation on December 23
 
of the retrofit rule which included these very planes and, in addi­
tion, failed to be accompanied by financing assistance, left the
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industry aghast and with the feeling of betrayal. The ATA had
 
built its favorable reception of nevc noise rules for the 70T and 
DC-8 on the quid pro quo of financial help.
 
Interviews with industry decision makers inearly 1977 indI­
cated that the industry would not accept the rule and would fight­
inthe new administration to have it set aside and that the indus­
try would simply take advantage of time and not order any retrofit
 
kits, thus presenting the government with the dilemma of grounding
 
those planes beginning in 1981 or of cancelling the noise rule
 
and having the environmentalists rise up en masse. Ifthis sce­
nario had held, there would have been little or no retirement of
 
jet aircraft.
 
However, on reassessing the situation a different course of
 
action was decided upon. The Air Transport Association and the
 
individual Federal Affairs representatives of the airlines and
 
aircraft and engine manufacturers had developed rather effective
 
representation with various Senators and Representatives inwhich
 
they made the most of the point that new airplanes meant jobs at
 
a time when unemployment was a national problem. They also made
 
the point that new aircraft would be quieter and hence more soci­
ally acceptable and therefore would be a means to getting the en­
vironmentalists off the legislators' backs. Finally they pointed
 
out that new aircraft would be much more fuel efficient. Therefore,
 
the industry decided to press for new bills in Congress providing
 
for the type of financial assistance which had been proposed by the
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ATA in 1976 and had only been abandoned when President Ford sent
 
his separate letters to McLucas and Coleman.
 
D.2 	COMPONENTS OF A SALEABLE BILL TO ASSIST RETIREMENT OF
 
AIRCRAFT
 
One of the primary reasons why the noise financing proposals
 
did not "fly" when they reached the upper echelon in the Ford Ad­
ministration was the fear not only that they would be viewed as ,
 
special interest bills for airlines, aircraft and engine manufactur­
ers and banks, and therefore many other businesses would attempt
 
to seek similar special treatment to assist them in retiring their
 
equipment. Accordingly, a bill which could be labelled "the aero­
space and airline relief plan" would have little chance of success.
 
On the other hand, the many hearings both in Washington and around
 
the country had clearly shown that the noise problem developed
 
haphazardly because of the failure of the Federal Government, the
 
manufacturers, the airport proprietors, the State and local govern­
ment, and planning agencies, the air carriers, and residents at or
 
hear airports to take such steps as were necessary to alleviate it.
 
The November 1976 Aviation Noise Abatement Policy document 
marshalled the facts and pointed out that it would take all the 
parties acting in coordination to reduce the impact of noise. 
Control of aircraft noise at the source - a matter for the manufac­
turer and the airlines - was just one, albeit a very important, 
element of the problem. As long as airport proprietors failed to
 
acquire enough surrounding land, as long as cities zoned in such
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a way that homes could be built-immediately adjacent to the air­
port or under a takeoff or approach path, and as long as the 
Federal Government failed to consider adequately the noise implica­
tions of operational procedures or of air traffic control, the.­
noise problem would not be solved. Thus the policy statement 
formed a solid basis for developing a series of bills known in 
general as the Airport and Aircraft Noise Reduction Act. 
At the time of the decision by President Ford, on October 21
 
1976, to order a retroactive application of FAR 36 (just 3 days
 
after he had indicated an "early noise policy" was unlikely) his
 
advisors had convinced him for political reasons not to include fi­
nancing legislation. The White House position was that the passage
 
of the Airline Deregulation would be sufficient. However, immedi­
ately after the election while under strong pressure from the ATA
 
he authorized a one-day hearing on December 1 to determine whether
 
any additional financing arrangements were necessary. Secretary
 
Coleman himself presided over this hearing. Shortly thereafter
 
once again Secretary Coleman recommended legislation embodying fi­
nancing assistance. Subsequently, a few days before leaving office,
 
President Ford drafted a message to Congress proposing legislation
 
which would have provided for the establishment by the CAB ofan envi­
ronmental surcharge on passenger and freight tariffs to be offset
 
by an equal reduction in the air passenger and freight tariff tax.
 
Grants to airlines from existing balances inthe Airport and Airway
 
Trust Fund would assist in financing modification of aircraft
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specified by the Secretary of Transportation. Time prevented any
 
hearings so the bill was dropped with the basic concepts surfacing
 
in a series of bills beginning in March 1977.
 
To summarize, as a new administration took office at the be­
ginning of 1977 the airlines were faced with a "fait accompli" ­
a rule requiring that 75% of their fleet be retired or modified
 
over a time span but with no financing aid. The policy statement
 
of November and the hearings in December provided the underpinning
 
for the components of a majority of the bills which followed. After
 
much maneuvering and compromise in December 1977, the House Committee
 
on Public Works and Transportation completed work on HR 8729, Title
 
III which was directed toward financing of retrofit, re-engine, or
 
replacement. Unfortunately analysis of this bill alone will not
 
demonstrate the extent to which legislation can affect the posture
 
of airlines toward the retirement problem. The balance of this sec­
tion will give an indication of how public policy can counteract
 
the normal economic process of decision making so as to in fact in­
fluence technology. Not only the timing of financing aid and the
 
"tilt" of legislation toward retrofit, or re-engine, or replacement
 
but also special tax credits have an important effect on airline and
 
aircraft and engine manufacturers' decisions. This is even more im­
portant in the case of airlines with weak financial statements.
 
Therefore it is necessary to review the major bills with particular
 
emphasis on the incentives they provided.
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D.3 EMPHASIS ON RETROFIT - H.R. 4539 
The new administration, through Secretary of Transportation
 
Brock Adams on the TV program "Face the Nation" in February, em­
phasized the desirability of replacement over retrofit for the
 
primary reason that sometime between the year 2000 and 2010 the
 
U.S. would run out of petroleum. He did not define how the re­
placement would be financed. However, on March 7, 1977, Rep. Glenn
 
introduced the first of several comprehensive bills
Anderson (Cal.) 

concerning various aspects of noise abatement. Each of the major
 
bills bore the title "Airport and Aircraft Noise Reduction Act"
 
and contained three to four titles dealing with (1)airport plan­
additionalning and determining one official noise descriptor, (2) 
funding for ADAP under the Airport and Airway Development Act
 
which would take funds out of the Airport and Airway Trust Fund
 
for air carrier and general aviation airports, and (3) financing
 
the retrofit, replacement of engines or replacement of noisy com­
mercial jet transports weighing over 75,000 pounds.
 
While not in the original H.R. 4539 or in the final version of
 
H.R. 8729, several versions contained a Title IV which militated
 
against preemption by the Federal Government where State and Local
 
Since this study is focused on retire-
Governments were concerned. 

ment, itwill not be appropriate to deal in detail with the prdvi­
sions of the various bills. However, since the various proposed
 
Title III's involving financing were part of the overall treatment
 
it is advisable to treat the major aspects of the legislation.
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3.1 Title I. Comprehensive Land Use Planning
 
First, in order to eliminate the confusion and lack of compara­
bility of the various noise measurements, the-Secretary of Transpor­
tation was given the authority and duty to establish a single system
 
of noise measurement. Secondly, there was a mandatory requirement
 
for airport operators to submit (a) a noise contour map showing non­
compatible land uses, and (b)a noise compatibility program to con­
trol noise. The financing of the above could come from a $2.00 head
 
tax which an operator could levy and from grants made by the Secre­
tary of Transportation. To ensure prompt action, it was provided
 
that if the plan was not disapproved by the Secretary in 180 days,
 
it become effective.
 
The purpose of the Title was to force the airport operators
 
and local and state planners to make effective contributions to the
 
,4reduction of noise. Zoning and purchasing land around airports
 
could move residential owners and schools far enough away from the
 
noise to reduce demands on the manufacturers and airline operators
 
for further relief. The effect of a successful application of the
 
title would lessen the pressure to retire current jet aircraft and
 
to minimize demands for more stringent noise limits. By the time
 
the committee agreed upon a bill the mandatory feature and the head
 
tax fell by the wayside.
 
3.2 	Title II. Funding for Air Carrier and General Aviation
 
Airports-

An additional amount of $260 million for the fiscal year 1979
 
and $310 million for fiscal 1980 was provided for the Air Carrier
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and General Aviation Airports. These amounts were carried forward
 
in subsequent versions and in the final committee print on
 
H.R. 8729. Initially, Transportation Secretary Adams opposed these
 
additions because the last increase was less than a year previous.
 
There appeared to be no further objection until a memorandum from
 
the General Counsel of the Treasury on September 27, 1977, opposed
 
the addition "as long as the costs of operating the Federal airway
 
system and most of the maintenance costs thereof are funded from
 
the general fund of the Treasury."
 
3.3 Title III. Financial Aid for Bringing Large Jets into
 
Compliance with Noise Rule
 
As a base time from which to determine the specific aircraft
 
for which operators were entitled financial aid, the bill provided
 
for an inventory to be made of those aircraft which did not as of
 
January 1, 1977, comply with 14CFR 36 as amended by 91-136. The
 
logic was that on this date the government changed the rules of the
 
game initiating a requirement that airlines spend money which they
 
would not otherwise have had to do. It would also prevent a car­
rier from after that date purchasing a noisy aircraft just for the
 
purpose of getting government aid in its replacement.
 
Because the source of funding was to be a surcharge on tickets,
 
the inclusion of private business aircraft would have resulted in a
 
cross subsidy to the owners of such aircraft. The bill, therefore,
 
was limited to planes used for the carriage of persons or property
 
for hire. Military planes were not included. This section was
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carried forward in all subsequent bills.
 
Funding Source: Surcharges'on tariffs: A major problem in
 
legislating financial aid for a particular industry is how to avoid
 
the charge that the general population is being taxed to favor
 
special interest groups, in this case the airlines and air travel­
lers. The Air Transport Association thought it found the answer
 
when in the previous year it had suggested that since the balance
 
in the Airport and Airway Trust Fund had consistently been increas­
ing to the point where it had reached $3 billion, the taxes going
 
into it were excessive. It was reasoned that for a temporary per­
iod, 10 years in the case of H.R. 4539, a portion of the taxes
 
could be reduced and an equivalent surcharge be put upon the airline
 
customer with the resulting revenues placed into a fund for the sole
 
purpose of financing aircraft noise abatement. Thus, the user would
 
be paying for abating the noise. While this concept was adopted by
 
'Messrs. McLucas and Coleman in the spring and fall of 1976, it did
 
not, atthat time, "fly" with the Office of Management and Budget
 
and other high Ford advisors. As a matter of record, it did not
 
"fly" with Ford until after the election at which time he transmit­
ted a bill with such a provision. The primary argument against this
 
was that the plan would further unbalance the budget because the
 
percentage now going into the Trust Fund would end up going to the
 
airlines. Although the Trust Fund itself had a balance the overall
 
government budget would be further unbalanced.
 
H.R. 4539 provided that each operator with a noncomplying air­
craft would assess a 2% surcharge on the before-tax tariff;
 
- 55 ­
(passenger or property). This surcharge would be placed into a
 
special account for the purpose of retrofit, replacing engines, or
 
replacing aircraft. The offsetting 2% decrease in the 8% passenger
 
tax was not covered in the bill because it was in the province of the
 
Ways and Means Committee.
 
It was estimated during the hearings that the 2% tax would
 
yield approximately $4 billion over the 10-year period prescribed in
 
the bill (Table 4).
 
Formula for Payment from Fund: For our purpose of analyzing
 
the factors affecting the retirement of jet aircraft, the section
 
dealing with the entitlement formula for allocating funds from the
 
special surcharge accounts is of key importance. Some seemingly
 
minor word or percentage changes can significantly alter the retire­
ment plans of operators. This is particularly true of carriers in
 
a weak financial position. As this and subsequent versions of the
 
bill were presented and amended, it was fascinating to observe the
 
ebb and flow of changes as different interests obtained the ear of
 
the legislators and as the legislators bargained within their group
 
for a consensus.
 
The legislation provided that within 30 days after the publish­
ing of the inventory of noncompliant aircraft, the "owners" (later
 
changed to "operators") would advise the Secretary which of three
 
methods they would employ to bring their aircraft into compliance
 
by the deadline dates. Each of these methods entailed a different
 
financial cost to the carrier. The formula provided reimbursement
 
------------------------
----
TABLE 4
 
ATA BASIC DATA ON NOISE REDUCTION PROGRAM
 
,Total jet fleet 

Carrier Jan.'l, 1977 

AA -------- 235 

BN -------- 86
CO . . . .563 

EA----- 56
DL 179 

EA -------- 228 

NA
NW -------- 113 

PA 114 

TW -------- 233 

UA --------. 364 

WA 74 

FT-----------19

AL 80----
L.....21
F L 2 1 

NC -------- 27 

PZ -------- 28 

P....20 

RW ------- 37 

so 28'
TI --------- 22 

HA ------ 8 

TS 8 

WC -------- 7 

AS .... lO 

Total 2,050 

Nonpart 36 Cost to Surcharge
Nonpart 36 Nonpart 36 
 standard retrofit 2-3 collections/2,
r2-3 engine jets J
B-747'3 4-engine jets engine jets! / entitlements2
, Jan. I,1977 Jan, l, 1977 Jan. 1, 1977 (millions) (millions) 
99 8 
 85 $37.9 $567.8
 
53 
 1 11 20.4 163.7

.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12.3 160.2
 
32 -----------------------------
80 3 13 12.4 160.2
24.4 460.2
168................................ 
. 57.7 535.4
3--------53
8 ...........................
 14.6 89.4

.55 17 8 
 21.1 212.9

'13................. 
 64 5.0 151.5
 
90 
 10 100 32.8 428.4
 
209 
 12 100 84.6 651.3
 
29- ­........
- - - - - 23 12.8 168.7
 
7 16--------------- 26.4
20..........-...................... 2 3 .4 1 2 0 .6
 
19------------------------------------9.1 

 . - 9.1 51.2
 
51.2
 
27-
 7.8 41.2
20: --------...- .......... 
 . 9.1 40.2
 
:-----:::----------------------

- 9.9 52.1
28-----------------------------------8.2 
 34.121 ---------------------------------- 6.0 30.1 
2----------------------------------- 6.5 18.1 
8---------- ------------------ 3.7 13.1
4------------- --------------------- 1.8 14.310----------------------............3.8 
 19.11,131 
 51 420 412.4 4,089.3
 
./Based upon number of nonpart 36 2- and 3-engine jets as of Jan. 1, 1977; times the estimated cost of SAM retrofit of
each type in 1981 dollars.
 
Based upon ATA proposed domestic and international surcharges over a 10-year period beginning Jan. 1, 1977, as 
fol­lows: Domestic Fares 2%; Domestic Waybills 2%; International Departures $2. Traffic has been estimated to increase
at a 5% annual rate. Current fare levels have been assumed for the entire 10-year period.
 
Source: House Subcommittee on Aviation, Hearings on H.R. 4539 p.111.
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from the special surcharge funds as follows:
 
75%Vof the cost of retrofit
Retrofit: 

Replacement of engines: 150%'of tke cost of retrofit
 
250% of the cost of retrofit
Replacement of aircraft: 

As has been mentioned before, therehad been a great deal of
 
for retro­controversy over whether there should be any rule at all 

fitting the two and three-engined airplanes on the ground that any
 
modification would be barely, if at all, discerfiible. There was
 
almost complete agreement that the 4-engine 707's and DC-8's should
 
be replaced in view of their age and fuel inefficiency. Thus, pre­
sumably the formula was designed to encourage retirement of these
 
aircrafts and their replacement by newer technology airplanes with
 
high-bypass engines. At first glance the percentages suggest this
 
to be tne case. However, "plugging in" a few practical numbers
 
shows that the incentive was to retrofit rather than to retire.
 
The following "ball park" figures are illustrative.
 
TABLE 5
 
APPLICATION OF THE 75%, 150%, AND 250% FORMULA OF H.R. 4539
 
707 ---- DC-8 (1980 DOLLARS) 
Est.Cost 
Per 
... 
Entitlement 
Balance 
to be 
% of Cost 
From 
Aircraft Formula Raised Fund 
Retrofit $2,160,000 $1,620,000 $540,000 75% 
Replace engines 8,000,000 2,430,000 5,570,000 30% 
Replace aircraft)) 23,000,000 4,050,000 18,900,000 17.6% 
Replace aircraft) 33,000,000 4,050,000 28,960,000 12.3% 
ORIGINAL PAGE ia
 
OF POOR QUALITY
 
- 58 ­
tt is evident that 250% of retrofit.cost for replacement pro­
vides less than 20% of replacement cost for medium sized aircraft.
 
Should the replacement be with current wide-bodies DC-1O or L-l01l 
types or newer technology types inthe price range of $30-35 million,
 
the figure would fall to around 12%. The compilation on p. 36
 
shows United and TWA each had about 100 such planes and American 88.
 
Simple multiplication shows the enormous capital cost of replace­
ment.
 
It is clear that the formula merely ensured that carriers in
 
weak financial condition would be forced to retrofit and retain
 
their old fleet whereas carriers with independent means, such as
 
Delta and Northwest, to name two, would buy new more efficient
 
aircraft and obtain a competitive advantage. The ATA calculated
 
that the total cost of retrofit for its member airlines was ap­
proximately $1 billion as isshown in Table 6 . Assuming the
 
formula was so strongly tilted toward-SAM retrofit that this was
 
,-"the option used, the ten year collections would bring in $4 billion
 
but retrofit would cost $750 million ($1 billion X 75%), leaving
 
unspent $3.25 billion. The sum would be actually less because
 
those few carriers without financial constraints would replace and
 
use the funds, up to their entitlement, to reduce their cost of
 
their ongoing reequipment program. There was no capacity limit in
 
the bill; itwas to come later. The position, therefore, of the
 
carriers and the aircraft manufacturers was that the bill would
 
result in slowing down the retirement process, impede the
 
Aircraft 
D)C-9 (all models) 
1t B-737 
BAC-111 

B-727 100/200 
3-707-800-300 
B-720-B 
DC-8 21/31 
DC-8 50/61 
DC-8 62/63 
B-747 (all models), 
Totals 
TABLE 6
 
ESTIMATED RETROFIT COST ATA AIRLINE MEMBER FLEET
 
(Based on U.S. Aircraft Only Being Retrofitted)
 
Current ATA Fleet 

Non-Part 38/Part 36 

1975 

330/7 

122/2 

31/0 

620/136 

268/0 
18/0 

31/0' 

99/0 
31/0 

51/44 

1980 ATA Fleet 
Non-Part 36/Part 36 
300/60 

121/9 

27/0 

600/245 
206/0 

15/0 

23/0 

74/0 

28/0 

48/75 

* 
1601/189 1442/389 

Cost P&r Ship Set 
(1980 $)includes 
Spares (20%) & Labor(6%) 
$ 273, 297 
431,520 
350.000 

195,441 

2,160,000 

2,160,000 

516,432 

2,323,944 

1,678,404 
482,744 

ATA Airline Member Fleet Annual Operating Cost Penalties
 
Added Fuel Cost - FAA forecasts 4,000 barrels a day or 1,424,000 barrels per year 
60,808,000 gallons per year at 1980 cost of 
Added Maintenance Cost - B-707 only per year (1980) 
Added Annual Operating Cost (1980) 
interest would add 10%.1i "Down-time cost is not Included nor is cost of interest -

Fleet Capital
 
Cost (1980$)
 
$ 81,989,100
 
52, 213,920 
9,450,000
 
11q,264,600
 
444,960,000
 
1 32,400,000
 
11,877,936
 
171,971,856 

46,995,312 

23,171,712
 
1/ 
$992, 294, 436 
$24.140,776
 
3,037,410
 
27,178,186
 
Source: Hearings on H.R. 4539 House Sub-Committee on Aviation, Committee on Public Works and Trans­
portation, 2/17/76, p. 797.
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introduction of new more efficient and quieter aircraft, and fail to
 
respond to the unemployment problem.
 
3.4 Other Criticisms of H.R. 4539
 
Unfairness to Pan American: The varying financial position and
 
the status of differing fleet mixes of the carriers made it impos-.
 
sible for the ATA to present a unified position to Congress. Pan
 
American pointed out that itwould suffer a competitive disadvantage
 
with its foreign competitors because itwould be obligated to raise
 
its fares 2% but its foreign competitors would not. It recommended
 
an addional $2.00 departure tax for all international carriers.
 
The Cross Subsidy Issue: The bill provided that any excess
 
money not used by a carrier would revert to the Airport and Airway
 
Trust Fund. However, in the event a carrier needed more money than
 
the surcharge would provide, the Secretary of Transportation could
 
dip into the Trust Fund to supply the necessary amount.
 
This became-known-as the cross subsidy clause. Delta and
 
Northwest were particularly hostile to this clause on the ground that
 
they, through efficient management, had gone ahead and spent large
 
sums inmodernizing their fleets, so that itwas unfair to require
 
their passengers to subsidize their competitors. The ATA testified
 
against the cross subsidy subsection. On the other hand, Pan
 
American strongly supported the provision as necessary to provide a
 
"competitive balance of equipment." Using figures found inTable 4,
 
page 56, an Executive Vice President of Pan American argued that
 
under the bill American would have $6.68 million, Braniff $14.8
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million, and Delta $35.5 million to replace or modify each plane
 
while PA would have $2.36 million]l/ The Secretary of Transporta­
tion as well as the ATA opposed the cross subsidy provision and it
 
was dropped from the next and all succeeding bills. Pan American's
 
real objection - the fact that the $2 departure tax failed to pro­
vide sufficient funds to replace their noisy planes - was later'
 
met by increasing the charge to $10.00 for fares of over $100.
 
3.,5 The-Administration Position on H.R. 4539
 
On May 5, 1977, the last day of hearings on H.R. 4539, Secre­
tary Adams in testifying on the bill proposed some very significant
 
changes which, if enacted, would have markedly affected management's
 
decisions on retrofit, re-engining Ior replacement. Two months
 
earlier, on March 3, 1977, the FAA issued Amendment 36-7 to FAR
 
Part 36 requiring significant noise reductions in newly designed
 
aircraft. The effective date was October 1, 1977. The question
 
raised in the hearings on H.R. 4539 was why should not-the financing
 
be structured to encourage the replacement of aircraft by the
 
quietest available planes instead of by those merely meeting the old
 
1969 standard. Accordingly, the Administration proposal was as fol­
lows:
 
35% of replacement cost providing the replacement airplane met
 
the March 3 published standards.
 
100% of the cost of re-engining, not to exceed 35% of replace­
ment cost for replacing the plane.
 
100% of the cost of retrofit for retrofit.
 
15/ Hearings on H.R. 4539, House Subcommittee on Aviation, April 21;
 
1977 p. 466. Testimony of W. W. Waltrip.
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If we use the same format-as for the H.R. 4539 calculation we haye
 
the following:
 
TABLE 7
 
APPLICATION OF ADMINISTRATION MAY 5 PROPOSAL
 
707 ---- DC-8 (1980 DOLLARS) -
Est.Cost 
per 
Aircraft 
Entitlement 
Formula 
Balance 
to be 
Raised 
% of Cost 
from 
Fund 
Retrofit $2,160,000 $2,160,000 0 100% 
Replace engines 8,000,000 8,000,000 0 100% 
Replace aircraft) 23,000,000 8,050,000 $14,980,000 35% 
Replace aircraft) 33,000,000 11,550,000 21,450,000 35% 
Assuming other factors of the bill remained the same, which
 
they did not, the proposal missed the target. Although the amount
 
available for retrofit was increased to 100%, the 100% available for
 
replacing engines was a much larger figure and hence was a greater
 
shift in emphasis toward replacing engines. A carrier with a large
 
number of 4-engine aircraft (100 in the case of TWA) and a weak bal­
ance sheet (TWA) out of economic necessity would be forced to choose
 
replacing engines. On~the other hand, another carrier with a strong
 
balance sheet and a desire to have the competitive advance of the
 
newest technology aircraft, could opt for a $8 to 11 million discount
 
on the purchase price of a replacement aircraft during the years of
 
surcharge. Another way of putting it is to equate it with a 4-year
 
rollback in inflation. While the hearings were replete with
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statements which drew no objection that replacement would result
 
in quieter, more technically efficient planes, particularly in the
 
area of fuel consumption, together with increased employment, and
 
enhancement of.U.S. technical superiority, and an aid to the bal­
ance of payments problem, the formula in most instances tilted
 
managements' choice to replacing engines or retrofit rather than to
 
replacing aircraft.
 
Voluntary vs. Mandatory Surcharge: One of Secretary Adams'
 
proposals came as a shock to the industry. He proposed that a
 
carrier could establish a surcharge or not, as it saw fit. Objec­
tions from the "have nots" in the industry immediately surfaced,
 
pointing out that since carriers competed with each other, a two­
tier pricing system could not survive. If one well-financed car­
rier chose not to levy a surcharge, all the others would be forced
 
to follow suit or lose business. Thus, the entire financing
 
package would fall apart. Interestingly enough, the press reported
 
that the entire surcharge financing concept as proposed by Adams was
 
opposed by President Carter's staff and the Office of Management and
 
Budget. President Carter while accepting the concept ordered
 
Adams to support only a voluntary surcharge.il/
 
3.6 Minority View of Bill
 
The most frequent and articulate opponent of the bill (and of
 
subsequent bills) on the subcommittee was Rep. Gene Snyder (Ky.) who,
 
16/ Aviation Daily, May 11, 1977, p. 57.
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from time to time, introduced amendments-which would have voided
 
the bill. His H.R. 5706 would have solved the problems of law suits
 
over noise and financing aircraft modifications with two quick
 
thrusts: (1)no person would have standing to bring a suit for com­
pensation for damages from aircraft noise if he leased or purchased
 
the property after the airport was established, and (2)no aircraft
 
manufactured before January 1, 1974, would have to comply with the
 
FAA noise rule 91-136, in effect repealing it. Efforts to delete or
 
minimize the application of 2 and 3-engine aircraft from the FAA
 
rule ultimately were unsuccessful. The bill approved October 20,
 
1977, did include a modified restriction on the right to sue for
 
noise compensation.
 
D.4 RETROFIT DEEMPHASIZED - H.R. 8124 
On the basis of testimony on H.R. 4539, Rep. Anderson on June 
30, 1977, introduced a new bill, H.R. 8124, which changed the thrust
 
%of financing in significant ways. Briefly, they were as follows:
 
4.1 Relaxing Compliance Date for 2 and 3-Engine Airplanes
 
As a result of the considerable testimony that retrofitting the
 
JT8-D 727's, 737's and DC-9's would result in little discernible
 
change to the human ear, the compliance date for these aircraft was
 
extended 7 years to 1990. Since there were 1,131 such aircraft on
 
January 1, 1977, this was over 50% of the entire fleet and over 70%
 
of the non FAR fleet.
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4.2 Less emphasis on Retrofit in the Payment Formula'
 
(a)Retrofit: On the ground that retrofitting 4-engined, old,
 
noisy fuel inefficient planes was a waste of resources, the per­
centage allowance was fixed at 50% as compared with the 75% in
 
H.R. 4539 and the 100% in the Adams proposal. The percentage for
 
the 2 and 3-engined planes constructed before 1/1/74 was 90% un­
less advantage was taken of the 7-year extension. In that case the
 
figure was 50%.
 
(b)Re-engine: Here the concept of relating entitlements for
 
re-engining to a percent of the cost of retrofit, as was the case in 
the previous bill, was replaced by one of the percentage of cost of
 
re-engine with a ceiling limited to the relationship to the cost of
 
replacement. Itwill be recalled that in March the FAA had issued
 
stricter noise rules (Amendment 36-7) for new planes and the com­
mittee was anxious for modifications to use the best technology.
 
Therefore, the provision was for 75% of re-engine costs, provided
 
the aircraft then met Amendment 7, but not to exceed 35% of the cost
 
of replacing the airplane. Here again, a penalty was attachedfor
 
taking advantage of the 7-year extension. If a carrier waited until
 
after January 1, 1985, it would receive only 25% of re-engine costs. 
(c)Replacement: A similar tilt toward using the best technol­
ogy quickly was used for the replacement percentages. Here also the
 
concept of relating replacement to a percentage of retrofit was
 
abandoned in favor of a relation to the cost of replacement. In gen­
eral, the amount was 35% of the replacement cost of an aircraft
 
meeting Amendment 7 and 20% for meeting FAR as of January 1,1977.
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For 2-engine airplanes and 727-200's constructed before 1/1/74
 
and being replaced between 1985 and 1990, the figure was 10% of re­
placement-cost to meet Amendment 7 and 0 to meet FAR 36 January 1,
 
1977, replacement. One sample calculation gives the following
 
results:
 
TABLE 8
 
APPLICATION OF H.R. 8124 FORMULA
 
707 ---- DC-8 (1980 DOLLARS) 
Est.Cost Balance % of Cost 
per 
Aircraft 
Entitlement 
Formula 
To Be 
Raised 
from 
Fund 
Retrofit $2,160,000 $1,080,000 $1,080,000 50% 
Replace engines 8,000,000 6,000,000 2,000,000 75% 
Replace aircraft 23,000,000 8,050,000 14,950,000 35% 
Replace aircraft 33,000,000 11,550,000 21,450,000 35% 
The formula portion of the bill was one which the airlines
 
could accept. Although retrofit allowances were reduced, no one, at
 
least of the 4-engined operators, wanted to retrofit anyway. At this
 
time, few airlines looked upon replacing engines as a reasonable al­
ternative, unless they could not get financing for replacing the
 
entire airplane. The replacement percentage of 35% was even 5%
 
higher than the Vice President of American Airlines, Donald Lloyd-

Jones, had suggested as an adequate figure.!?/ In essence, the
 
cost to the company from its regular sources of income would be
 
17/ Hearings on H.R. 4539, p. 507.
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rolled back to about the 1975 costs. Roweyer, other'sections of
 
the new bill presented problems.
 
4.3 Surcharge Collections
 
The collections were to be 2% of domestic passenger fares,,
 
domestic and international freight waybills, plus a*$3.00 interna­
tional departure tax. The most important surcharge change was that
 
instead of accruing for ten years, itwould accrue mandatorily for
 
the first five years and voluntarily for the next five. This was a
 
compromise between the Carter proposal of 10-year voluntary and the
 
ATA 10-year mandatory. As is detailed later, it also was a mechan­
ism to keep Delta and Northwest in support of the bill. Since
 
there was general agreement that the voluntary system would not
 
work, airline managements drew the conclusion that the amount avail­
able for assistance was just cut in half.
 
4.4 Subsequent Sale or Lease of Re-engined or Replacement
 
.Airplanes
 
In deciding whether to retire or re-engine a plane, airline
 
managements were faced with restrictions on selling replacement
 
planes for 15 years, unless they paid back the surcharge in its en­
tirety. A 5-year limitation on selling re-engined planes was estab­
lished, again unless the surcharges were paid back.
 
4.5 The Buy American and Equal Capacity Replacement Clauses
 
A replacement airplane could not be bought with surcharge money
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unless over 50% of the airplane price was attributable to the U.S.A.
 
The reason for this was not clear inasmuch as Col. Borman of Eastern
 
who had the A300 under close investigation testified that the over
 
50% of the price of the A300 was attributable to the U.S.A.
 
Finally, since replacement airplanes were likely to have a
 
larger capacity than the planes they replaced, some expressed the
 
fear that a wealthy carrier could vastly increase its capacity by
 
buying larger planes. Accordingly, this bill and all subsequent
 
bills limited replacement to 107% of the non-compliant airplane
 
seats and to 107% of non-compliant airplane cargo capacity.
 
4.6 Summary
 
As of July, 1977, with H.R. 8124 the airlines and aircraft
 
and engine manufacturers were encouraged that the 2 and 3-engine
 
aircraft might escape retrofit and that considerable incentive had
 
been given to retire the old 707 and DC-8 aircraft. On the other
 
hand, they were concerned that governmentally imposed restrictions
 
on the sale and lease of aircraft might force them to cancel plans 
to replace. The environmentalists were upset that the majority of
 
the non FAR airplanes which also made the most flights into noise
 
impacted regions, were being let off the hook. The minority,
 
through Rep. Snyder, considered the bill a "rip=eff" for the bene­
fit of airlines, bankers, and aircraft manufacturers.
 
D.5 A Reduction in-Financinzi Benefits - H.R. 8729 Aug. 3, 1977
 
The optimism which the airlines felt over financing assistance
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because-of the provisions of H-.R. 8124 soon evaporated wheh a new
 
bill, H.R. 8729, was introduced by Rep. Anderson on August 3, 1977.
 
As a result of pressures from environmentalists and the ranking
 
minority member, the changes contained in H.R. 8729 adversely af­
fected financing benefits in three significant ways.
 
5.1 Deletion of the 7-Year Extension for 2 and 3-Engine Jets:
 
Although the extension in H.R. 8124 was for 7 years, the net
 
effect for all practical purposes was presumed to kill the retro­
fitting of the 2 and 3-engined aircraft. Since Table 4, p.56, indi­
cates a cost of over $400 million for the SAM retrofit, this amount
 
if deleted could have been applied to help pay for new aircraft and
 
accelerate the retirement of old. However, the new bill reinstated
 
the requirements of the December 23, 1976, FAA rule, thus requiring
 
the expenditure of over $400 million for retrofit. Thus, a re­
assessment of retirement plans, assumed untilH.R. 8124 became a
 
necessity. This change heightened the element of uncertainty in
 
planning.
 
5.2 Changing of the Base Date for Determining Eligibility for
 
Surcharge Entitlements
 
Prior to H.R. 8729's introduction, the non-compliant airplanes 
eligible for financing assistance were those in service January 1, 
1977. Under the new bill, the date was moved to July 1, 1977, six 
months later. During the intervening 6 months, various airlines had 
made fleet changes toward compliance with the FAR 91-136, effective 
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January 1. For example, American added5 new complying aircraft 
and disposed of a non-complying 707. Delta had 16 changes in its 
fleet, acquiring nine727-200's and disposing of 7 non-complying 
planes. The new date would remove them from application of the
 
formula. Faced with this kind of a possibility, retirement of
 
noisy aircraft would suffer. The incentive would be to maintain
 
the status quo until Congress decided upon a final bill. The
 
very carriers doing the most to bring their fleets into line with
 
the rule were being penalized.
 
5.3 Reducing the Entitlement Computation Base by the Accrued
 
Depreciation.
 
As noted, the previous formula embodied a figure of 35% of re­
placement cost ifthe replacement airplane met the March 3 rule, and
 
20% if itmet the January 1 requirement. Minority members of the
 
House Committee argued that the carriers already had financial bene­
fits from depreciation charges and these should be subtracted from
 
the computation base. Accordingly, the new bill provided that the
 
replacement cost against which the percentage would be applied
 
"shall be the actual cost reduced by the aggregate amount
 
allowable under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 for de­
preciation or amortization with respect to the aircraft
 
being replaced, for periods before the date of acquisition
 
of the replacement aircraft."
 
The results of applying this to two assumed replacement prices in the
 
case of early 707 DC-8 aircraft whose constructive purchase price
 
was about $7,100,000 with a current residual of $100,000 is shown on
 
the following table.
 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
 
OF POOR QUJAnM?
 
- 71 -
TABLE 9
 
APPLICATION OF 'DEPRECIATION DEDUCTION AUGUST 3. 1977
 
VERSION OF H.R. 8729"
 
707 and DC-8 AIRCRAFT
 
Estimated Amount To Reduction 
Replacemcnt Accrued Base for From Fund Be Raised from 
Cost Depreciation Formula at 35% Privately H.R.'8124 
$23,000,000 $7,000,000 $16,000,000 $5,600,000 $17,400,000 $2,450,000 
33,000,000 7,000,000 26,000,000 9,100,000 23,900,000 2,450,000 
These figures show a reduction in financing assistance by
 
$2.5 millions per plane. Although there was a rationale behind the
 
theory of the deduction, as a practical fact, its application not
 
only reduced the funds available to below the desired goal but also
 
penalized the carriers with aggressive fleet replacement plans in
 
operation. Delta estimated the adverse effect to be $100 million.
 
Some carriers, such as Delta and Northwest, had depreciated
 
planes for tax purposes as quickly as possible for cash flow pur­
poses. For the early planes, the rate was 7 years on the double
 
declining balance (DOB) method and, under current rules, on a
 
9-1/2 year DDB. At the other end of the scale were those using
 
the CAB standard of'14 years for turbofans or 16 years for wide­
bodies to enhance reported earnings under the new bill. Utilizing
 
the double declining balance on a 7-year basis would entail 4
 
times the penalty for such a carrier, and at the end of 7 years
 
the penalty would still be double that for those carriers using
 
maximum life. In private conversations, the carriers referred to
 
w0N '
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this as '"the big wipe-out."
 
5.4 Other Provisions ,
 
Slightly offsetting the effect of reintroducing compliance
 
by 2 and 3-engine aircraft was a "safety valve" ptovision which
 
permitted the Secretary of Transportation to waive the applica­
tion of the regulations to such aircraft for such time as seemed
 
reasonable. No standards were set up for the Secretary's guidance.
 
The most likely potential use of the waiver involved certain 4­
engined craft on which manufacturers-might drag their feet on
 
building retrofit kits. Conceivably in a certain economic sit­
uation with an amenable Secretary of Transportation, the whole
 
retrofit program coulvd be voided.
 
On the complaint of Pan American that the surcharges were
 
inadequate for international operations, two increases were pro­
vided. One, the 2% property surcharge was changed to 5%, and,
 
two, the $3.00 U.S. Departure Tax was changed to $10.00 on fares
 
of $100 or more and $2.00 on fares of less than $100. 
A benefit to the carriers was included by eliminating the
 
funds received from inclusion in gross income under the Internal
 
Revenue code. This was to draw continuous criticism from the
 
Treasury and Representatiye Snyder.
 
Finally, the bill contained a Title IV which. could be read
 
to be in opposition to Federal preemption. This was a direct blow
 
to the ATA contention that for uniformity Federal preemption was
 
a must.
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Given the strength and politics of those who considered the
 
whole financing arrangement as special interest legislation, all
 
that would be needed to defeat the bill would be for several air­
lines to turn against it using as a reason favoritism to selected
 
inefficient carriers. Thus the price of support from carriers,­
such as Delta and Northwest was satisfying their complaint that 
they were being discriminated against. One of their complaints is
 
illustrated by Table 10.
 
The table shows that Delta would have to return $48 million
 
of its charges to the trust fund, Eastern $188 million, Northwest
 
$67 million, National $20 million, and Continental $40 million.
 
All the other trunks were eligible to use far more than their
 
collections.
 
Secretary Adams was sympathetic to some of the carrier com­
plaints and urged an increase in the percentages for replacement
 
as partial compensation for the depreciation deduction. He also
 
recommended a 100% coverage for retrofit. The depreciation de­
duction he found "counterproductive" and the 15-year restriction
 
on selling replacement aircraft and the 5-year restriction for re­
engined aircraft "unnecessarily restrictive." Additionally, he
 
favored eliminating the "buy American" provision for fear of inter­
national retaliation. On the other hand, he again reiterated the
 
Carter position that the wholesurcharge plan should be voluntary.
 
Finally, he indicated that the $10 international rate for Pan
 
American was "excessive and inflationary,"
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D.6 RESTORING LOST BENEFITS BY SUBCOMMITTEE AND FULL 
COMMITTEE A 
To recapitulate, after several years of hearings'emphasizing 
the desirability of replacement over retrofit, the first draft of 
the Airport and Aircraft Noise Reduction Act, H.R. 4539, contained 
incentives for retrofit rather than replacement. Secretary Adams
 
proposed a marked shift to replacement as did the subsequent bill
 
H.R. 8124. Within a month, H.R. 8124 was superseded by H.R. 8729
 
which again reversed course in providing benefits and introduced a
 
provision said to be discriminatory against efficient self-sufficient
 
carriers. As a result, the adversely affected parties marshalled
 
their Washington forces to correct the inequities.
 
Earlier in this report, we alluded to the initial lack of en­
thusiasm for any financing bill by financially strong carriers who
 
had engaged in equipment modernization programs meeting FAA noise
 
requi'rements. Originally, they objected first to helping the
 
weaker lines, apparently preferring to see them eventually "go down
 
the tube." Secondly, they most strenously objected to any cross
 
subsidy features in which their passengers would be taxed to preserve
 
the existence of less efficient competitors. The ATA had a most
 
difficult time in developing a position upon which all carriers
 
could agree. It was only when the cross subsidy was dropped and
 
Delta and Northwest found that they too could enhance their ongoing
 
programs through using the surcharge funds that they became not
 
only willing but aggressive parties in favor of financing
 
legislation.
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TABLE 10 
COMPARISON OF SURCHARGE COLLECTIONS AND ENTITLEMENTS 
UNDERHtRS8729 AND PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS 
TO ALL ATA MEMBER CARRIERS 
(Millions of Dollars) 
SURCHARGE ENTITLEMENTS UNDER 
AIRLINES COLLECTIONS 1/ HR 8729 PROPOSED MOD. 
AA 315 524 630 
BN 94 117 144 
CO 59 17 21 
DL 247 199 227 
EA 335 147 206 
NA 50 30 40 
NW 
PA 
127 
312 
60 
517 
104' 
598 
TW 258 622 724 
UA 288 773 947 
WA 84 115 130 
AL 49 20 20 
FL 21 8 8 
NC 
OZ 
20 
17 
5 
6 
5 
6 
PI 16 8 8 
RW 22 8 8 
SO 15 7 7 
TI 
FT 
13 
55 
5 
90 
5 
90 
AS 7 18 27 
WC 6 2 2 
HA 
TS 
8 
5 
1 
3 
1 
3 
TOTALS 2423 3302 3961 
1/	Assuming 5 year domestic/lO year international surcharges, under
 
HR 8729. Proposed modification have no substantial effect on
 
collected amounts.
 
Source: ATA
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A markup session for the subcommittee to amend the bill was
 
held on September 20 but the proceedings were blocked by Rep. Gene
 
Snyder using a parimentary technicality. His real complaint was
 
that he had a commitment from the chairman of the full committee,
 
Harold Johnson, which had been broken that the bill would: (1)pre­
vent the use of federal- funds for replacing planes which would- be 
retired before January 1, 1985 (the noise compliance date); (2)pro­
vide that the funds would be proportionate to the useful remaining 
life-of the replaced plane; and (3)explicitly prohibit banks or 
financial institutions from receiving any benefits under the bill. 
However, the markup did take place three days later on September 23. 
6.1 	Subcommittee Amendments of September 23 - Enhancing 
Replacement and Re-engining 
The amendments can be summarized as follows. 
'6'I.I The Formula. After the committee amendments, 18/ 
the financing formula was as follows: 
Retrofit 90% for 2 and 3-engined planes 
50% for 4-engined planes: 
Re-engine 75% of cost of re-engining not to exceed 
40% of the cost of replacement 
Replacement 35% of replacement cost for March 3 
standards 
25% of replacement cost for January 1 
standards 
Prior to applying the above percentages,
the replacement cost would be reduced by 
the excess, if any, of depreciation over 
the amount treated as ordinary income in 
the disposition of the replaced aircraft. 
18J H.R. 8729 showing amendment adopted by the Subcommittee on
 
Aviation [Committee Print] September 27, 1977
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The retrofit formula represented n6,cange from the June and
 
August bills. The re-engining figure of 40%'involved a 5% increase
 
from previous bills and actually provided a greater dollar benefit 
than the 35% for replacement. The difference was more than 5%of 
the cost of replacement average because inthe case of replacement 
the depreciation deduction was taken from the replacement cost be­
fore applying the percentage. Since he-engining was 1/3 to 1/2 the
 
cost of replacement, the balance to be raised would be much smaller.
 
6'1.2 Eligibility Date: Moved to January 24, 1977, from
 
July 1. Each airline has its own special problems
 
and when a few have the same problem they can combine to seek a
 
consensus. 
 The propect of success is enhanced ifwhat they seek
 
does not hurt another carrier and has a rational basis. Moving
 
the date to January 24 (the true effective date of the December 23
 
order) benefitted the industry, according to figures compiled by
 
ATA, by $41,200,000. As indicated in Table 11 
below, the amounts
 
varied widely among selected carriers.
 
TABLE 11
 
EFFECT OF DATE CHANGE ON SELECTED CARRIERS
 
American $8,000,000

North Central 8,000,000
 
Pan Am 4,300,000
 
Flying Tiger 5,000,000
 
Western 5,000,000
 
Braniff 3,000,000
 
Continental 100,000
 
TWA 100,000

National 
 0

United 
 0
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If one assumes a $23,000,000 new technology replacement air­
plane requires 4 years from date of order to significant deliver­
ies and that the manufacturer requires 30% down by date of
 
delivery with payments to begin at once and be amortized evenly,
 
the $8,000,000 made available by the date change could provide
 
one year's progress payments on 4 aircraft which would involve
 
the ultimate retirement of more than 4 aircraft. Thus, this date
 
change was not insignificant.
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6.1.3 The Depreciation Offset. Delta and Northwest
 
strongly argued that thedepreciation deduction was a blow against
 
efficient operators using conservative financial practices such as
 
DDB. The greater the depreciation the b.igger the deduction from
 
their cost basis before applying the formula percentage figure fpr
 
replacement money. Thus their incentive for retirement was decreased
 
while .the incentive for re-engining would be increased. Since the
 
sale of a used aircraft over book value is an indication that depre­
ciation is excessive and since the amount is treated as ordinary in­
come and so taxed, they argued that the deduction for depreciation
 
should be offset by the amount realized as ordinary income on a sale.
 
Both Delta and Noithwest have been very successful in disposing of
 
old aircraft with little or no value on the books for prices close to
 
or exceeding their original purchase price. In these cases applying
 
the offset completely eliminates the deduction so that the carriers
 
would be back to the benefits under the old H.R. 8124. (See Table 8.)
 
Not only was this type of offset important for retiring old
 
relatively cheap,(by current standards) planes but also for newer
 
more expensive types. For example, suppose a carrier having three
 
noncomplying 747's costing about $22 million each contracted to sell
 
them for a total of $43 million after three years of ownership.
 
Having used depreciation on the double declining balance method,
 
$36 million in depreciation would have to be deducted under the
 
first version of H.R. 8729. This would be $12 million per plane
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from a replacement figure using our standard $33 million assumed re­
placement cost. Thus the honey available'from the fund would be
 
$7.35 million for each plane [($33M-12M) X 35%]. Assuming the sale
 
price of $14.3 million each the deduction would now be $7;7 million
 
so that the fund could supply financing assistance of $8.9 million.
 
Thus the September amendment added $3.6 'million financing assistance
 
on this particular transaction.
 
6.1.4 Replacement Percentages. Since the 35% figure was -re­
tained for aircraft meeting the March 3 standards while the 20% for
 
the old standards of Jan. 1 was increased to 25%, once again it ap­
peared that a step backward was taken from increasing the incentive
 
for replacement. As has been just pointed out, with a re-engine lim­
it of 40% of replacement cost and only a 35% limit for replacing
 
the entire aircraft the total dollars required for replacment were
 
very much more than for re-engining. Considering capital con­
straints this split would cause carriers to take a very close look
 
at re-engining which would, of course, have an adverse effect upon
 
retirement of aircraft.
 
6.1.5 Other Changes Made by the September Amendments.
 
Several other changes of interest to us were made.
 
1. Improving the domestic market for 2 and 3-engine noncomply­
ing used aircraft. Some carriers cannot afford to purchase new air­
craft and often there are no new aircraft of the correct size avail­
able. If carriers were to purchase noncomplying aircraft after Jan.l
 
1977 they would be ineligible for surcharge funds for retroft. The ATA
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proposed that these carriers haVe'access.to the same financing mech­
anism as the original, operators. 'The ATAlsuggestion was adopted
 
including a recommendation, the reason for which is not clear, that
 
the replacement entitlement of the original operator should then be
 
reduced by the amount of the retrofit entitlement. This reduction
 
was criticised by the Secretary as an attempt to cure an inequity
 
which did not exist. He also argued that the new provision added
 
an undeserved penalty on the selling carrier.19/
 
2. Elimination of Title IV: Title IV had weakened the air­
lines' position with regard to federal preemption. Its elimination
 
was gratifying to the industry.
 
3. Reduction of period within which a carrier could not sell
 
its replacement airplane without losing a portion of surcharge funds
 
used to purchase the aircraft. The former figure of 15 years was
 
reduced to 5 thus restoring to management some degree of flexibility
 
indecision making and giving management an opportunity to change
 
equipment with changing condtions.
 
4. 'Buy America": This provision was deleted, thus reducing
 
problems with foreign manufacturers.
 
5. Guidelines for granting waivers of compliance. As pre­
viously noted, an early bill gave the Secretary very broad powers to
 
grant waivers of compliance with no guidelines. The new provision
 
19 	 October 19, 1977, letter from Secretary Adams to Chairman of
 
Committee on Public Works and Transportation, House of
 
Representatives, p.2-3.
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required a finding of "good cause" which_ was defined as; Cl1I a case 
where the supplier could not furnish in timely manner the necessary 
engine retrofit kits, replacement engines, or replacement aircraft; 
(2)any case where the operator could not obtain financing at reas­
onable rates; (3)any case where compliance would result in the
 
inability to operate the aircraft so that service to the public
 
would end; and (4)any other circumstances the Secretary deemed
 
appropriate.
 
6.2 DOT Position: Further Increase in Entitlements Desirable
 
The final opportunity for those for and against financing
 
assistance to affect the legislation to go before the House came at
 
the full committee markup Oct. 20. The administration in general
 
favored the airline view and made the following points and sugges­
tions in a letter to Chairman Johnson. 20
 
6.2.1 Formula:-Replacement Vs. Re-engining. The change in­
creasing the percentage for Jan. I standards to 25% while at the
 
same time keeping the replacement percentage at 35% and increasing
 
the re-engine figure to 40% exacerbated the basic problem with the
 
section which was its failure to provide sufficient incentive to
 
purchase new quieter designs. Financially it was to the distinct
 
advantage of the carriers to buy older designs. The Secretary recom­
mended that no funds b provided for replacing with Jan. 1 noise
 
rule aircraft.
 
2?0/ Letter, Brock Adams to Chairman Harold T. Johnson dated
 
Oct. 19, 1977
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6.2.2 Cost Reduction for Depreciation' The Secretary argued that 
while the offset amendment modified the extreme penalty of the depre­
ciation deduction, the result would still be to discourage replacement 
of older noisy aircraft. The depreciation reduction provision, he 
said, should be deleted. Of course, such a deletion would have to 
contend with strong opposition from Rep. Gene Snyder for whose bene­
fit the provision was inserted. 
6.2.3 International Concerns. Little attention had been paid to
 
foreign carriers who under the bill would be required to levy the
 
surcharge but could not use the revenues to purchase new aircraft or
 
modify old ones. The inequity could be corrected by turning the
 
money over to the foreign carrier. However, this would be a
 
$1/2 billion going to foreign carriers without benefit to American
 
carriers. The Secretary reiterated his September complaint that the
 
$10 surcharge was excessive.
 
6.2.4 Excessive Powers Given to the Secretary. The most serious
 
objection to the Sept. 23 versionwas the broadness of the standards
 
by which the Secretary would judge applications for exemptions.
 
"They are so broad that airlines unwilling to comply with the regula­
tions could by their own market decisions force a situation where the
 
Secretary would have little choice but to grant exemptions.".
 
Finally, he pointed out that the requirement that the Secretary
 
establish allowable costs of retrofiting, re-enginging and replacement
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placed a heavy duty upon him with which he was not equipped to cope. 
He could have gone further and pointed out that the Secretary would 
be under great political pressure from the airlines and manufacturers 
to pick figures favorable to, them with the consequent allegations of 
"deals." 
6.3 H.R. 8729 FINAL AMENDMENTS OCT. 20, 1977, FULLCOMMITTEE
 
6.3.1 The Increase of the Replacement Percentage to 40%. As a
 
result of various pressures the full committee approved an amendment
 
increasing the replacement percentage to 40% which did two things,
 
namely, (1)eliminate the inequity of the September amendment under
 
which a carrier could receive significantly more to re-engine at 40%
 
of replacement and no deduction for depreciation than for replace­
ment; and (2)increase the actual dollar entitlement for replacement.
 
Table 12 shows the collections and entitlements estimated by ATA for
 
member airlines for both the 35% figure and 40%.
 
While entitlements of in the neighborhood of $600 million for
 
American and Pan American, $700 million for TWA and $900 million for
 
UAL made satisfactory reading for the respective airline managements
 
and their lenders, the availability of such funds through the sur­
charges was another matter. The original bill contained surcharge
 
accruals for a 10 year period and was estimated to produce about
 
$4 billion - the amount estimated by the ATA to be required in the
 
final bill. However the compromise of 5 years mandatory and
 
another 5 voluntary cut ATA's estimate down to $2.4 billion. An
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TABLE 12
 
ESTIMATED IMPACT OF MODIFIED
 
NOISE BILL
 
Q4TLLIONS OF DOLLARS)
 
Airline Collections 1/ Entitlements 2/ Entitlements 4/
 
A 	 315 547 607
 
BN 94 	 126 134
 
CO 59 	 19 19
 
DL -	 247 275 298
 
EA 335 176 176
 
NA .50 35 35
 
NW 127 135 142
 
PA 312 
 522 593
 
T1 258 634 712
 
UA 288 821 899
 
WA 84 115 130
 
FT 55 90 90
 
AL 49 	 20 3/ 20 3/

FL 21 
 8 	 8
 
NC 20 	 5 
 5
 
OZ 17 6 6
 
PI 16 8 8
 
RW 22 
 8 8
 
SO 15 -7 7
 
TI 13 5 5
 
AS 7 
 3 	 3
 
WC 6 
 2 	 2
 
HA 8 1 	 1. 
TS 5 	 3 
 3
 
Totals 2423 
 3571 	 3911
 
Notes: 1/	Assumes 5 year domestic / 10 year international surcharge

collections.
 
2/ 	 Provides entitlements of 25% for Part 36 and 35% for Part 36-7 
aircraft; also provides for depreciation recapture. 
3/ 	 Assumes that carriers would exercise the retrofit option.
Should they elect to replace non-complying aircraft, their
 
entitlements would be greater.
 
4/ Provides entitlements of 25% for Part 36 and 40% for Part 36-7
 
aircraft, also provides for depreciation recapture.

I Source: ATA
 
I 
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effort to restore the 10 year failed in the markup session as did a
 
compromise effort of 7 years.
 
On an individual aircraft basis, using our same assumptions of
 
possible replacement costs at either $23 million or $33 million and
 
depreciation offset completely by depreciation recapture on sale,
 
the 40% number develops a $9.2 million entitlement as compared with
 
the previous $8.05 million for the $23 million replacement. And for
 
-the-$33-ffi11it6-n-l ig-aircraft the resulting figure is $13.2 million
 
or a $1.6 million increase. A recapitulation from the first bill to
 
the one committed to the whole House on Dec. 13, 1977, follows.
 
TABLE 13
 
SUMMARY FOR 707/DC'8AIRCRAFT REPLACEMENT
 
ENTITLEMENTS
 
Entitlements (inmillions of dollars)
 
Bill,-br Proposal $23 Million Aircraft $33 Million Aircraft
 
,H.R. 4359, Mar. 7, 1977 $4.050 $4.050
 
Administration, May 5 8.050 11.550
 
H.R. 8124, June 30 8.050 11.550
 
H.R. 8729, Aug. 3 5.6 9.100
 
H.R. 8729, Sept. 23* 8.050 11.550
 
H.R. 8729, Oct. 20 9.2 13.2
 
*Assuming old aircraft show maximum depreciation on the books.
 
Note: The figures for Aug. 3, Sept. 23, and Dec. 13 are maximums.
 
Should the depreciation and depreciation "recapture" be
 
different than assumed, the entitlements would have to be
 
adjusted accordingly.
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Although within the ATA there was a problem of presenting a 
united front (at one time or another Delta, Northwest, Continental,
 
National and even Eastern seemed ready to break ranks), the figures
 
inthe table which inMarch began with a $4.05 million maximum en­
titlement ended up inOctober at $9.2 and $13 million. This would
 
indicate that up to this point the ATA lobby was very successful. 
Of course, the ATA had a broad spectrum of supporters in its ef­
forts. First were the aircraft and engine manufacturers. However, 
because of differences among the airlines the latter's role was ltss 
visible. Manufacturers are very skittish about alienating customers. 
Obviously their interest was replacement by new design airplanes and
 
their testimony did not understate the difficulties or disadvantages
 
of retrofit and re-engining. Given the unemployment problem in the
 
country, the labor unions were solidly on the side of financing
 
assistance with replacement being the desired mode. Understandably,
 
the investment community strongly supported financial assistance in
 
order to strengthen their customers, both the airlines and the
 
manufacturers.
 
Additionally the bill was strongly supported by the environ­
mentalists providing the 2 and 3-engine airplanes would not escape 
the timetable in the noise rule. Finally support came from many 
municipal authorities because of their hope for federal assistance 
with the noise problem.
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6.3.2 Foreign Carriers Made Eligible for Surdharge Fund.
 
Foreign air carriers have relatively the same number of jet
 
aircraft as the U.S. carriers, i.e., 2000. Of these 2000 about 400
 
not meeting Jan. 1, 1977, FAR 36 standards fly into the United
 
States. Because of their longer range with the extra fuel 
loads
 
required, these 400 tend to create higher noise levels. 21/, Their
 
retirement or modification would be looked upon with favor by the
 
public and the aircraft manufacturers. In the debates much was
 
said of the international problem of unilaterally taking an action.
 
However, the committee recognized the inequity of making demands on
 
and giving benefits to U.S. operators and not to foreign. It de-­
veloped that in certain foreign countries there were already such
 
things as a noise head tax which U.S. passengers paid.
 
The Committee passed an amendment which provided that the
 
foreign carriers would be required to collect the surcharges appli­
cable to international flights and could obtain a portion or all of
 
the surcharges back as soon as its entire fleet operating.in the
 
United States meets part 36. To a certain extent this is discrim­
inatory against domestic carriers. First, foreign carriers do not
 
have a phased timetable as do U.S. carriers. Foreign carriers do
 
not have to comply until 1985. Secondly, it is possible under the
 
wording for a foreign carrier to receive 100% of replacement, re­
engine or retrofit cost. This is true because of the provision that
 
21/ 95th Cong. 1st Session, House Report No. 95-836, Airport and
 
12
 Aircraft Noise Reduction Act, Dec. 13, 1977, p. .
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when all the aircraft meet FAR 36 and are so certified as to the
 
cost the Secretary is required to return an amount equal to the
 
certified expenses, but not to exceed the amount collected by the
 
operator.
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-D.7 SUMMARY OF TITLE III AS ADOPTED BY FULL COMMITTEE 

As adopted by the full Committee on Public Works and Transpor­
tation of the House of Representatives on October 20 and reported
 
December 13, 1977, Title III of the proposed Airport and Aircraft
 
Noise Reduction Act, H.R.8729 may be summarized as follows.
 
1. The Secretary of Transportation will publish the list of
 
commercial jet aircraft weighing over 75,000 lbs. which 
.were-in-for-hire serv-i-ce-on-Jani -4-,1-9-7-7, -and whl-ch-di-& 
not meet the FAA noise regulations promulgated Dec. 23, 
1976, to be effective Jan. 1, 1977.
 
2. Within 30 days the operator must advise the Secretary
 
that he will comply with the rule and specify the means
 
chosen: (1)retrofit, (2)replace engines, or (3)replace
 
airplane.
 
3. To provide funds to support this program each domestic
 
operator is required to impose a 2% surcharge on his
 
before tax passenger and cargo tariffs. International
 
cargo requires a 5% surcharge. International passenger
 
surcharge is $10 for fares of $100 or more, and $2 for
 
lesser international fares.
 
4. In the case of U.S. carriers the funds are deposited
 
into individual trust accounts to be withdrawn as needed
 
under terms of a formula. In the case of foreign car­
riers the surcharges go into one fund and may be utilized
 
only upon certification that all the operator's aircraft
 
operating into the U.S. comply with the rule. 1985 is
 
the final limiting date.
 
5. Domestic surcharges are mandatory for the first 5 years
 
and voluntary for the next five. International surcharges
 
are mandatory for 10 years.
 
6. Surcharges in the accounts may be withdrawn for the sole
 
purpose of noise abatement. The "Entitlements" for with­
drawal are calculated by a formula intended to provide
 
an incentive to replace noncompliant aircraft with com­
pliantaircraft, preferably new technology aircraft meeting
 
the stricter FAA rule published March 3, 1977.
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-A. Retrofit: 

B. Replacing engines: 

C. Replacing the aircraft: 
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Entitlement Formula
 
2 & 3 engines: 90% of retrofit cost
 
4 engines: 50% of retrofit cost
 
75% of the cost of replacing en­
gines but not to exceed 40% of:'
 
the cost of a replacement plane
 
meeting the March 3 rule
 
40% of cost of replacement if
 
the aircraft meets the Mar. 3
 
rule
 
25% if meeting the Jan. 1 rule
 
Before applying the above per­
centages, depreciation minus the
 
ordinary income recovered on
 
sale must be deducted.
 
Noncomplying aircraft can be sold
 
with the buyer making the modifi­
-cation with his entitlement and
 
the seller losing an equivalent
 
amount.
 
Leasing of replacement aircraft
 
is restricted to leasing to
 
another air carrier for 5 years.
 
If a replacement aircraft is sold
 
within 5 years, a prorate of the 
used entitlement goes to the
 
Treasury.
 
Replacement payments are limited
 
to covering no more than 107% of
 
seats of noncomplying aircraft.
 
107% also established for replac­
ing dedicated cargo capacity.
 
7. Surcharges are not to be considered as gross income for Internal
 
Revenue purposes.
 
8. No cross subsidy. Excess surcharges above entitlements will go
 
via the Treasury to the Airport and Airway Trust Fund;
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9.	The Secretary, through the FAA Administrator, may waive 
application of the regulations upon application by operator
who shows "good faith" and there is "good cause" for fai-lure 
to comply. The good cause is further defined as: ()inability
to 	obtain SAM kits, replacement engines, or replacement air­
planes; (2)inability to obtain financing "at reasonable
 
rates"; (3)inability to maintain scheduled service to the
 
public; (4)"any other circumstances the Secretary deems
 
appropriate."
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7.1 Impact on the Federal Budget
 
Precise quantification of the effect of Title III on the Feder­
al Budget is not possible. The revenue side, consisting primarily
 
of aggregating passenger revenues of each carrier and projecting,them
 
forward for five years combining an assumed traffic growth fact*h and
 
a tariff escalation factor, is less complicated than estimating the
 
cost side. The latter involves replacement assumptions versus re­
engine versus retrofit decisions using aircraft much of which is not
 
yet designed and whose economic effects are under constant evaluation.
 
The changing economic fortunes of the carriers which can be heavily
 
influenced by route awards, by regulatory reform as well as by tech­
nological progress, widen the forecast bands of possibilities. With
 
this caveat we present the estimates furnished to the legislators.
 
Assuming the 5-year mandatory period the Congressional Budget
 
Office estimated that the surcharge "may result in excess revenue
 
'22/
of approximately $100 million." Such a statistic will not be
 
forgotten by those pushing for the bill's passage. In view of the
 
fact that the FAA has estimated that the surcharges would produce
 
$2.5 billion for U.S. Flag carriers, and that the ATA has estimated
 
the entitlements to be about $4 billion, a word of explanation is
 
in order. Simply stated, no carrier can withdraw more than its own
 
surcharges no matter what the cost or entitlements are, whereas
 
carriers whose surcharges exceed their entitlements must refund the
 
22/ Ibid. p. 25
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difference to the Treasury. In today's real world what this means
 
is that some of the neediest carriers, TWA for example, will receive
 
relatively less to meet their requirements than some more affluent
 
carriers. The elimination of the cross subsidy provision was the
 
initial obvious cause of this situation.
 
However, the deeper explanation demonstrates the interaction
 
of economic arid political power. Considering the problem and the
 
-ultimate-bj-tTv6--AT-A- in keeping its members behind the bill,
 
perhaps Anwar Sadat and Menahem Begin could consult the ATA on com­
posing conflicts. Key sections of the bill 
are the result of
 
successful maneuvering by Delta and Northwest whose support was ab­
solutely essential. Profitable Northwest, led by President and
 
Chairman Donald Nyrop, one of the last of the rugged individualists,
 
was almost paranoid about permitting any money collected from his
 
passengers going to support equipment purchases by any of his 
com­
petitors whose plight he openly stated was due to 
incompetent
 
.management. Even more profitable Delta also felt that any use of
 
its surcharges to weaken the competitive advantage it had carved
 
out for-itself was government intervention in private business of
 
the worst sort. They made it quite clear that they were in 
a posi­
tion to blow the bill out of the water unless two primary demands
 
were met.
 
The first demand was that no carrier's surcharges be used by
 
any other carrier. The second demand was that regardless of how the
 
rest of the carriers were affected these two carriers would have
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to be able to use all their surcharge money, They did not wish to
 
refund anything to the Treasury. The original bill, itwill be re­
called, called for a 10-year accrual and would have provided over
 
$4 billion. In the breakdown of entitlements this would have pro­
vided Northwest and Delta with almost twice as much as they could
 
use. 
 Thus the 5-year figure not only was a compromise with the
 
administration's position of voluntary surcharges for 10 years but
 
handily fit Northwest and Delta's requirements. In meeting these
 
demands many other carriers had to sacrifice significant benefits.
 
However, when faced with the choice of significant benefits, though
 
inadequate, or no benefits, the other carriers, with the sword of
 
Damocles hanging over their heads, felt they had no choice.
 
7.2 The Minority View 

. 
As has been suggested early in this section, the opponents to
 
the bill were articulately represented by Rep. Gene Snyder of
 
Kentucky who consistently objected not only to specific provisions
 
but also to 
the philosophical basis of the legislation.. His posi­
tion is outlined in a minority report.23/
 
23/ Ibid. pp. 33:36.
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In assessing the effects of Title III of the bill on the re­
tirement of transport jet aircraft one must consider the possibili­
ties of the successful progress of the bill through Congress and its
 
ultimate approval by the President. The proponents of legislation
 
often become overconvinced of the success of their project merely
 
by rereading their own material. Therefore, it seems appropriate
 
to highlight the objections of both those with a simple lack of en­
thus i asm an dthose. who-in_]_ess-formal-onvers-at-i on-use-terms--6 
"ripoff," "subsidy," or "wonderful gimmick." The contra opinions
 
covered in the minority report may be summarized as follows. 
Three signers of the report (Reps. Snyder, Ambro, and
 
Goldwater) considered retrofitting a waste of money which should be
 
spent on new technology aircraft, and at the final markup Rep. Snyder
 
unsuccessfully again tried to repeal the FAA Amendment 91-136 of
 
1
-Dec. 23, 1976, which would have voided the retrofit requirement.
 
The minority report also commented that since FAR 91-136 did
 
not have to be fully complied with until Jan. 1, 1985, "There is
 
no sane justification for giving owners or operators of aircraft
 
financial assistance for replacing their equipment which will be
 
totally depreciated and out of use prior to Jan. 1, 1985.."24-/ In /
 
regard to replacement, some of the minority felt that even the
 
depreciation deduction was not enough to take away from replacement
 
cost. It was argued that the percentage of life left in the old
 
aircraft on Jan. 1, 1985, if any, should be the percentage of cost
 
4/ Ibid. p. 34
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of new replacement aircraft on which the 40% "subsidy" is computed.
 
This would result in a de minimis amount.
 
Rep. Ambro commented that the replacement formula of 25% for
 
the Jan. 1 rule and 40% for the Mar. 3 rule still did not provide
 
enough incentive for new technology. However, his proposal was not
 
to increase the 40% but to decrease the 25% to 20%. This was oppo­
site to the concern expressed by some in Boeing who felt that the
 
40% to 25% spread was already too large to the detriment of some of
 
their current technology aircraft sales potential. As an example,
 
it was calculated that from their point of view a 10% spread was
 
already a $1.3 million penalty on a 727 price.
 
Rep. Ambro also pointed out that the 5-year mandatory and 5-year
 
voluntary surcharge was deficient for two reasons. First a 10-year
 
period as provided in the original bill was needed to collect the
 
estimated needed sum of $4 billion. The 5-year mandatory period cut
 
the amount collected in half. Secondly, the competitive pressures
 
within the industry would ensure that the 5-year voluntary period
 
would never be utilized; thus the objective of the program would
 
never be realized. We have already discussed the economic and polit­
ical pressures which gave rise to this provision.
 
The minority report also expressed disappointment with the
 
waiver provisions which seemed to contain broad economic loopholes
 
for airlines not disposed to investing in noise control. It could
 
well have added that whatever may be said on the merits of a series
 
of limitations on the Secretary's power, the addition of the clause
 
- 98 ­
"Any other circumstances the Secretary deems. appropriate" opens wide
 
the door of possible abuses. 
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D.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
 
The development of the jet transport in the 1950's and their
 
introduction in significant numbers in the early 1960's represented
 
a quantum jump for the industry. The coupling of larger size with
 
an almost doubling of speed accompanied by more economical operation
 
laid the basis for an increasing volume of flights. Unfortunately
 
for society the first jets were exceedingly noisy. Although the
 
introduction of the turbofan represented some improvement in the
 
noise level, the sheer increase in number of operations more than
 
compensated for the difference.
 
In 1969, bowing to public pressure, the FAA promulgated FAR
 
Part 36 which provided that any newly designed certificated plane
 
must have a significantly lower level of noise emissions. Later in
 
1973 the rules were tightened to include any currently produced
 
plane coming off the production. This left 75% of the existing jet
 
fleet uncovered by the regulations. In descending order of noise
 
emissions were (1)the early pure jet 707's and DC-8's, (2)the tur­
bofan 707 and DC-8's, and finally (3)the 2- and 3-engined turbofan
 
jets such as the 727, 737, and DC-9 series.
 
Homeowners, school operators, and others located near airports
 
continued their pressure for noise relief insisting that the noise
 
rule be extended to cover the remaining 75% of jet transport air­
craft. If previous history is to be used as a guide,,often a
 
dangerous assumption, many in the 707 and DC-8 fleets were on the
 
point or beyond the time of their expected retirement from their
 
first purchaser. Indeed they were approaching what had originally
 
been assumed by many to be their design life.
 
However at this time the airlines were suffering a period of
 
reduced and, in some cases, negative earnings. Their position was
 
that private financing to handle noise compliance expenses was just
 
not available. The next section covers the financial perspective
 
in more detail.
 
As a result of extensive public hearings and many private dis­
cussions in November 1976 Secretary Coleman issued a policy statement
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indicating that the FAA would shortly publish a rule requiring the
 
noisy planes to meet the 1969 rule over a period of time either by
 
retrofitting, replacing engines, or retiring the aircraft. Such a
 
rule was issued December 23, 1976. Although there was spread on
 
the record a comitment by the FAA not to promulgate such a rule
 
without a financing plan, the rule was so promulgated and initially
 
the administration argued that the passage of a deregulation bill
 
-
-would--improve the -earr-iers- -economic position -sufficiently tha- fi 
nancing would not be a problem. The airlines felt betrayed and
 
immediately took their case to Congress.
 
The foregoing section depicted the ebb and flow of the battle
 
between the airport neighbors and the airlines over the timing,
 
method, and financing of the noise abatement. After first consider­
ing and rejecting the idea of refusing to take any steps toward
 
compliance so as to face the government with a "fait accompli"
 
and daring itto ground the aircraft, the ATA sought to support
 
that part of broad noise control bills which would assist in the
 
financing of either retrofit, replacing engines-, or retiring the
 
planes. Their strong preference was for retiring current planes
 
and replacing them with quieter more fuel efficient airplanes. In
 
this they were supported by the labor movement which saw more jobs,
 
and by the aerospace industry which saw the need for keeping tech­
nology moving as well as the relative effect on the bottom line of
 
their operations.
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In tracing through the various versions of bills H.R. 4539,
 
8124, and 8729 one develops a deeper understanding of the problem
 
of uncertainty facing airline managements making equipment decisions.
 
Those managements under severe financial constraints must know the
 
implications of their decisions. 
 A decision made on the assumption
 
that H.R. 4539 with its emphasis on retrofit would pass would have
 
been most unwise if H.R. 8124 with its elimination of the 2- and
 
3-engined aircraft from compliance were enacted. Similarly at one
 
stage H.R. 8729 had a higher percentage going to re-engining than
 
replacement, and replacement was reduced by depreciation. Accord­
ingly, any carrier in extremely tight financial condition would have
 
been forced to consider quite seriously re-engining some very old
 
planes when retirement was the desired course. 
Although H.R. 8729
 
as reported out by the full committee December 13, 1977, seems to be
 
reasonably satisfactory to the airlines, the fact that it has not
 
been to the Ways and Means Committee much less the Senate, indicates
 
that it has a long way to go. Therefore, one must give much cre­
dence to the views voiced by many airline equipment decision makers
 
that they will do nothing significant until they know the final 
out­
come of the noise financing legislation.
 
However sincere these statements have been, changing conditions
 
cast a cloud over their continued validity for some carriers. The
 
overcast of financial impossibility has been replaced if not by bro­
ken clouds at least by rays of sunshine. The change in direction of
 
profitability has wrought significant changes in the attitudes of
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certain carriers. Secondly, the overcapacity with which the
 
industry was plagued has all but disappeared for some so that
 
playing a waiting game might put them at a competitive disadvan­
tage. Finally, one situation which made iteasier to say, "We
 
won't move a muscle until a financing bill ispassed," ischanging.
 
This situation isthe availability of a "better mousetrap" as a
 
replacement airplane.
 
Over the past several years overcapacity and the absence of an
 
economic new technology or derivative plane between the size of a
 
wide-body and a 707 or DC-8 which also met the new more stringent
 
noise standards was given as a further reason for not retiring the
 
older planes. As traffic surged in 1977 some airlines became less
 
certain that the DC-10, L1011 and the A300 were too large. Further,
 
intensive development by Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas of deriva­
tives and new technology models has been slowly but surely sapping
 
the nonavailability argument of validity. Finally, the need for
 
more aircraft due to growth plus more interest on the part of
 
lenders in providing funds and the strong financial condition of
 
several carriers may whet the appetite of these carriers to parti­
cipate in launching a new type aircraft.
 
Notwithstanding these latter developments, one can safely con­
clude that uncertainty concerning federal legislation over financing
 
assistance for retrofit, re-engining or replacement isthe primary
 
factor adversely affecting the retirement of our old jet transport
 
aircraft.
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E.
 
FACTORS IN JET AIRCRAFT RETIREMENT:
 
TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES
 
The conclusion reached in this section is that for currenttjet
 
aircraft "age" per se, whether it be measured by the passage of7 time,
 
the number of hours the aircraft is in service, the number of
 
"cycles" (either pressurization, or landing) is not a factor in the
 
forseeable future leading to their retirement. The reasons for this
 
conclusion follow.
 
E.1. AGE IN YEARS
 
- The conventional view is that machines wear out with use. Pro­
vision for this is made by depreciating the machine over its useful
 
life. We have seen that in the prejet era, aircraft were retired on
 
the average after seven to ten years of service which did not match
 
their depreciation periods. Itwas anticipated that the more costly
 
jets would have a longer service life than the preceding technology
 
and thus spread the capital costs over more units of service. When,
 
about ten years later, more efficient wide-bodied aircraft were de­
signed, the annual traffic growth was approximately 15%. With this
 
demand it appeared that the cycle of seven to ten years would re­
peat itself, at least, for trunk carriers. However, the slowing of
 
traffic growth accompanied by financial adversity which was intensi­
fied by the rapid increase in fuel prices adversely affected the need
 
for more capacity and inhibited the purchase of new, more efficient
 
replacement Aircraft if such were-available.
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As the advisability or necessity of keeping current fleets op­
erating grew, attention turned to examining the question of to what
 
length and at what cost could aircraft lives be extended. The fol­
lowing table shows the Fleet Age Distribution of U.S. Trunk lines.
 
From the standpoint of chronological age alone, 75 commercial jets
 
exceed 16 years of age and 487-are over ten years old.
 
TABLE 14 
SYSTEM TRUNK AIRLINE
 
SCHEDULED FLEET AGE DISTRIBUTION,
 
Years in Service Number of Aircraft
 
18 3 
17 27 
16 48 
15 
14 17 
13 67 
12 87 
11 91 
10 147 
9 160 
8 304 
7 152 
6 90 
5 65 
4 88 
3 110 
2 75
 
1 65
 
Source: Robert R. Ross, Commercial Jet Replacement Process, MST
 
Thesis, Transportation Center, Northwestern University,
 
1976
 
Engineering investigations and experience by the operators re­
veals that aside from some corrosion around the windows and in the
 
OFOIGqL PAIGE 15
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floors and underbody of the aircraft, the passage of time alone
 
does not cause significant deterioration of the aircraft. Main­
tenance "fixes" have been able to correct for the corrosion.
 
Appendix A indicates that the current jet fleet was introduced into
 
service in 1958, about 29 years ago. Since 19 years have elapsed
 
without significant degradation, time itself is not a concern with­
in the period of this study.
 
E.2 AGE IN HOURS AND CYCLES
 
In the prejet era, a convention arose to discuss airplane life
 
in terms of hours flown. Until the introduction of the four-engine
 
pressurized craft, the stage length of flights by the few aircraft
 
types were not widely different. Even in the prejet era, before the
 
days of "on condition" maintenance, a great deal of importance was
 
attached to "hours," generally meaning the "off to on" time
 
accumulated.
 
The advent of the jet with its transcontinental and transoceanic 
range and the further sophistication of design concepts brought with 
it the idea that the limiting factor of physical use of the aircraft
 
would be better expressed by "cycles." This may be defined as a
 
takeoff and the subsequent landing.
 
2.1 Boeing Narrow-Bodied Equipment:
 
Boeing designed the early 707's for 20,000 cycles which, given
 
their estimates of the longer stage length of the aircraft translated
 
into an "hours" figure of about 50,000. It also translated into a
 
service life of about 17 years. At about 30,000 hours, a significant
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unanticipated "rework" program was 
performed including "reskinning"
 
certain wing panels. This brought the estimated service life up be­
yond the original 50,000 hours to 60,000 hours.
 
Three situations combined to make this rework desirable.
 
First, the immediate public acceptance of the first jets led to their
 
use on much shorter segments than the designers had anticipated and 
hence accelerated the time at which the cycle limit would be reached. 
Second, the market-success-coupled-with- the-in-nrces-dllibii ty of 
the jets enabled the operators to increase utilization. This also
 
accelerated the accumulation of cycles. Finally, Boeing which had
 
previously been accustomed to the low utilization and relatively
 
infrequent landings of military equipment and without the years of
 
experience with a commercial fleet such as 
the DC-3, DC-4 and DC-6
 
of Douglas, designed the 707 to operate at somewhat higher stress
 
levels than did Douglas. One result was a lighter airplane and an
 
attendant presumed slight fuel 
economy and increased payload. In the
 
707 series the consensus is that the amount spent in increased main­
tenance just about balances the economy of the lighter weight.
 
A number of 707'snow exceed 57,000 hours and are facing another
 
but less substantial rework at reaching 60,000 hours. 
 Some airlines
 
are undertaking this maintenance expense and then project the useful
 
life to 82,000 hours. Employing normal annual utilization figures
 
would result in a total life expectancy of 28 years. Boeing engin­
eers indicate, and this is 
not disputed by the operators of 707 air"
 
craft, that when the 82,000 hours are reached, itwill be readily
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possible and not too expensive in relation to replacement costs to
 
undertake further work to extend the life to 100,000 hours or be­
yond. Table 15 below displays a frequency distribution of flight
 
hours for various series of 707 aircraft.
 
TABLE 15
 
BOEING 707/720, 727, 737, 747 FLEET STATUS
 
IN-FLIGHT HOURS AS OF JUNE 1975
 
Number of Aircraft
 
Hours 707 & 720 ' 727 737 747 
60,000+ 
55-60 6 
50-55 24 
45-50 56 
40-45 99 
35-40 142 7 
30-35 132 66 
25-30 159 207 
20-25 102 228 12 25 
15-20 22 240 109 95 
10-15 
"5-10 
8 
11 
103 
138 
154 
45 
67 
39 
0-5 34 165 116 38 
Source: Ross (1976) 
Current Boeing 707 aircraft are powered by P&W JT3D engines.
 
Earlier non-fan craft used the JT3C and JT4. Unlike the airframe,
 
which in general terms stays intact but for repairs and modification,
 
an aircraft engine not only is moved from plane to plane but over
 
time undergoes almost a complete replacement of component..parts. In
 
fact it is often said that the only part of an engine which remains
 
after a few years is the name plate displaying the serial number.
 
The same comment is applicable to the JT8D on the 727 series, the
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JT9D on the 747 and to the GE CF6. Accordingly, as with the air­
frame, age per se-of an engine has no necessary relationship to the
 
retirement of the aircraft. The efficiency aspect will be treated
 
elsewhere.
 
The next series of Boeing aircraft considered is the 727 ser­
ies. Starting the design as it did about 10 years after the design
 
of the 707, Boeing took into consideration the experience on the 707, 
--lT &Fed some of the stresses on the wing and fuselage and designed 
the plane assuming a much shorter average length flight. Early 727
 
fuselages had a cold bond process which was unsatisfactory from a
 
corrosion point of view and hot bonding replaced it. Thus the goal
 
or design was set at 60,000 cycles. Subsequent experience indicates
 
that the average stage length for the 727 is approximately one hour.
 
Accordingly the design life on this basis is 60,000 hours. In 1975,­
the high time aircraft had over 37,000 hours, and more than 200
 
planes were over 25,000 hours. It will not be until 1980 that 727's
 
will reach 54,000 hours. Since the 727 was designed bn the experi­
ence of the 707, and since-no structural problems have developed
 
thus far, the conclusion is reached that itwill be possible to push
 
the service life another sizeable increment.
 
The Boeing 737 needs little treatment here. It was specifically
 
designed for the higher cycles of the short haul and was also a
 
structural advance over the preceding 707. With a chronological age
 
of less than 9 years, a high time of about 20,000 hours and cycles of
 
about 32,000, age in any one of these parameters is not a concern to
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the operators of the 737.
 
Insummary, for the current Boeing fleet, which number 2791
 
aircraft out of a total world commercial jet fleet of 4587, retire­
ment of these planes will not come about because of their age in
 
years, or because they have reached the end of their life because
 
of hours in the air or cycles.
 
2.2 McDonnell Douglas Narrow-Bodied Equipment:
 
The next largest fleet is that of McDonnell Douglas whose com­
mercial jet aircraft number 1240. As was the case with Boeing,
 
these DC-8 series aircraft were designed for a service life equiva­
lent to 50,000 hours (McDonnell Douglas Co. report J6903, "Struc­
tural Durability of DC-8 Jet Aircraft," June 1975). At 8 hours a
 
day, this is a design service life of 17 years. Table 16 shows the
 
total flight hours of certain Douglas series.
 
TABLE 16
 
DC-8-20, -30, -40, -50 Series
 
Fleet Status In-Flight Hours as of June 1975
 
Total Flight Number
 
Hours (000) of Aircraft 
15-20 
20-25 7 
25-30 22 
30-35 37 
35-40 45 
40-45 62 
45-50 55 
50-55 12 
55-60. 5 
Source: Ross (1976)
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The early Douglas planes are now about 19 years of age, are
 
approaching 60,000 hours of use, and because of the stage lengths
 
have fewer cycles than hours. On the basis of current structural
 
studies Douglas is now predicting a mean service life of 82,000
 
hours; this translates into a 28-year service life. As aircraft in 
the data base mature, it is felt by the manufacturer and operators 
that the service life can be further extended. For example, if ex­
amiiWLion i1-60,OUO-hTirs re-ea l tht-4W-craEks have developed the 
projected life will be 100,000 hours or 34 years. If, on the other 
hand, approximately 30 cracks have developed the projected mean 
service life will be 110,000 hours or 38 years. As previously indi­
cated the Douglas is somewhat heavier structurally than Boeing and
 
has had less maintenance work on it.
 
The Douglas DC-9 short haul plane entered service in 1965 and
 
1966. No structural fatigue has been found and with an age of less
 
than ten years, with hours less than 30,000 and cycles less than
 
40,000 the physical life of the series projects out beyond anything
 
of concern in th istddy. 
In summary, for the current Douglas fleet retirement will not
 
come about because of age in years, hours of service, or number of
 
cycles performed.
 
2.3 Wide-Bodied Aircraft: Boeing 747, Douglas DC-l0,
 
Lockheed L1011 
The wide-bodied aircraft - namely, the 747, DC-l0 and L1OII ­
were designed after-taking careful account of the experience with 
the DC-8 and 8-8 series and much interaction between manufacturers 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
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and the airlines. Generally speaking, particularly the airframes
 
contain incremental refinements on existing technology and should
 
have an even longer service life of the nature considered in this
 
section than the narrow-bodied jets. This expectancy is confirmed
 
by the longer depreciation periods the carriers have set up in7.­
tially for the wide-bodied as compared with their previous,
 
aircraft.
 
E.3 DEPRECIATION, BOOK VALUE, USED AIRCRAFT PRICES IN THE JET
 
ERA] 
Depreciation is often defined as "the losk, not restored by
 
current maintenance, which is due to all the factors causing the ul­
timate retirement of property. These factors embrace wear and tear,
 
decay, inadequacy, and obsolescence" (Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell
 
Telephone Co. 29 US 151, 167 (1934)). In the air transport indus­
try obsolescence is difficult to quantify in advance. In the prejet
 
era we noted that despite the development of more efficient piston
 
aircraft, obsolescence from a financial point of view was masked by
 
a strong demand to fill an undercapacity situation. As a consequence,
 
.aircraft generally sold above book and provided some funds for the
 
purchase of jets.
 
In the jet era there is a wide gap between the time one airline
 
may start to retire a piece of equipment and that of another line.
 
Table 17 below indicates that BAC-III's began to leave American and
 
Braniff in 5 and 7.years respectively; Eastern's 720's began at 7
 
years and Continental's at 14. Such departures may mean the purchase
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was early proved a mistake because of overcapacity, wrong mission,
 
or failure to receive a contemplated route award.
 
TABLE 17
 
JET AIRCRAFT RETIRED FROM TRUNK SERVICE
 
Aircraft Type Carriers Years in Service 
BAC-I1 AA,BN 5,7 
CV-990 AA 6 
Carave.1e- ..... . UA----------- -- 8..--8-- .-----­
DC-8-61/63 
707-100/300 
DC-8-NF 
EA,NA 
CO,BN,PA 
PA,EA,NA,DL 
6,8 
8,9,13 
8,13,13,16 
DC-9-10 CO 9 
CV-880 DL,TW 13,15 
720 EA,AA,BN,PA,NW,UA,CO 7,9,9,9,10,12,14 
Source: Ross (1976) 
OOR Q ISO BIGO.F1O0gQALT 
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Table 18 below demonstrates that aircraft retired from one
 
carrier stay inservice with others much longer. For example, on
 
Western theBoeing 720 is still flying after 15 years of service.
 
TWA and American still have the early 707's, which were once turbo­
jets before conversion to turbofans, pushing 18 and 19 years of'age.
 
TABLE 18
 
JET AIRCRAFT REMAINING IN TRUNK SERVICE
 
Aircraft Types Carriers Years in Service
 
707-100/300 AA,TW,PA,NW,WA 18,17,14,149
 
DC-8-NF/50 UA 17
 
720. WA 15
 
727-100 EA,UA,AA,TW,NA,NW,BN,PA 14,14,13,13,12,12,11,4I
 
DC-9-10 EA,TW 11,11
 
DC-8-61/62/63 BN,DL,UA 10,10,10
 
DC-9-30 EA,DL 10,10
 
727-200 AA,CO,NA,NW,TW,UA,
 
WA,BN,DL 9,9,9,9,9,9,8,6,5
 
737 UA,WA 9,9
 
747 PA,AA,BN,NW,TW,UA 8,7,7,7,7,7
 
DC-l0 AA,NA,UA,CO,TW,WA 6,6,6,5,5,5
 
L-10ll EA,TW,DL 5,5,4
 
Source: Ross (1976)
 
If the Domestic Trunks plus Pan American were to replace air­
craft as their book life expired, Boeing has calculated from public
 
data that an average of 170 planes a year would be replaced over the
 
period 1978-1986 as shown in Chart 4, on the following page.
 
The Fleet Age Distribution, Chart 5, p.l15, is shown to be 8.6
 
years for the total fleet, 9.2 for the low-by pass fan, and 17.2
 
years for the non fans. Different airlines have significant differ­
ences in the rate at which their fleets are aging. Chart 6, p.ll 6;
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illustrates trends. The largest airlines, the very ones that
 
launched the jet era (PAA,AAL,UAL,TWA), have fleets that are above
 
the trunk average age. While initially other lines followed the
 
same aging pattern, beginning in 1972 several carriers, Continental,
 
Delta, Northwest being very visible examples, began replacing their
 
fleets with newer aircraft, thus lowering their average age dramati­
cally. This action comes into focus later during the discussion on
 
the impact of noise regulations on replacement of aircraft and on the
 
policy problems of how to assist needy carriers with old fleets with­
out discriminating against carriers who feel by good management they
 
made the replacement at their own expense.
 
For regulatory purposes, the CAB has established depreciation
 
periods of: 
10 years ------- Turbojets 
14 years ------- Turbofans 
16 years ------- Wide-bodies 
For business accounting, the carriers initially used the same or
 
shorter depreciation periods. For example, Delta depreciated all
 
aircraft over 10 years with a 10% residual while Northwest wrote off
 
its narrow-bodies over 10 years with a 15% residual. On its wide­
bodies Northwest employed 15 years with 10% residual. Subsequently
 
when it became evident that the useful life of the narrow-bodies
 
would exceed the book life, some airlines adjusted the depreciation
 
periods to longer lives. The CAB itself in a recent economic study,­
has adjusted depreciation by adding 3 years to its normal regulatory
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figures tabulated above. This investigation revealed that on an
 
industry wide basis, airlines are depreciating their equipment for
 
accounting purposes over a longer period than the CAB regulatory
 
rules. However, carriers with strong finances such as Delta and
 
Northwest did not readjust their depreciation practices. The changes
 
in depreciation rates on the part of the carriers are a function of 
their desire to show earnings or minimize losses as well as to take 
advantage of investment credit laws. Accordingly, they are financial
 
in character. Depreciation rates established for equipment, or the
 
results of such rates, are not a driving factor in determining retire­
ment policies.
 
The extent to which these management depreciation decisions rep­
resenting actual experience during the years 1970-1975 is reflected in
 
a study made by AVMARK Inc. Table 19of that study relating to the U.S.
 
certificated air carriers indicates that 841 planes were sold for
 
$1.5 billion which figure was $232 million more than book value. In
 
the case of Northwest, its book profit was 47%. The profit may not
 
mean that Northwest was a shrewder bargainer but that it had a higher
 
rate of depreciation on its fleet.
 
To the extent that used aircraft prices impinge on the decisions
 
to retire aircraft, a market must exist or the decision must be made
 
on the basis of scrap value. And to the extent that the past gives
 
some basis for assessing the future, a review of where retired air­
craft have been going is desirable. A study by AVMARK, Table 2, ndl­
cates that in the 1970-75 period 70 jets have "trickled down" to the
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Table 19
 
SUMMARY OF USED AIRCRAFT SALES BY U.S. CERTIFICATED AIR CARRIERS 
­
1970-1975
 
Airline 
Number 
Sold Gross Sales Price 
Book Profit 
(loss) 
Percent 
Profit 
American 
Braniff 
66 
36 
$ 213,245,000 
79,942,000 
$ 21,663,000, 
3,916,000 
1C.2% 
4.7 
Continantal 
Delta 
Eastern 
National 
North.jest 
Pan American 
TWA 
United 
Western 
Total Trunks 
39 
68 
87 
12 
51 
- 57 
25 
57 
27 
2 
142,693,000 
'106,574,000 
262,943,000 
19,171,000 
166,264,000 
102,442,000 
62,930,000 
53,856,000 
32,112,000 
Tl427W-9 0 
( 722,000 )
22,578,000 
16,197,000 
3,048,000 
78,638,000 
18,021,000 
C 5,015,000 ) 
10,158,000 
-9,786,000 
0.'t 
21.2 
6.2 
15.9 
47.3 
17.6 
( 8.0 ) 
18.9 
30.5 
-T8,313,Qoo14.4Z 
Allegheny 
Frontier 
Hughes Airviest 
North Central 
Ozark 
Piedmont 
Southern 
Texas International 
Total Regional 
43 
18 
26 
3 
3 
6 
14 
3 
16- . 
$ 21,186;000 
24,134,000 
11,933,000 
1,822',000 
5,654,000 
1,597,000 
10.062,000 
5,293,000 
-7547,,00 
$ 1,913,000 
1,769,000 
4,096 000 
( 8,000 )
1,977,000 
135,000 
1,973,000 
'67,000 )
7TS 7Oo 
9.4% 
7.3 
3a.3 
(0.4 
35.0 
8.5 
19.7 
(1.3 
20.6,L 
Alaska 
Aloha 
Hawaiian 
Kodiak 
Reeve 
Wi1en 
Total Territorial 
20 
2 
2 
i0 
3 
2 
39T 
$ 6,022,000 
140,000 
7,586,000 
446,000 
141,000 
150,000 -
$---1-85700 
$ 104,000 
13,000 
-1,800,000 
188,000 
119,000 
52,000 
$ 2,276,000 
1.7% 
9.3 
23.7 
12.2 
8d.4 
34.7 
T57W 
Airlift 
FLying Tigers
Seaboard W!orld 
Total All-Cargo 
22 
13 
6 
-4-
$ 24,771,000 
43,591,000 
36,237,000 
104,99,0-00 -
C 3,053,000 ) 
6,196,000 
6,506.000 
-­931,0-0 
(12.3%) 
19.0 
18.1 
10.4% 
Capitol 
Johnson (Evergreen) 
McCulloch 
Modern 
Oversees National 
Saturn 
Trans International, 
World 
Total Supplemetitals 
23 
30 
10 
8 
-12 
20 
5 
12 
-T22--
$ 19,420,000 
778,000 
3,410,000 
3,243,000 
28,162,000 
11,700,000 
22,287,000 
57,947,000 
-T4z-2 o - -
6,862,000 
365,000 
726,000
-( 3,038,000 ) 
5,954,000 
. 526,000 
2,n30,000, 
"16,007,000 
$7; -,f----
35.3 
46.9 
21.3 
(93.5) 
21.1 
4.5 
10.9 
27.6 
-0-
TOTAL INDUSTRY' 841 $1,565,767,000 $231,948,000 
-14.9% 
Source: AVARK, Inc., Miami, Florida 
PAGE 1$OFRIoGIL 
OF 20R QU1ALITY 
- 120 -

TABLE 20
 
USED AIRCRAFT - WHERE THEY WENT
 
U.S. Carrier Industry
 
1970 - 1975
 
Total 
Number 
Transaction 
Value 
Average 
Transaction 
Percent 
Total 
Percent 
Total 
Purchased By Aircraft (000) (000) Value Number 
Far East, Asia & African 
Area 57 $221,566 $3,887 13.1% 6.6% 
Middle East Region 37 179,838 4,860 10.6 4.2 
U.S. Local Service 
Airlines 70 173,337 2,476 10.2 8.2 
Canada and Caribbean 57 144,100 2,528 8.5 6.6 
Latin America 59 137,542 2,331 8.1 6.8 
U.S. Manufacturers 54 136,299 2,524 8.0 6.2 
European Cargo & Charter 
Airlines 73 131,723 1,804 7.8 8.4 
U.S. Trunk Airlines 18 129,785 2,210 7.6 2.1 
European Scheduled Airlines 
Brokers in USA 
28 
117 
97,702 
69,861 
3,489 
597 
5.8 
4.1 
3.2 
13.5 
U.S. Supplemental Air 
Carriers 52 66,115 1,271 3.9 6.0 
U.S. All-Cargo Carriers 3 40,045 13,348 2.4 .3 
Financial Institutions and 
Leasing Companies 
European Brokers 
43 
25 
45,770 
30,887 
1,064 
1,235 
2.6 
1.8 
4.8 
2.9 
U.S. Territorial Airlines 21 28,194 1,128 1.7 2.4 
Aircraft Sold and 
Repossessed 15 17,801 1,187 1.1 1.7 
Sales to Third Level 
Carriers, Flying Clubs, 
Corporations, Individuals 
and Others 137 43,790 320 2.6 15.9 
Total Transactions 865 $1,694,345 S1,959 100.0% 100.0% 
The foregoing data is from air carrier reports to the U.S. Civil Aero­
nautics Board and shows the purchasers listed by the airlines. In certain
 
cases, especially those involving brokers and financial institutions, th
 
aircraft were subsequently transferred to third parties. Further, data 
does not necessarily accurately reflect the extent of actual owners of the 
aircraft.
 
Source: AVIARK, Inc., Miami, Florida 
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U.S. Local Service Airlines involving a sum of $175,000,000. How­
ever, more significantly, 37 planes went to the Middle East Region
 
for about $180,000,000. Finally, 57 aircraft were sold to the Far
 
East, Asia and African Area for $223,000,000. AVMARK projects an
 
increase in the price of used aircraft even in the face of a sub­
stantial potential increase in offerings of U.S. Carriers desired
 
or being forced to reti.re their noisy high cost fleets. We, how­
ever, do not think the market can absorb quantity and maintain
 
higher prices. 
E.4 CONCLUSION ON AGING OF THE CURRENT JET FLEET
 
4.1 Narrow-Bodied
 
The current jet era began in 1958 with the advent of the coast­
to-coast Boeing turbojet. Following quickly were Douglas DC-8 and
 
Convair 880 turbojets. The-normal power plant was the P&W JT-3 and
 
JT-4. In 1961, a quieter more efficient engine, the JT-3D, was de­
veloped and powered all production aircraft. Some airlines reequipped
 
their existing aircraft with the new turbofans. In 1964 and 1965, the
 
shorter range, smaller 727 and DC-9 were introduced powered by a new
 
P&W JT8D turbofan. Unless sold to other carriers, these aircraft and
 
their power plants have been in use by the purchasing carriers con­
tinuously. Some of the older 707 and DC-8 series are reaching 19
 
years of age, far beyond the original depreciation periods set by the
 
original purchasers, and approaching the design life span of the air­
craft using hours as a standard.
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Careful engineering analysis and structural retesting by the
 
manufacturers and users have developed the -fact that with some addi-­
tional maintenance, the life span can further safely be extended by
 
additional. significant increments up to 82,000 and then 100,000
 
hours. This would bring the life span up to 30 or 40 years. With
 
respect to depreciation, -it is largely a management decision which
 
is not necessarily based on the expected usefdl lifeof__the_aircraft.-

Therefore, neither chronological age per se or book life car be said
 
to be a factor causing the retirement or even affecting the retire­
ment of current jet aircraft.
 
4.2 Wide-Bodied
 
The wide-bodied jumbo 747 aircraft was introduced in 1970 fol­
lowed by the DC-b and L1Oll in 1972. The manufacturers aver, and
 
in general the purchasers agree, that additional quality has been
 
built into these airframes taking advantage of the lessons learned
 
from their previous models. Thus, age will be of no concern for a
 
very long time. These aircraft are powered with a new generation of
 
high bypass engines. The users are not ready to agree on their life
 
span.
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F.
 
REPLACEMENT DECISIONS: A FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE
 
We examine financial aspects of the aircraft retirement deci­
sion in this section. Since industry demand is generally perceived
 
as rising, the retirement decision is in fact a decision to replace.
 
We begin our discussion by introducing the economic logic of re­
placement decisions. Perhaps, the single key element in that deci­
sion process is defining the discount rate which will equate the
 
sum of future cash flow benefits With the current cost of obtaining
 
new planes. The discount rate is taken to be the marginal cost of
 
additional capital funds. As this marginal cost is determined by
 
investors, based on their perception of return-risk characteristics
 
of the firm, we focus our attention next on the economic performance
 
of airlines in the 1966-75 period.
 
There are several qualifications-to be made before we begin.
 
First, our approach to airline industry financial problems is a de­
scriptive one. That is,while we focus almost exclusively on quan­
titative aspects of performance, our emphasis is on the "proximate"
 
determinants of the record. We do not examine industry financing
 
in terms of explicit behavioral models simply because of a lack of
 
funding, rather than a disdain for such work. Second, our financial
 
analysis focuses on the "Big Eleven" trunk carriers: American,
 
Braniff, Continental, Delta, Eastern, National, Northwest, Pan Am,
 
Trans World, United and Western. These firms own the bulk of the
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domestic jet fleet, and operate nearly all of the aging, noisy, and
 
fuel-inefficient craft.
 
It is important that we distinguish the sources data used in
 
this section. With few exceptions, these data are derived from the
 
COMPUSTAT tapes supplied monthly to the financial community by
 
Standard and Poor. 5/ As such, the data shown in our calculations
 
are based exclusively on the annual audited statements of air car­
riers. Use of the COMPUSTAT series requires some additional clari­
fication. We note that all balance sheet information employed here
 
are measured in "book" rather than "market" terms. The data em­
ployed for all carriers are those of the consolidated form, reflect­
ing the performance and structure of airline as well as other
 
subsidiaries. (Our choice here is a deliberate one since it is the
 
consolidated reports which are of concern to the financial institu­
tions.) Finally, we note that our data are based on fiscal years.
 
For all but two carriers, the 1975 fiscal year coincides with the
 
26/

calendar year.
 
F.1 THE CALCULUS OF REPLACEMENT DECISIONS
 
The ultimate purchase decision for new aircraft is a financial
 
one. True, the technological characteristics of-the new craft and
 
C.E. Ferguson, Jr. and W.G. Glimpse (1976). COMPUSTAT Analysis
 
System: Users' Guide, Investors Management Sciences, Inc.
 
Delta (June) and
6i/	Exceptions and final month of fiscal year are: 

National (June).
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the craft to be replaced are integral to this decision. However,
 
the outcome of this process will depend on several other variables
 
which are unrelated to the new aircraft (e.g., the firm's capital
 
structure and level of interest rates prevailing in the economy).
 
Our task in this section is to summarize the decision rules in­
volved in the equipment replacement decision and to describe the
 
requisite calculations for these rules.
 
The distinguishing characteristic of capital equipment is that
 
it provides services over a lengthy period. Managers must thus con­
cern themselves with a multiperiod profitability calculation. For
 
each future period up to its retirement date the equipment is pre­
sumed to generate cash flows ("profits" plus depreciation) which can
 
be well estimated as of the current date. Replacement decisions re­
quire that we examine two distinct series of future cash flows:
 
(i)those specific to the existing equipment, and (ii)those implicit
 
in use of new equipment. That is, replacement implies that new equip­
ment will displace current equipment in some given service activity.
 
The differential cash flows resulting from replacement must be suf­
ficient to justify purchase.
 
The cash flows resulting from continuing use of existing equip­
ment are not difficult to project, since the service inwhich these
 
craft are used iswell understood, as are the craft's operating char­
acteristics. Indeed, the only real difficulty here is in antici- "
 
pating inflation in the unit prices of associated inputs (e.g., fuel
 
and wage rates). The future cash flows specific to new equipment are
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often more difficult to project accurately. This is typically the
 
case where a new type of aircraft isunder consideration, since its
 
operating characteristics are often not established and the plan
 
may well provide a different type of service (thereby altering
 
demand).
 
Should an airline consider replacement of existing craft with
 
new ones, the extended cash benefits will be of four types:
 
-i-revenue gains-thr-ouh improved- availability or 
altered service characteristics;
 
ii)operating cost reductions produced by lower weight,
 
reduced fuel consumption, etc.;
 
iii) increased cash flows as the result of larger depre­
ciation allowances; and
 
iv)decreased tax levels associated with the higher
 
levels of depreciation or with any legislated special
 
tax treatment.
 
In the context of the current debate some important qualitative views
 
of these benefits can be made. We note first that the revenue gains
 
from new aircraft will be slight indeed since new craft will not per
 
se generate increased numbers of passengers. True, where higher ca­
pacity planes are substituted for DC-9's and 727-00's there will be
 
passenger gains incertain limited capacity markets. However such
 
markets are few innumber - and additions to this market classifi­
tation are not developing rapidly. Our analysis indicates that com­
pared with current wide-bodies only limited operating cost reduc­
tions would be associated with a new-design aircraft. Reductions
 
in operating costs will be largely in the form of fuel savings ­
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these the result of improved engine efficiency and lowered gross
 
takeoff weights. The weight reductions now inview appear largely
 
due to limited use of composite materials.
 
The "tax benefits" of new aircraft are immediate and are sup­
portive of replacement. That is,the financial community focuses
 
on the cash flow - net income plus depreciation - implications of
 
an investment decision. The value of depreciation allowances, how­
ever, isconditional on positive values of taxable income. To the'
 
extent that pretax earnings are minimal, the tax savings associated
 
with increased depreciation are slight. The latter situation, of
 
course, has been typical of U.S. trunk carriers in the 1970's,
 
Replacement implies that the older aircraft in fact leaves the
 
fleet, thus generating immediate cash benefits. In a world of
 
stable prices the sale price of the old plane will closely approxi­
mate its book value. As such the sale of older aircraft will not
 
affect the firm's tax liabilities. However, the extreme inflation
 
rates of the past decade have produced an understatement in aircraft
 
book values. Thus aircraft which are current replacement candidates
 
have market values well inexcess of book - and their sale will pro­
duce taxable income. Consider the following: the Boeing B-737-200
 
which was purchased for $4.4 million in 1970 has a current market
 
value of $3.5 million. Employing a ten-year service life, sum-of­
the-year's-digits-depreciation scheme, and a $1 million salvage
 
value the 1977 book value of this plane isbut $1.6 million. Thus
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the sale of a six-year-old aircraft could produce a tax liability
 
as high as $912,000.27/
 
The replacement decision involves comparing the purchase price
 
of the new aircraft (less the proceeds from sale of the old craft,
 
net of tax liabilities incurred in that transaction) with the stream
 
of future benefits obtained from operating the new plane-in place
 
of the older one. Since these future cash flows are obtained over
 
---time,--they-mus-t-be-discounted-to-aliw e-fb-rann-igs foregone by the 
firm as a result of the new aircraft purchase. The appropriate inter­
est rate for such discounting would be the rate attached to a risk­
free asset (e.g., short-term treasury bills) if the future returns 
were a certainty. 
Considerable uncertainty is associated with the cash flows pro­
duced by a fleet of new aircraft. This stems from lack of informa­
tion on technical performance, changing regulatory attitudes, com­
petitive forces, etc. Accordingly, the case can be made for using 
a discount rate (inexcess of the "risk-free rate") which reflects 
the risk characteristics of the new craft. By most conventional 
measures of trunkline risk, this sector is one of the more risky in
 
the U.S. economy. It follows that the discount rates used to ana7
 
lyzenew aircraft purchases will be high relative to those used by
 
other firms in capital budgeting.
 
2./ These data are taken from Avmark, Inc., Transport Aircraft
 
Values, 1970-1984. Miami, 1976.
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.The fintal.steplin the replacement calculus is to ask if the
 
discounted future benefits from purchase exceed the net cost of
 
the new equipment. If this result obtains, the aircraft will be
 
purchased because this investment will increase stockholders''
 
earnings and thus raise the market value of the firm's equity,:
 
shares. Should the net purchase price exceed the discounted value
 
of the future cash flows associated with purchase, then the air­
craft would not be purchased. And this because the returns from
 
the investment would fail to match the stockholders' earnings ex­
pectations, thereby producing a decline in the value if the
 
stock.
 
The key features, then, in the replacement decision are the
 
following:
 
i) uncertainty associated with cash flows from new
 
aircraft;
 
ii)tax implications coincident with retirement of older
 
planes and depreciation of new ones; and
 
iii) derivation of discount rates applicable to the future
 
cash flows which adequately reflect the risk structure
 
of the firm and industry.
 
The following paragraphs of this section review the current per­
formance of the trunkline industry. This performance gives key
 
indications as to the nature of uncertainty, tax considerations, and
 
risk structure. From these findings, we go on to examine qualita­
tively the prospects for fleet replacement under alternative economic
 
and regulatory scenarios.
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F.2 LEVERAGE AND RISK STRUCTURE
 
The cost of obtaining funds - as well as the potential barrier
 
to any funding - is tied to the capital structure of a firm. That
 
is the relatives-ize of debt and lease obligations in all corporate
 
capital funds (leverage) influences,the rate which must be-paid to
 
produce new capital funds. This is especially the case when "fixed
 
obligations" (debt service and lease payments)'bulk large relative to
 
cash flow.
 
'Table21 examines the leverage position of the trunk carriers in
 
the period 1971-75., Part A of this table shows the ratio of long­
term debt to all long-term (or "permanent capital") funds; this is
 
the proportion of long-term funds obtained from creditors. While the
 
tax deductibility of interest payments makes debt an attractive form
 
of fund raising to the shareholders, when debt becomes too high the
 
possibility of default - which places at risk the assets held by
 
shareholders --discourages high debt proportions. In this context
 
the data of Panel A are interesting. While no trend emerges for the
 
carriers, ifseems clear that long-term debt has remained a fairly
 
stable proportion of all capital.
 
Inrecent years firms have engaged in a good deal of "off the
 
balance sheet" financing- i.e., leasing of capital equipment. That
 
this has been particularly true of trunk air carriers is seen in
 
'Part B of Table 21. Herewe adjust the long-term debt-to-permanent­
capital ratio by adding lease obligations to both numerator and de­
nominator. The resultant ratio more fairly reflects the firm's
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Table 21 
SELECTED FINANCIAL RATIOS: 1971-1975
 
U.S. Domestic.Trunks Plus Pan Am
 
Item Firm 1971 1972 1973 1974 1.975 
A. Long Term Debt/Long Term 
Debt plus Equity 
MAL 
BNF 
.572 
.682 
.573 
.658 
.579 
.655 
.531 
.618 
.528 
.508 
CAL .744 .696 .709 .717 .746 
DAL .550 .517 .493 .56d .580 
EAL .654 .620 .716 .686 .701 
NAL .594 .667 .658 .579 .580 
NWA .446 .410 .438 .387 .397 
PAA .708 .717 .708 .739 .760 
TWA .732 .724 .730 .739 .760 
UAL .672 .674 .653 .630 .644 
VIAL .680 .626 .590 .554 .550 
B. Long Term Debt plus AAL .768 .778 .796 .788 .800 
Lease Payments/L.T. 
Debt plus Equity plus 
BNF 
CAL 
.855 
.804 
.842 
.769 
.832 
;.788 
.829 
.784 
.825 
.810 
Lease Payments DAL' .619 .593 .599 .629 .640 
EAL .859 .817 .863 .866 .879 
NAL .700 .730 .732 .690 .696 
NUA .497 .463 .499 .462 .470 
PAA .802 .811 .812 .844 .863 
TWA .870 .861 .876 .875 .904 
UAL .806 .814 .786 .769 .780 
WAL .795 .773 .765 .760 .777 
.C. Times Interest Earned* AAL 4.0 4.6 2.8 6.2 4.3 
BNF 4.2 5.0 4.6 4.1 4.2 
CAL 3.9 4.2 2.9 2.4 1.9 
DAL 8.4 12.7 13.9 10.2 6.4 
EAL 3.2 4.2 1.6 2.6 1.9 
NAL 2.6 6.0 5.7 6:3 4.4 
NWA 7.8 12.8 10.7 9.9 9.2 
PAA 1.9 2.4 2.5 .8 2.3 
TWA 3.8 6.5 6.2 2.6 1.4 
UAL 3.8 4.7 5.9 7.8 4.0. 
WAL 4.9 6.3. 8.0 8.2 5.5 
* Includes book depreciation. 
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TABLE 21 (continued)
 
1971 1973 1974 1975
Item Firm 1972 

D. Coverage'* AAL 1.6 1.6 1.0 1.9 1.1
 
BNF 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.1 1.9
 
CAL 2.7 2.7 2.0 1.9 1.4
 
DAL 4.6 5.0 4.5 4.2 3.0
 
EAL 1.4 1.8 .8 1.4 1.0 
NAL 1.6 3.7 3.5 3.8 2.5 
-N... 3-----2---- -3-.9-----473-- -4.7---- 3.8-
PAA 1.2 1.5 1.6 .5 1.4 
TWA 1.7 2.3 2.2 1.3 .7 
UAL 1.8 2.2 3.0 3.7 1.9
 
WAL 2.9 3.4 4.0 3.9 2.1
 
E. Return on Equity AAL .005 :010 -.089 .36 -.038 
BNF .106 .158 .176 .169 .122 
CAL 070 .064 ;OOi .052 -.066 
DAL .106 .133 ;181 .204 .102 
EAL .017 .061 -.167 .022 -.190 
NAL -.032 .140 .126 .163 .058 
NWA .045 .036 .097 .110 .070 
PAA -.103 -.070 -.047 -.267 -.180 
TWA .004 .128 .120 -.070 -.315 
UAL -.013 .034 .079 .130 -.008 
WAL .068 .116 .179 .182 .037 
F. Return on Assets AAL .025 .023 -.015 .034 -.002 
BNF .074: .089 .102 .123 .087 
CAL .058 .060 :037 .074 .026 
DAL ).078 - .104 .145 .159 .083 
EAL -.044 .052 -.009 .056 .003 
NAL :002 .086 .090 .133 .054 
NWA .026 .027 .065 .107 .053 
PAA -.001 .003 .614 -.050 -.001 
TWA .029 .051 .055 .020 -.020 
UAL .024 :04.0 .068 .109 .021 
WAL .058 .081 .121 .134 .032 
** Includes book depreciation. . Coverage-isratio of earnings before interest 
and taxes to interest plus one-third of rentals. 
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fixed obligations and the relative position of the stockholder. A
 
different picture of leverage now emerges. To wit, trunk carriers
 
are extremely leveraged. And in the case of six carriers this lev­
erage has increased with time. These ratios are very high relative
 
to other firms in the U.S. economy.
 
Parts C and D of Table 21 focus on the ability of trunk car­
riers to meet fixed obligations. These are the so-called coverage
 
ratios. The first of these stresses interest coverage, the second
 
provides for coverages of both interest and capital rentals (leases).
 
Inboth cases the diversity of averages is of interest. The finan­
cial strength of both Delta andNorthwest is the most striking find­
ing: the tenuous - and deteriorating - situation for American,
 
Continental, Eastern, Pan Am and TWA, the most perplexing.
 
Extreme leverage and poor coverage performance require explana­
tion. One must ask how, in the face of poor coverage, the trunk
 
carriers have developed such a high debt structure. The answer to
 
this question lies in the economic history of the industry. The­
period bounded by 1946 and 1955 was one of strong traffic growth.
 
Financing of early postwar equipment was made possible by retained
 
wartime earnings and current internal funds (cash flow). With the
 
advent of commercial jet aircraft, capital needs grew very rapidly.
 
During the 1956-61 period, some 40% of all funds were obtained
 
through the sale of long-term debt. The specific debt instrument
 
employed most often was the debenture; life insurance companies were
 
the purchasers.
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The first 4-engine jet aircraft provided a substantial shift
 
on both the nature and quantity of air passenger service. During
 
the 1961-66 period, capital spending continued at a high level as
 
twin- and tri-jets were substituted for prop and turbo-prop equip­
ment. Carriers turned to the substantial cash flows-(especially
 
profits) generated by these jet craft and their predecessors to fi­
nance this accumulation. Dividend payouts remained low (consistent
 
with the-pattern-O rbvWthindustrt&s},-declining-slightly as a rela­
tive use of funds. The developments of the early sixties, then,
 
caused little concern on the part of the senior lenders as carrier
 
leverage declined and profitability appeared growing.
 
The 1966-71 period gave rise to substantial spending on flight
 
and ground equipment. This, of course, involved the refinement of
 
twin- and tri-jet configurations and the introduction of wide-body
 
aircraft. During the period, funds came from a multiplicity of
 
sources: convertible debt issues, bank borrowing, and (late in the
 
period) leasing. Unfortunately, the heavy commitments of this period
 
coincided with a rapid deterioration in the profitability of the
 
carriers. 2 This declining profitability made the financial commit­
ments of the late sixties look unattractive almost immediately.
 
While the insurance companies' unsecured position worsened, these
 
lenders took hope in the promise of improved financial performance.
 
28I While this decline is partly the result of excess capacity
 
associated with the high level of purchases, it is not our task
 
here to explain the determinants of profitability. Rather we
 
seek only todescribe the implications of shifting profitability
 
for industry financing.
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This improvement was ascribed to two factors: a seemingly sympa­
thetic regulatory agency and projected demand growth which would
 
alleviate excess capacity. Neither of these materialized.
 
1971-75 witnessed both demand instability and a call for regu­
latory reform. Slow and fluctuating demand for air passenger ery­
ice - coupled with severe input cost escalation - produced a
 
worsening economic record for nearly all carriers. In several
 
cases, the results were nearly disastrous (Eastern, Pan, and TWA).
 
High interest rates brought those carriers which had relied on
 
bank financing into continuing difficulties with these lenders, and
 
worsened relations with long term lenders. Indeed the declining
 
fortunes of the carriers served to cut off insurance sources since
 
these lenders portfolio decisions are narrowly circumscribed by
 
regulators who focus largely on coverage performance. That the
 
rising call for "regulatory reform" (especially easing of entry
 
restrictions) caused concern among these lenders, as well as air­
craft lessors, is hardly surprising. While the demand for funds
 
was limited during the period, the supply was more constrained.
 
True, financing was arranged; but at rates which were increasingly
 
tied to forces in capital markets and at maturities which were ever
 
shorter. Not surprisingly, depreciation and increases in short­
term liabilities provided about two-thirds of all funds, 1971-75.
 
Insum, the 1966-75 decade was one of changing fortunes for the
 
trunk carriers industry. Substantial commitments of capital funds
 
failed to yield the projected cash flows. And this failure produced
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an ever-increasing tension between borrower and lender. The 1976-7
 
aircraft financing has been limited. Where equity has been used it
 
has been very expensive. This statement, however, does not char­
acterize all carriers and one must examine the record of each car­
rier more carefully to determine future financing possibilities in
 
the industry.
 
F.3 INVESTMENT PROFITABILITY AND SOURCESJ1F EARNINGS . .
-. 

Relatively high debt levels are a desirable result under cer­
tain circumstances. As noted earlier, the tax deductibility of
 
interest payments means that debt funds can be obtained at a lower,
 
after-tax rate than equity funds. To the extent that earnings are
 
stable, the returns on the assets financed by debt will increase
 
stockholder wealth. However, unstable (uncertain) earnings' streams
 
are not consistent with high relative levels of debt funding, since
 
this instability increases default probabilities. Even instability
 
of earnings may be tolerated should average returns on invested
 
funds be sufficiently above zero.
 
The data in Parts E and F of Table 21 allow us to review the
 
level and variation in trunk carrier profitability. Return on equity
 
is-simply the ratio of after-tax profits to equity. The generally
 
low level of profitability observed ismost striking. Indeed, any
 
industry mean will be distorted by the performance of two carriers:
 
Braniff and Delta. It is axiomatic that highly-levered firms will
 
experience greater after-tax earnings variability than less-levered
 
firms, and this is seen in Part F. Of definite concern here is the
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return on assets record. Return on assets is here defined as the
 
ratio of taxable income plus interest obligations to total assets.
 
With the exception of the two carriers mentioned earlier, the record
 
isnot a good one: (i)several carriers recorded persistent growth
 
during the seventies (NAL, NWA, UAL, WAL) only to have the trend de­
stroyed by the recession of 1975; (ii)the remaining carriers ex­
hibit trendless and chronically low returns throughout the period.
 
Return on assets is,however, but one ingredient inthe return
 
to equity holders calculation. And it is the equity return which re­
quired our attention. Specifically, given the highly levered capital
 
structure inthe industry, the major future external source can only
 
be equity (i.e., income retention or sale of stock). The extent to
 
which equity financing can be obtained depends on the return-risk
 
characteristics of any new issue. To determine the prospective re­
turn, we turn, to a detailed analysis of the sources of after-tax
 
profits inthe trunkline sector.
 
The level and growth of after-tax profits isthe result of two
 
forces: economy-wide developments in prices and income, and manager­
ial decisions on supply,-financing and tax policy. One approach to
 
separating these influences follows. Define the following variables:
 
Y: after tax profits
 
L: total liabilities
 
.E: equity
 
X: before tax profits
 
I: interest payments
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T: all tax payments
 
We also define several ratios of interest,
 
w: return on assets
 
1:= average interest cost
 
e: effective tax rate
 
That is,
 
= (X+ I)(E + Q -1
 
_!= 1L-I
 
T X-I
 
Using these definitions one may derive an expression for the proxi­
mate determinants of profits:
 
Y = (l-e){n-)LI
 
With astable capital structure (constant E and L) shifts in profit­
ability may come from changes in: (i)operating profitability,
 
(ii)interest charges, and (iii) tax policy. Rising fuel prices, for
 
example, would lower 7rceterus paribus. Similarly a decline inshort­
term interest rates will lower average interest costs; and a switch
 
in depreciation policy to accelerated methods will raise depreciation
 
charges and lower tax liabilities.
 
This view of equity returns gives rise to Table 22 which exam­
ines-the ten-year history of earnings sources in the trunkline
 
.industry. Data are shown for eleven carriers. The following series
 
are presented: return on assets as defined above, "financial gain"
 
'(the difference between return on assets and average interest cost),
 
and the effective tax rate. The last of these would have a maximum
 
Firm 

AAL 

.BNF 

CAL 

DAL 
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TABLE 22
 
COMPONENTS OF EQUITY EARNINGS 1966-1975
 
Return Financial Effective Earnings 
Year on Assets Gain -- _Tax Rate Per Share 
1966 .097 .067 .378 2.90
 
67 .072 38 .295 2.38
 
68 .055 18 .211 1.75
 
69 .056 19 .210 1.90
 
70 -.002 -.035 .282' -1.30
 
71 .025 -.016 .083 .11
 
72 .023 -.011 .121 .20
 
73 -.015 -.051 .213 -1.69
 
74 .045 .003 .250 .72
 
75 -.002 -.028 .221 -.72
 
1966 .084 .057 .147 .95
 
67 .016 .002 .000, .25
 
68 .072 .023 .223 .55
 
69 .058 -.007 .206 .32
 
70 .026 -.023 .311 -.13
 
71 .073 .024 .280 .49
 
72 .089 .045 .247 .86
 
73 .102 .050 .263 1.16 
74 .123 .050 .311 1.31
 
75 .087 .030 .243 1.02
 
1966 .201 .169 .474 1.59
 
67 .120 .089 .401 1.57
 
68 .040 .004 .190 .37
 
69 .039 -.002 .244 .25
 
70 .040 .000 .285 .29
 
71 .057 .010 .392 .59
 
72 .060 .014 .470 .64
 
73 .037 -.019 1.086 .01
 
7.4 .074 -.008 .277 .57
 
75 .026 -.040. .430 -.68
 
-1966 .218 .191 .466 1.81
 
67 .260 .222 .459 2.57
 
68 .155 .117 .449 1.89
 
69 .136 .092 .466 2.05
 
70 .142 .072 .431 2.33
 
71 .073 .025 .289 1.57
 
72 .104 .060 .383 2.20
 
73 .145 .101 .432 3.32
 
74 .159 .104 .438 4.56
 
75 .083 .021 .340 2.4V
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TABLE 22 (continued)
 
Return, Financial Effective Earnings
 
Firm Year on Assets Gain Tax Rate Per Share
 
EAL 1966 .047 .018 .000 1.47
 
67 .057 .030 .240 2.12
 
68 .017 -.027 .248 1.02
 
69 .033 -.013 .282 -.19
 
70 .044 -.003 .256 .46
 
- 7-1-- - 7044- - - -009- - -- 239 T3­
72 .052 .011 .242 1.21
 
73 -.009 -.056 .199 -2.69
 
74 .056 -.008 .240 .41
 
76 .003 -.051 .000 -2.61
 
NAL 1966 .231 .199 .464' 2.62 
67 .163 .129 .458 2.03
 
68 .139 .11-1 .469 2.51 
69 .132 .081 .464 . 2.25 
70 .037 ..004 .192 .61 
71 .002 -.051 :650' -.46 
72 .086 .041 .331 .2.32
 
73 .090 .039 .396 2.36 
74 .133 .062 .429 3.58
 
75 .054 -.011 .126 1.33
 
NWA 1966 .243 .221 .465 2.90 
67 .237 .210 .468 3.21
 
68 .157 .140 .472 2.74 
69 .112 .101 .364 2.46
 
70 .055 .036 .003 2.10
 
71 .026 -.013 -.810 1.01 
72 .028 -. 001 -.025 .82 
73 .065 .030 .069 2.40
 
74 .107 .048 .342 3.00
 
75 .053 .012 .078 2.01 
TWA 1966 .086 .043 .389 3.29 
67 .064 .031 .120 4.12
 
68 .035 .001 -.396 2.15.
 
69 .035 .001 -.174 1.95
 
70 -.039 -.073 .295 -6.09
 
71 .029 -.010 -1.268 .27
 
72 .051 .026 .187 3.50
 
73 .055 .029 .329 3.71
 
74 .020 -.022 -.033 -1.82
 
75 -.019 -.062 .166 -6.35
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TABLE 22 (continued)
 
Firm Year 

UALo 1966 

67 

68 

69 

70 

71 

72 

73 

74 

75 

WAL 1966 

67 

68 

69 

70 

71 

72 

73 

74 

75 

Effective Earnins.
 
Tax Rate Per Share­
.386 2.31
 
.324 3.96
 
.460 2.27
 
.453 2.43
 
.187 -2.22
 
'144 -.24
 
.406 .97
 
.500 2.41
 
.549 4.17
 
-.023 -.72
 
.467 1.22
 
:453 .82
 
.359 .56
 
.553' -.81
 
1.360 .04
 
.306 .39
 
.360 .74 
.422 1.35 
.424 1.59 
-.190 .34
 
Return 

on Assets 

.068 

.089 

.063 

.067 

"003 
.024 

.040 

.068 

.109 

.021 

.191 

.110 

.056 

-.034 

.036 

.058 

.081 

.121 

.132 

.032 

Financial 

Gain 

.040 

.059 

.030 

.025 

-.037 

-.019 

-.'001 

.025 

.066 

-.020 

.151 

.082 

.027 

--.092 

-.023 

.008 

.033 

.075 

.081 

-.009 
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value of .48 were there no "other taxes" included in T, no income
 
averaging procedures available tocorporations, no tax on capital
 
gains, or special treatment of foreign income. (That these condi­
tions do not always obtain accounts for effective tax rates out­
side the interval 0 to .48.)
 
Perhaps the best way to examine Table 22 is on an average
 
basis. The trends developed for the industy_can_then_be_com 
__
 
pared with individual carriers at the reader's convenience.
 
Return on assets statistics were earlier examined only for the
 
1970's. Within the context of the past decade further remarks are
 
in order. Specifically, dramatic declines in asset profitability
 
characterize the 1966-75 period, with the exception of BNF and UAL.
 
Of greater concern is the fact that return rates for the industry
 
have fallen dramatically relative to economy wide returns. While
 
the sources of this decline in profitability are manifold, two
 
factors seem critical; (f)rapid escalation of input unit prices ­
first labor, then fuel; and (ii)inadequate productivity gains
 
associated with aging, or oversized, craft and fleets.
 
Financial gain (7 - i) measures the extent to which asset 
profitability exceeds the average cost of borrowing to provide 
these assets. In a sense this statistic describes corporate gains 
from leverage. We noted earlier the extremely high leverage in the 
industry, as well as the potential value of debt instruments;
 
and turn now to ex post performance. The reported values of this
 
statistic are extremely disappointing. The rapid inflation rates
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of the past decade caused problems through the business sector:
 
interest rates rose rapidly to reflect inflationary expectations,
 
while asset returns failed to keep pace. Inother sectors, however,
 
this development simply narrowed the amounts of financial gain.. In
 
the air trunkline group, the same trend caused numerous carriers'
 
financial gain to become negative, i.e., on average these firms were
 
actually obtaining less from all assets than the cost of borrowed
 
funds. A painful result under any circumstances, the impact of
 
after-tax earnings insuch a highly leveraged industry was devastat­
ing. (This remark issimply a restatement of the "double whammy"
 
implicit inleverage.)
 
A few carrier-specific remarks on financial gain are inorder:
 
Note first that, with the exception of DAL, all of the trunks are
 
experienced innegative financial gain. Inseveral cases these prob­
lems were associated with the rapid growth of interest on short-term
 
business loans during the 1969-70 period and were not persistent.
 
However, several carriers have faced regularly negative values for
 
financial gain, and insome cases the situation has worsened. Finally
 
we note that the inflation of 1975, and the resultant increase in
 
short-term borrowing rates, produced negative financial gain figures
 
for all but three (BNF, DAL, NWA) carriers. Worst hit by the events
 
of 1975 were those carriers which have substantial bank revolving
 
credit agreements (CAL, EAL, PN, TWA) since these loans carry inter­
est rates which float with money market rates. Itshould be added
 
that the problems of 1975 were made the more severe by credit,
 
OR1GW A G IS
 
O-P6doR 9UMA&LTY 
- 144 ­
agreements which required higher effective rates above prime and
 
further restricted financial management practice.
 
Tax policy can, of course, exert a strong and potentially
 
counter-cyclical influence on corporate earnings. While there are
 
numerous ways of lowering the effective tax rate, thus raising
 
after-tax profits, the leading technique inthe airline industry
 
has been accelerated depreciation. Acceleration is only a temporary
 
-avi-daffe-b-ut -i a word ofpositive interest rates it is a desir­
able strategy. And in certain firms asset growth may proceed at
 
sufficiently high rates to produce indefinite postponement. (While
 
this situation isunusual, it is not far from the case which existed
 
when wide-bodied aircraft started to join the trunk carrier fleet.)
 
Effective tax rates for the trunks are given in Table 22. With
 
the exception of Delta these rates are not typical of the economy.
 
This is due to: (i)the high levels (and'age) oficapital investment
 
in airlines relative to other sectors, and (ii)the propensity of
 
airline management to select accelerated depreciation schemes. The
 
following Table 23 - derived from the Compustat data base - illus­
trates this point.
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TABLE 23
 
COMPARISON OF EFFECTIVETAX RATES
 
Industry or Effective Tax Rate
 
Firm 1966 1975
 
Communication .48 .45
 
Utilities .38 .32
 
Transportation .38 .35
 
AAL .38 .22
 
BNF .15 .24
 
CAL .47 .43
 
DAL .47 .34
 
EAL .00 .00
 
NAL .46 .13
 
NWA .47 .08
 
PAA .39 .15
 
TWA .39 .17
 
UAL .39 -.02
 
WAL .47 -.19
 
Clearly the airline industry has employed investment tax credits and
 
tax deferral schemes to an extent not at all common to other regu­
lated, capital intensive sectors. We emphasize this point because
 
the value of such deferrals is conditional on the level of taxable
 
income. To the extent that the low return record of the past sever­
al years continues through the remainder of the decade, one must
 
conclude that tax policy will not continue to provide substantial
 
capital fund sources.
 
Equity return data are of interest because they condition the
 
level of capital sources: return levels provide measures of the ex­
tent to which new equity can be sold in the industry, as well as
 
determining the desirabliity of investing income retentions. If
 
equity returns are adequate then the firm can obtain new equity, or
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reinvest cash flows, without lowering the wealth of its stockholders.
 
The picture for future equity financing is a mixed one: two car­
riers, Braniff and Delta, have produced substantial per share earn­
ings. As the earlier discussion shows, Delta has accomplished this
 
with substantially less debt per share than Braniff; and has not re­
lied as heavily on tax deferral schemes. For these carriers - and
 
Delta in particular - equity financing remains an easy source of
 
funds. - Ndti-nal, Nortfwest, and Western have provided positive re­
turns to equity holders throughout the decade with two exceptions
 
(NAL, 1971 and WAL, 1969). The critical question is one of trend
 
here. While the 1975 results were not favorable, the return trends
 
for these carriers are upward.
 
During the 1971-75 period four carriers exhibit improving equity
 
returns ifwe abstract from 1975: National, Northwest, United and
 
Western. However, since Northwest and United begin from extremely
 
low bases, we must distinguish between the four. The growing equity
 
returns for these carriers were not the result of leverage since
 
liability-equity ratios remained relatively constant. In the case
 
of National and Western, the return records are simply the result of
 
increased operational profitability in the face of rising interest
 
costs. Northwest and United produced equity return growth via differ­
ent strategies, the former relying heavily on tax reductions via
 
acceleration schemes, while the latter depended on efficiencies in
 
operations and balance sheet management. Distinguishing again be­
tween the four carriers, we note that only National and Western
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generated equity returns which would make retention investments
 
attractive.
 
Equity returns at Pan Am have been persistently negative and do
 
not warrant further discussion here. 
We turn instead to the remain­
ing trunk carriers: American, Continental, Eastern, and TWA. "All
 
of these firms exhibit declining returns on equity in the 1971-75
 
period. 
 While the rate of decline for AAL is almost imperceptible,
 
the trend in the other cases isdefinite. However, the poor per­
formance of these carriers can largely be laid to the following fac:
 
tors: first, persistently low return on assets. 
Second, all of
 
these carriers maintained large revolving credit agreements with
 
commercial banks during the period, and in most cases paid interest
 
rates in 
excess of their return on assets. This performance has
 
been such that itwill be difficult indeed to attract new equity to
 
these firms, much less to justify income retention should earnings
 
improve in the near term. 
That both AAL and TWA appear in this group
 
is a source of concern here, since these carriers hold a large pro­
portion of the older craft in the trunkline fleet.
 
The leverage and coverage statistics discussed in Section F.2
 
go a long way toward describing risk associated with airline industry
 
common stock. 
That is, high levels of debt relative to permanent
 
capital imply high fixed tharges, and low values of coverage ratios
 
indicate possibilities of default on these charges. Inrecent years
 
it has been suggested that the relation of changes in specific secur­
ity returns relative to average shifts in the securities market
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average returns provide a measure of the "risk" which is specific 
to a given firm. Define the following variables: 
R.: return on security j (dividend yield plus capital 
gain) 
Rm: average return on a "market portfolio" composed of 
all securities. 
Now, from the equation 
Rj = aj + jRm + Sj (3) 
we derive the following view of risk: the variance of returns on
 
security j (aj2) is the sum of systematic or market, influences
 
2
(02(2 ) and firm-specific risk a. . Accordingly, computed values of
 
aj derived from fitting (3)to prior years' experience are thought
 
to express the relationship between risk in a given security and
 
market risk, i.e., values for aj in excess of unity indicate greater
 
"systematic" risk in security j than in the portfolio of market se­
curities, and vice versa. Stocks with computed values of aj in ex­
cess of one thus rise faster than a bull market, and fall faster
 
than a bear market returns.
 
One security research firm provides regular reports of a sta­
tistic very similar to the B in (3). This is the Value Line service
 
which excludes dividend yield from its return definition. However,
 
given the paucity of airline industry dividends, we have in the Value
 
Line statistics a useful measure of risk in equity instruments. For
 
the eleven carriers the computed values are:
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Firm "
 
AAL 1.45 
BNF 1.60
 
CAL 1.60
 
DAL 1.35
 
EAL 1.45
 
NAL 1.70
 
NWA 1.60'
 
PAA 1.50
 
.TWA 1.85
 
UAL 1.60
 
WAL 1.60
 
As these coefficients are derived by lea st-squares oftits of (D-) /
 
for the 60 months prior to October 1975, the values reported are
 
random variables. Accordingly it is difficult to conclude that
 
there exist important differences among these values. Rather these
 
values are reported because of their excess over unity. On this
 
measure of risk, airline equity investments are risky indeed. Note
 
that the lowest estimate in the group is 1.35 - a value exceeded by
 
only 118 of the 1600 firms in the Value Line sample. (Excepting the
 
DAL figure, trunk air carriers constitute 8.5% of the 118 firms.)
 
F.4 REPLACEMENT FINANCING: PERSPECTIVE 7
 
The preceding remarks clearly document the disastrous financial
 
performance of the domestic trunk airline industry, 1966-1975. The
 
message in this record for replacement decisions is clearly negative.
 
To wit, excess leverage has produced debilitating impacts on equity
 
returns, and has raised borrowing costs to,unusual levels.
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Further debt financing thus appears an impossibility for all but a
 
few carriers. Indeed, deteriorating coverage positions have raised
 
serious questions as to the appropriateness of further leasing ­
and this in spite of the substantial tax incentives for such activ­
ity. Our work indicates equity financing (either through income re­
tention or new stock issues) is the only serious approach to the
 
massive replacement program. The same work shows that future equity
 
f~n TFrquires much higher return rates than have previously been
 
typical. These higher rates follow from several developments:
 
(i)declining rates of return on assets produced by quantum jumps in
 
fuel costs, (ii)increasing interest rates associated with excessive
 
leverage, and (iii) investor uncertainty generated by deregulation
 
discussion and uncertainty as to noise abatement retrofit, refanning,
 
or replacement financing legislation. 
 -
The first quarter of 1977 saw these projections satisfied in a
 
special sense. American Airlines - a carrier with a high degree of
 
financial leverage and a relatively high proportion of older aircraft
 
in its fleet - moved to begin replacement of its 707-100 aircraft.
 
American's irregular return on equity, associated with high interest
 
costs relative to return on assets, had made future debt financing
 
nearly impossible. American offered 5 million shares of $2.1875 pre"
 
ferred stock (with 5 million warrants to purchase shares of its com­
mon stock at $14) for $25 per unit on March 20, 1977. The net pro­
ceeds of this issue were $18.5 million. The impact on American's
 
balance sheet was substantial: debt.declines from 41% to 37% of its
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long-term capital structure. While itwould be easy to over-state
 
the impact of this move, itmust nonetheless be viewed as signal.
 
Later in 1977 EAL and TWA engaged insimilar financing.
 
What isto be learned from the AAL example is simple. Debt must 
be reduced as a part of any major replacement program. Of course, 
this is inconsistent with the scale of the replacement task. Itcan 
only be concluded that such replacements as do occur will be well 
below the levels projected by numerous studies of industry capital 
"needs." Replacement of older aircraft will occur, and at more 
rapid rates among the less-levered, more profitable carriers. How­
ever, that replacement programs will be smaller than projections is 
the only reasoned conclusion which follows from an examination of ­
the airline industry's financial performance. 
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APPENDIX A
 
INVENTORY OF COMMERCIAL JET FLEET, U.S. CARRIERS
 
Source: Ross, Commercial Jet Replacement Process, Northwestern
 
University, The Transportation Center (1977)
 
AC 

AIRLINE 	 TYPE 
U.S. TRUNK 	 747-100 

-AMERICAN 	 720-B 

707-120B 

707-320B 

707-320C 

DC-8-50F 

DC-8-61F 

727-100 

727-200 

DC-10-10 

CV-990A 

BRANIFF 	 747-100 

DC-8-50 

DC-8-62 

DC-8-62F 

727-100 

727-I00Q/C 

727-200 

BAC-ill 

CONTINENTAL 	720B 

727-100Q/C 

727-200 

DC-10-10 

DC-10-1OCF 

DELTA 	 747-100 

DC-8-50 

DC-8-61 

727-100 

727-200 

DC-9-30 

L-101l 

TTL 

# 

9 

3 

48 

10 

31 

2 

1 

57 

55/9 

25 

4 

1 

4 

6 

1 

12 

17 

44 

-
5 

1 

36/1 

8 

8 

3 

19 

13 

5 

71/18 

62 

17/2 

# 

IN SER 
9 

0 

48 

10 

31 

0 

0 

57 

55 

25. 

0 

1 

4 

6 

1 

12 

17 

44 

-
5 

1 

36 

8 

8 

3 

5 

13 

5 

71 

62 

19 

1st YR 

TYPE OPER 

1970 

1961 

1960 

1969 

1963 

.N/A 

N/A. 

1954 

1968 

1971 

1952 

1959 

1973 

1967 

1957 

1966 

1956 

1970 

-
1962 

1967 

1968 

1972' 

1974 

1970 

1960 

1967 

1972 

1972 

1967 

1973 

ANY NEW 

PURCH 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

N/A 

N/A 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

NO 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

'YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

NO 

YES 

YES 

YES 

AGE 

HIGH YR 

6 

15 

17 

7 

13 

N/A 

N/A 

12 

8 

5 

14 

'7 

14 

9 

9 

10 

10 

6 

-
14 

9 " 

8 

4 

2 

6 

17 

9 

11 

8 

9 

' 3 

HIGH 
HOUR 

15,000 

30,000 

54,000 

25,000 

30,000 

N/A 

N/A 

32,000 

23,000 

12,000 

-
27,000 

46,000 

33,000 

33,000 

32,000 

33,000 

24,000 

-
52,000 

21,000 

27,000 

16,000 

9,000 

17,000 

54,000 

31,000 

31,000 

25,000 

27,000 

7,000 

HIGH
 
LAND 
5,200 

15,400 

27,000 

9,800 

16,700
 
N/A 

N/A 

27,600.
 
18,900 

6,000 

-
4,400
 
16,600
 
11,900
 
11,900
 
29,800
 
30,900
 
23,200
 
-

36,500
 
18,500
 
24,500
 
8,200
 
3,800
 
8,000 

35,600 

20,800
 
21,400 

18,500 

34,000
 
5,500
 
REMARKS 
1 10OF; 2 100 F76 
10 Convert 720 
23 Convert.120; Some 
for sale 
Leased to !AS Cargo AL 
Leased to Spantex 
(Ison'order ORT 75) 
(11 options dropped) 
Leased to Spantex 
Corporate Aircraft 
Sold to Boeing 
All for sale (6 Units 
Converted 8-10 
Acquire NE Merger 
First Units acquired 
NE.Merger, 
-o 
-F 
AC TTL # 1st YR ANY NEW AGE HIGH HIGH 
AIRLINE TYPE # INSER TYPE OPER PUROH HIGH YR HOUR LAND REMARKS 
EASTERN 727-100 46 46 1963 YES 13 35,000 32,000 
727-I00Q/C 
727-200 
00-9-10 
25 
42 
9 
25 
42 
9 
1966 
1969 
[1966 
YES 
YES 
YES 
10 
7 
10 
31,000 
20,000 
26,000 
23,530 
15,800 
24,200 Return to DACO 1978 
DC-9-30 72 72 11967 YES 9 23,000 21,900 
00-8-20/30 3 0 1960 YES 16 41,000 19,700 Repossessed 
L-1011 
00-8-61 
29/6 
5 
29 
0 
1972 YES 
-
4 
-
10,000 5,700 
-
2 Sold Cathay Pacific 
2 Leased Capitol, 2 JAL 
NATIONAL 747-100 2 0 1970 YES 6 16,000 5,000 Sold to NW 
727-100 
727-200 
DC-8-20/30 
DC-10-10 
DC-10-30 
13 
26 
1 
11 
4 
13 
25 
0 
11 
4 
1964 
1968 
1963 
1971 
1973 
YES 
YES 
NO 
YES 
YES 
12 
8 
16 
5 
3 
29,000 
23,000 
N/A 
12,000 
10,000 
31,500 
23,500 
N/A 
7,000 
3,030 
1 
1 
NWAC
I 
leased to OV 
NORTHWEST 00-10-40 
747-100 
22 
12 
22 
10 
1972 
1970 
YES 
YES 
4 
6 
9,000
20,000 
6,000 
6,600 
_ 
747-200B 5 5. 1971 YES 5 17,800 5,400 4­
747-200F 3 3 1975 YES I -1 
707-3208 
707-3200 
727-100 
727-IOOQ 
5 
3 
20 
12 
5 
3 
15 
12 
1963 
1964 
1964 
1966 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
13 
12 
12 
10 
24,000 
22,000 
26,000 
22,000 
10,700 
9,800 
27,300 
22,900 
Surplus 
Some for sale 
I 
727-200 31/4 31 1968 YES 8 17,000 16,800 
PAN AM 747-100 
747-2000 
32 
2 
32 
2 
1969 
1974 
YES 
NO 
7 
5 
23,000
12,000 
6,300
2,800 
TWo are Freighters
Sblease World AW 
747SP 5 5 1975 YES 1 - -
707-320B 51 51 1962 YES 14 50,800 17,475 
707-3200 19 19 1963 YES 13 45,000 15,800 
727-100 11 11 1965 YES 11 23,000 26,500 
727-I00Q 2 2 1966 YES 10 22,000 25,600 
707-320 2 0 1959 YES 17 42,000 14,700 Far Sale 
TWA 747-100 10 10 1969 YES 7 22,000 4,000 
-a 
70/-1208 40 40 1962 YES 14 47,000 19,400 
707-3208 36 36 1962 YES 14 50,000 14,600 > 
707-320C 16 15 1963 YES 13 39,000 15,100 
727-100 
727-100Q 27 8 27 8 1964 1967 YES YES 12 9 31,O0o24,000 22,10017,800 
AC TTL 

AIRLINE TYPE # 

TWA Cont'd 	 727-200 39/14 

DC-9-10 19 

707-320 10 

L-10ll 30 

CV-880 25 

UNITED 	 747-100 18 

DC-8-50 16 

DC-8-50F 15 

DC-8-61 30 

DC-8-62 9 

727-100 86 

727-100Q 36 

727-200 28 

737-200 59 

DC-8-20-30 31 

720 4 

DC-10-10 37 

WESTERN 	 720B 18 

707-320C 5 

727-200 21/5 

737-200 24 

DC-10-10 7 

REGIONAL/LOCAL SERVICE
 
AIR CALIF 	 737-200 8 

ALASKA 	 727-100 .5 

727-00Q 3 

ALLEGHENY 	 DC-9-30 43 

DC-9-50 8 

'BAC-I1I- '31 

200
 
# Ist YR 

IN SER 'TYPE OPER 

39 

19 

10 

30 

0 

18 

16 

15 

30 

9 

86 

36 

28 

57 

30 

0 

37 

18 

5 

21 

24 

7 

8 

5 

4 

43 

8 

31 

1968 

1966 

1959 

1972 

1960 

1'970 

1961 

1964 

1967 

1969 

1963 

1966 

1968 

1968 

1960 

N/A 

1971 

1961 

1968 

1969 

1968 

1973 

1968 

1969 

1966 

1967 

1975 

1972' 

ANY NEW 

PURCH 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES-

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

N/A 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

NO 

YES 

YES 

YES 

NO 

AGE 

HIGH YR 

8 

10 

17 

4 

17 

6 

15 

12 

9 

7 

13 

10 

8 

8 

16 

N/A 

5 

T5 

8 

9 

8 

3 

8 

13 

10 

9 

1 

11 
HIGH 

HOUR 

22,000 

20,000 

57,000 

9,000 

-
19,000 

52,000 

31,000 

29,000 

22,000 

31,000 

29,000 

19,000 

14,000 

52,000 

N/A 

13,000 

43,000 

29,000 

18,000 

19,000 

11,000 

19,000 

26,000 

28,000 

26,000 

1,000 
32,000 

HIGH
 
LAND 

21,200 

20,600
 
18,100
 
3,900 

-
4,600
 
22,900 

13,600
 
11,900
 
7,300
 
24,903
 
20,600
 
16,900
 
21,600 

25,000 

N/A 

6,500
 
31,000
 
9,500
 
13,200
 
24,800
 
4,200
 
32,500 

27,100 

22,900
 
34,600
 
1,000
 
42,000 

REMARKS
 
Delivery deferred
 
2 Sold to Saudi, More
 
for Sale
 
Grounded, For Sale
 
6-1-63 5 Converted
 
from 10's
 
Two leased out
 
15 Converted from
 
lO's 61-63 a
 
Not operable
 
One on sublease to Aloha
 
Lease PSA; pur. PA
 
EX, EN, Mohawk
 
AC TTL # Ist YR ANY NEW AGE HIGH HIGH 
AIRLINE TYPE # IN SER TYPE OPER PURCH HIGH YR HOUR LAND 
ALOHA 737-100 2 2 1973 NO 8 11,000 10,800 
737-200 4 4 1969 YES 7 14,000 38,000 
FRONTIER 737'200 19 19 1969 YES 7 20,006 24,900 
HAWAIIAN DC-9-30 4 4 R967 YES 9 17,000 25,500 
DC-9-30F' 1 1 .1972 NO 20,000 39,000 
DC-9-50 8 8, 1975 YES 1 2,000 31,000 
HUGHES AIR DC-9-10 4 4 1968 YES 8 25,000 36,800 
DC-9-10F 12 11 1973 NO 8 25,000 34,900 
DC-9-30 17 17 1968 YES 6 24,000 331,800 
B727-200 0/3 - - - - -
NORTH DC-9-30 21 21 1967 YES 9 21,000 35,,100 
CENTRAL DC-9-50 3/3 3, 1076 - -
OZARK DC-9-10 6 4 1966 YES 10, 23,000 37',500 
DC-9-30 19 18 1968 YES 81 22,000 33,900 
PACIFIC SW -.727-200 22 22 1967 YES 9 20,000 31,200 
737-200 3 3 1968 YES 8 16,000 24',900 
L-1011 2/3 0 1974 YES 2 1,000 1,,800 
PIEDMONT 737-200 19 19 1968 YES 8 20,000 322,100 
SOUTHERN DC-9-10 
DC-9-30 
21 
6 
21 
6 
1967 
1969 
YES 
YES 
9 
7 
29,000 
19,000 
501800 
27,400 
SOUTHWEST 737-200 5 5 1971 YES 5 12,000 17 900 
TEXAS INT. DC-9-10 13 13 1966 YES 10 25,000 33,800 
DC-9-10F 3 3 1967 YES 9 25,000 33;800 
DC-9-30 5 5 1969 YES 8 19,000 24,500 
WIEN AIR 737.200Q 7 7 1968 YES 8 14,000 16,800 
REMARKS 
EX AVIANCA 
2 UA 
5 Used 
Lease OV 
EX CO 
on 
2 Grounded; 3 Order 
Dispute 
> 
AC TTL Ist YR ANY NEW AGE HIGH HIGH 
AIRLINE TYPE # IN SER TYPE OPER PURCH HIGH YR HOUR LAND REMARKS 
SUPPLEMENTAL/CARGO 
AIRLIFT INT 
CAPITOL INT 
DC-8-50F 
DC-8-63F 
727-IOOQ 
707-300 
DC-8-61 
DC-8*63F 
DC-8-20/30 
2 
3 
1 
2 
2 
2 
4 
2 
3 
0 
0 
2 
1 
4 
1967 
1968 
1967 
i971 
1968. 
1967 
-
YES 
YES 
YES 
NO 
YES 
NO 
9 
8 
9 
-
9 
8 
16 
45,000 21,600 
30,000 9,000 
26,000 14,700 
- -
27,000 8,100 
25,000 7,500 
52,000 26,000 
Leased out 
Leased to Aerolineas 
Argentinas 
PUR. fm NA 
*One lease OV 
EX BN, EX NA 
FLYING TIGER 747-IOOF 
DC-8-63F 
3/3 
14* 
3 
14 
1974 
1968 
NO 
YES 
7 
8 
16,000 
28,000 
5,100 
8,400 
McCULLOCH 
INT 
DC-8-20/30 
B720 
I 
3 
O, 
3 
1975 
1975 
NO 
NO 
17 
-
43,000 19,800 
- -
EX UA 
OVERSEAS 
NAT 
DC-8-61F 
DC-8-63F 
DC-9-30F 
DC-8-20/30 
DC-1O-30F 
2 
2 
4 
5 
0/2 
2 
2 
4 
4 
0 
1972 
1968 
1967 
1973 
1973 
. 
NO 
YES 
YES 
NO 
YES 
8 
8 
9 
16 
-
* 
26,000 6,500 
29,000 7,300 
25,000 22,000 
46,000 13,800 
- -
2 Cannibalized 
Del 1977 
SATURN DC-8-61F 1 0 - - - - Leased to Seaboard Wld 
SEABOARD WLD 747-200F 
DC-8-50F 
DC-8-61F 
DC-8-63F 
2 
1 
5 
5 
2 
1 
5 
5 
1974 
1964 
1973 
1968 
YES 
YES 
NO 
YES 
2 
11 
9 
8 
8,000 1,800 
37,000 10,400 
32,000 8,000 
34,000 8,500 
TRANS INT DC-8-63F 
DC-10-30F 
DC-8-61 
6 
3 
1 
6 
3 
0 
1968 
1973 
YES 
YES 
-
8 
3 
-
29,000 
11,000 
7,300 
2,700 
- Leased to Seaboard Wid 
WORLD 747-200C 3 1 1973 YES 3 10,000 2,200 1 Sublease PA; 
1 Sublease Korean 
DC-8-63F 
747-I00Q 
6 
4 
. 6 
0 
1971 
1967 
YES 
YES 
7 
9 
28,000 7,300 
27,000 17,000 Leased to PSA 
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APPENDIX B
 
INVENTORY OF NON-U.S. COMMERCIAL JET FLEET (Free World Only)
 
Source: 	 Ross,Commercial Jet Replacement Process, Northwestern
 
University, The Transportation Center
 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS 
Or POOR QUA=ITI 
AC TTL # Ist YR ANY NEW AGE HIGH HIGH 
AIRLINE TYPE IN SER TYPE OPER PURCH HIGH YR HOUR LAND REMIARKS 
CANADA 
AIR CANADA 747-100 
747-2008 
DC-8-50 
DC-8-5OF 
5 
1 
2 
5 
5 
1 
2 
5 
1971 
1975 
1968 
1963 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
5 
1 
8 
13 
14,000 
4,000 
24,000 
41,000 
4,600 
1,700 
11,500 
15,200 
DC-8-61 
DC-8-63 
7 
12 
7 
12 
1967 
1969 
YES 
YES 
9 
7 
25,000 
22,000 
9,800 
8,600 
727-200 
DC-9-10F 
DC-9-30 
14 
8 
44 
14 
8 
44 
1974 
1972 
1967 
YES 
NO 
YES 
2 
9 
9 
4,000 
22,000 
22,000 
5,200 
33,400 
21,600 
Ex.CO 
DC-9-30F 
L-1011 
DC-8-40 
1 
10 
11 
1, 
10 
8 
1973 
1973 
1960 
NO 
YES 
YES 
.9 
3 
16 
21,000 
8,000 
45,000 
18,600 
4,100 
20,700 
Ex OV Nat'l 
CP AIR 747-200B 
DC-8-50 
DC-8-50F 
DC-8-63 
727-100 
727-200 
4 
1 
1 
5 
4 
2 
4 
1 
1 
5 
4 
2 
1975 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1970 
1975 
YES 
YES 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
1 
10 
10 
8 
6 
1 
8,000 
40,000 
35,000 
37,000 
20,000 
3,000 
2,600 
12,400 
10,850 
10,700 
15,100 
2,300 
Ex PG 
737-200 
DC-8-40 
7 
5 
7 
4 
1971 
1961 
YES 
YES 
4 
15 
24,000 
61,000 
18,600 
18,900 
EASTERN PRO 737-200 7 7 1969. YES 7 17,000 27,300 
NORDAIR DC-8-61F 
737-200 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1973 
1969 
NO 
YES 
9 
7 
31,000 
12,000 
14,900 
10,4'00 
Lease from TIA 
737-200C 5 5 1968 YES 8 21,000 13,500 
I 
AC TTL # Ist YR ANY NEW AGE HIGH HIG 
AIRLINE TYPE # IN SER *TYPE OPER PURCH HIGH YR HOUR LAND REMARKS 
PACIFIC WEST 707-120B 1 1 1967 NO 15 50,000 20,600 Ex Quantas 
707-320C 1 1 1972 NO 11 37,000 13,000 Ex NW 
727-I00Q 2 2 1972 NO ,8 22,000 13,600 Ex Air Asia, TIA 
737-200 10 10 1968 YES* 8 14,000 26,300 
737-200C 1/1 1 1969 YES 7 19,000 23,400 
QUEBECAIR 727-100 1 1 1974 NO 12 30,000 25,000 Ex EA 
BAC-111-300 3 3 1969 NO Ex British Eagle, Phil. 
Air 
TEMPAIR 707-220/320 1 1 1974 NO 16 54,000 19,900 Ex PA 
WARDAIR 747-100 
707-320C 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1973 
1968 
YES 
YES 
5 
8 
16,000 
17,000 
5,300 
11,800 
Ex CO 
1 
INTERNATIONAL C) 
AEROCONDOR 720B 2 2 1972 NO 15 38,000 21,1176 Ex AA 
COLUMBIA 707-120B 1 1 1975 NO --
AERO PERU DC-8-50 3 3 1974 NO 14 55,000 13,8100 Ex BIASA, KLM 
727-100 1 1 1974 NO 13 35,000 30,100 Ex EA 
F28 3/1 3 1974 NO Merger SATCO 
AERO TRANSPORT , 
ITALIANI DC-9-30 16 16 1969 ,YES 7 13,000 19,500 
AERO MEXICO DC-8-50 5 5 1962 YES 14 42,000 21,000 1 EX NA 
DC-9-10 9 9 1967 YES 9 26,000 26,000 
DC-9-30DC-10-30 72 72 19741974 YESYES 22 7,0009,000 7,000­3,390 
AIRLINE 
AC 
TYPE 
TTL 
# 
# 
IN SER 
Ist YR 
TYPE OPER 
ANY NEW 
PURCH 
AGE 
HIGH YR 
HIGH 
HOUR 
IGH 
LAND REMARKS 
AER QUISQUE-
YANAS DC-8-20/30 
707-200 
2 
2 
0 
2 
1974 
1974 
NO 
NO 
6 
15 
39,000 
40,000 
14,800 
14,000 
Ex JA 
Ex PA 
AFFRETAIR 
(GABON) DC-8-50F 2 2 1972 NO 11 44,000 11,000 Ex SB, CA 
AFRICAN 
SAFARI DC-8-20/30 1 1 
I 
1973 NO 16 48,000 12,000, Ex Martinair 
AIR AFRIQUE DC-8-50 
DC-8-50F 
DC-8-63F 
Caravelle ± 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
1 
1963 
1966 
1970 
YES 
YES 
YES 
13 
10 
6 
43,000 
45,000 
23,000 
15,300 
16,700 
5,800 
Ex Alia Roy Jordan 
1OR 1 1 i973 NO 11 
Caravelle 
11R 
DC-8-20/30 
DC-10-30 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
1967 
1967 
1973 
YES 
NO 
YES 
9 
15 
3 
48,000 
10,000 
18,200 
4,100 
Ex UTA 
AIR ALGERIE 727-200 
737-200 
737-200C 
4 
6 
2 
4 
6 
2 
1971 
1970 
1972 
YES 
YES 
YES 
5 
6 
4 
14,000 
12,000 
10,000 
9,200 
8,300 
7:600 
Caravelle 3 3 
Caravelle 6 1 
3 
1 
1960 
1961 
YES 
YES 
16 
15 
AIR BRUNEI 
(BORNEO) 737-200 2 2 1975 YES 1 2,000 500 
AIR CENTRA-
FRIQUE Caravelle 2 2 1975 NO 14 .Ex Sterling 
6R. 
AIR CEYLON DC-8-5O 
HS-121-1E 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1972 
1969 
NO 
YES 
16 
7 
51,000 Ex UTA (NW) 
AIRLINE 
AC 
TYPE 
TTL 
# 
# 
IN SER 
1st YR 
TYPE OPER 
ANY NEW 
PURCH 
AGE 
HIGH YR 
HIGH 
HOUR 
HIGH 
LAND REMARKS 
AIR CHARTER 
INTIL FRANCE 
727-200 
Caravelle 3 
2 
5 
2 
4 
1971 
1971 
NO 
NO 
9 
13 
18,QO0 22,800 Ex PCC, SW 
Ex Air France 
AIR FRANCE 747-100 14 
747-200F 1 
707-320B 6 
707-320C 11 
727-200 20 
737-200 2 
707-220/230 17 
747-200F(GEY' 0/1 
A300 7 
Concorde 0/4 
Caravelle 3 36 
14 
1 
6 
11 
20 
2 
17 
0 
7 
2 
33 
1970 
1974 
1962 
1965 
1968 
1973 
1959 
-
1975 
1976 
1959 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
6 
2 
14 
11 
8 
8 
17 
-
1 
-
17 
21,000 
6,000 
46,000 
36,000 
16,000 
16,00 
47,000 
3,000 
6,000 
1,200 
14,000 
8,000 
15,300 
20,800 
14,200 
2,600 
Ex WA 
AIR INTER 
FRANCE 
Caravelle 12 
Mercure 100 
Caravelle 3 
5 
9/1 
17 
5 
9 
17 
1972 
1974 
1967 
YES 
YES 
YES 
6 
2 
9 
AIR INDIA 747-200B 
707-320B 
707-320C 
707-420 
5 
3 
2 
4 
5 
3 
2 
4 
1971 
1964 
1967 
1960 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
5 
12 
9 
16 
16,0pO 
35,090 
30,090 
51,000 
6,600 
14,600 
12,400 
22,600 
AIR HAITI DC-8-20/30 2 0 1973 NO 16 40,0Q0 15,600 Ex EA 
( ' 
AIR JAMAICA DC-8-50 
DC-8-61 
DC-8-62 
727-200 
DC-9-30 
3 
2 
1 
5 
3 
3 
2 
1 
5 
3 
1971 
1969 
1973 
1974 
1969 
NO 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
14 
9 
7 
2 
7 
40,Oo 
26,000 
22,000 
4,000 
16,00 
15,600 
6,300 
.5,500 
3,800 
8,000 
Ex"EA 
Ex EA 
Ex EA 
. 
"cr 
AC TTL # Ist YR ANY NEW AGE HIGH HIGH 
AIRLINE TYPE # IN SER TYPE OPER PURCH HIGH YR HOUR LAND REMARKS 
AIR MADAGASCAR 737-200 2 2 1969 YES 7 10,000 10,100 
AIR MALI 727-I00Q 1 1 1971 NO 9 17,000 12,400 Ex WLD 
AIR MALTA 720B 
BAC-111-500 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1974 
1975 
NO 
NO 
16 
I0 
43,000 20,500 Lease from Pakistan Int'l 
Lease from B. CAL 
AIR MICRONESIA 727-l00Q 2 2 1968 NO 9 23,000 15,500 
AIR NAURU 737-200Q 1 1 1975 YES 1 -
AIR NEW DC-8-50 6 6 1965 YES 16 52,000 23,900 2 Ex UA 
ZEALAND ;DC-1O-30 7 7 1973 YES 3 14,000 3,700 
AIR PANAMA [727-100 3 3 1972 NO 11 20,000 19,000 Ex All Nippon 
AIR RHODESIA 720 3 3 197 NO May Not Be Operable Any More Ex CAL Air 
AIR SIAM 747-100 1 1 1973 NO 5 11,000 5,100 Lease Air Linguis 
DC-1O-IOCF 1 1 1974 YES 2 6,000 1,600 
A300B2 1 0 1974 YES 2 - - No Longer Operable 
AIR SPAIN DCrB-20/30 2 0 1971 NO 16 41,000 Ex EA 
AIR VIETNAM 727-I00Q 1 0 1968 NO - - Ex PA 
AIR VIKING 720 3 3 1974 NO 16 32,000 19,000 Ex UA (May Not Be Operable), 
(ICELAND) 
AIRLINE 
AC 
TYPE 
TTL 
# 
# 
IN SER 
1st YR 
TYPE OPER 
ANY NEW 
PURCH 
AGE 
HIGH YR 
HIGH[ 
HOUR, 
HIGH 
LAND REMARKS 
AIR ZAIRE 
(Air Congo) 
DC-8-63F 
737-200C 
Caravelle 11R 
2 
3 
2 
2 
3 
2 
1970 
1973 
1967 
YES 
YES 
YES 
6 
3 
9 
9,0pO 
5,000 5,300 
0-8-20/30 
DC-10-30 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1967 
1974 
NO 
YES 
16 
2 
40,000 
5,000 
16,000 
2,000 
Ex PA 
ALIA JORDAN 720B 
707-320C 
727-200 
2 
6 
3 
2 
6 
3 
..1972 
1971 
1974 
NO, 
YES 
YES. 
16 
13 
2 
38,060 
42,000 
5,000 
23,800 
12,700 
4,400 
Ex PA 
2 Ex PA 
ALISARDA 
(Italy) 
DC-9-10 
DC-9-30 
2 
0/2 
2 1974 
-
NO 
-
10 
-
26,060 
-
41,600 Ex Southern 
ALITALIA 747-100 
747-200B 
DC-8-62 
DC-8-62F 
DC-9-30 
DC-9-30F 
DC-10-30 
2 
3 
8 
2 
33 
3 
8 
2 
3. 
8 
2 
33 
2 
8 
1970 
1971 
1967 
1968 
1967 
1968 
1973 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
6 
5 
9 
8 
9 
8 
3 
21,000 
18,000 
30,0QO 
28,000 
18,000 
14,00Q 
11,000 
4,300 
4,900 
7,500 
7,000 
18,000 
14,000 
4,600 
DC-8-40 11 6 1960 YES 16 49,000 20,000 
Caravelle 16N 14 11 1960 YES 16 
ALL NIPPON 727-200, 
737-200 
L-1Ol 
26 
14 
15/8 
26 
14 
15 
1969 
1969 
1973 
YES 
YES 
YES 
5 
7 
3 
16,000 
17,000 
5,009 
15,000 
17,400 
3,800 
ALM DUTCH 
ANTILLES DC-9-30 3 3 1975 YES 1 3,000 2,500 
ALYMEDA S. 
YEMEN 720B 1 1 1974 NO 16 Not Reported Ex AA 
ANSETT AIR-
LINES 
727-100 
727-100Q 
4 
2 
4 
2 
1964 
1969 
YES 
YES 
12 
7 
39,006 
24,000 
28,000 
16,900 
(Australia) 
AIRLINE 

ARIANA 

AFGHAN 

AEROLINEAS 

ARGENTINAS 

AUSTRIAN 

AUENSA 

VENEZUELA
 
AVIACO, SPAIN 

AC 

TYPE 

727-200 

DC-9-30 

F28 

7206 

727-I00Q 

747-100 

707-3208 

707-320C, 

737-200 

737-200Q 

F28 

747-2003 

DC-9-30 

DC-9-50 

Caravelle 6 

DC-9-10 

DC-8-50 

DC-8-5OF' 

DC-9-30 

DC-9-30F 

Caravelle lOR 

Caravelle 6 

TTL 

# 

7 

12 

5 

1 

2 

1 

5 

4 

10 

2 

3 

0/1 

9 

2 

3 

1 

5 

1 

8 

0/4 

4 

5 

# 

IN SER 

7 

12 

5
 
1 

2 

1 

5 

4 

10 

2 

3 

-
9 

2 o 

3 

1 

5 

1 

8 

4 

-.4 

1st YR 

TYPE OPER 

1972 

1967 

1973 

1968 

1975 

1966 

1968 

1970 

1970 

1975 

1971 

1976 

1963 

1967 

1973 

1973 

1974 

-
1973 

1972 

ANY NEW 

PURCH 

YES 

YES 

NO 

YES 

NO 

YES 

YES 

YES-

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

NO 

NO 

YES 

NO. 

NO 

AGE 

HIGH YR 

4 

9 

16 

7 

6 

10 

8 

6 

6 

1
 
-
5 

1 

13
 
9 

16 

13 

2 

-
10 

14 

HIGH 

HOUR 

13,000 

25,000 

36,000 

16,000 

13,000 

33,000 

29,000 

16,000 

14,000 

-
17,000 

2,000 

? 

40,000 

.38,000 

5,000 

-
'HIGH
 
LAND 

9,200
 
24,300
 
19,000 

8,800 

6,800 

9,500 

8,500
 
18,700
 
16,300
 
-
17,000
 
2,000
 
?
 
20,000 

19,000 

3,200
 
-
REMARKS
 
Ex PA
 
Ex Jet Av
 
Lease from mfr
 
(Ex Delta
 
Ln
 
L~ase from IB
 
Lease from Capitol
 
Ex IB
 
EX IB
 
AIRLINE 
AC 
TYPE 
TTL 
# 
# 
IN SER 
Ist YR 
TYPE OPER 
ANY NEW 
PURCH 
AGE 
HIGH YR 
HIGH, 
HOUR' 
HIGH 
LAND REMARKS 
AVIANCA 
COLUMBIA 
7208 
707-320B 
727-100 
727-100Q 
7 
2 
8 
2 
7 
2 
8 
2 
1961 
1968 
1966 
1971 
YES 
YES 
YES 
NO 
16 
8 
10 
8 
40,060 
29,000 
22,000 
13,000 
17,400 
11,800 
25,200 
13,800 Ex CO 
BALAIR, 
SWITZERLAND 
DC-8-50F 
DC-8-63 
DC-9-30F 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1-
1 
1971 
1973 
1970 
NO 
NO -
YES 
10 
7 
6 
38,000 
26,000 
12,000 
9,500 
6,500 
6,500 
Ex Universal 
Ex EA 
BANGLADESH 
BIMAN 707-320C 1 1 1973 NO 10 23,060 10,300 
BRMATHENS, 
NORWAY 
737-200 
737-200C 
5/1 
1 
5 
1 
1969 
1971 
YES 
YES 
7 
4 
25,000 
17,000 
16,700 
14,600 
BRITANNIA, 
U.K. 
737-200 
737-200C 
11/2 
2 
11 
2 
1968 
1970 
YES 
YES 
8 
6 
25,090 
20,000 
15,100 
10,700 
BRITISH 
CALEDONIAN 
707-320C 
707-320 
BAC-111-200 
BAC-111-500 
11 
1 
7 
11 
11 
1 
7 
11 
1967 
? 
1965 
1969 
YES 
? 
YES 
-YES 
9 
? 
11 
7 
49,000 
53,060 
10,400 
19,700 
S 
t 
. 
BRITISH 
AIRWAYS 
(OVERSEAS 
DIVISION) 
(EUROPEAN 
DIVISION) 
747-100 17/1 
707-320B 2 
707-320C 9 
Concorde 1/4 
747-200B(RR) 0/4 
VC-10 Std. 4 
VC-1O Super 15 
707-420 8 
Comet 2 
L-iO1 7/8 
BAC-111-500 18 
17 
2 
9 
1 
4 
15 
6 
0 
7 
18 
1970 
1970 
1965 
1976 
1964 
1965 
1960 
1959 
.1974 
1968 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
-
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
6 
6 
11 
-
-
12 
11 
16 
17 
2 
8 
19,060 
18,000 
37,000 
-
56,00b 
2,000 
5,700 
5,300 
12,100 
19,500 
-
2',000 
Scrapped 
AIRLINE 
AC 
TYPE 
TTL 
# IN SER 
I1st YR 
TYPE OPER 
ANY NEW 
PURCH 
AGE 
HIGH YR 
HIGH 
HOUR 
HIGH 
LAND REMARKS 
HS-121-1C 
HS-121-2E 
HS-121-3B 
20 
15 
26 
20 
15 
26 
1963 
1968 
19741 
YES 
YES 
YES 
13 
"8 
2 
BRITISH WEST 707-120B 
INDIAN.AIRWAYS 707-320C 
TRINIDAD (BWIA) 707-220 
2 
4 
4 
2 
4 
2 
1969 
1974 
1971 
NO 
NO 
NO 
14 
10 
17 
37,000 
26,000 
45,000 
21,900 
11,600 
25,900 
Ex Quantas 
Ex NW 
Ex BN (All for Sale) 
CAAC, CHINA 707-320B 
707-320C 
HS-121-IE 
HS-121-2C 
HS-121-3B 
4 
6 
3 
18/15 
2 
4 
6 
3 
18 
2 
1975 
1975 
1970 
1972 
1974 
YES 
YES 
NO 
YES 
YES 
1 
1 
4 
2 
2,000 
2,000 
1,000 
1,000 
Ex Pakistan Int'l 
CAMERON AIR 707-320C 
737-200Q 
1 
2 
1 
2 
V972 
1972 
YES 
YES 
4 
4 
7,000 
7,000 
2,200 
11,800 
CARGOLUX, 
LUXEMBURG 
DC-8-83F 3 3 1973 NO 8 28,000 7,000 1 purchased from FT 
2 lease from SB 
CATHAY PACIFIC 
HONG KONG 
707-320B 
707-320C 
L-1011 
CV-880 M 
4 
8 
2 
0 
4 
8 
2 
0 
1971 
1972 
1975 
1962 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
13 
12 
1 
14 
43,000 
38,000 
2,000 
-
19,eOO 
14,900 
1,500 
-
Ex NW 
Ex NW 
May have been sold 75 
CHOAN AIRLINES 
TAIWAN 
747-100 
707-320B 
707-320C 
727-100 
727-I00Q 
Caravelle 3 
1 
1 
5 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
5 
2 
1 
2 
1975 
1971 
1969 
1967 
1969 
1971 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
NO 
6 
13 
7 
9 
7 
16 
19,000 
- 42,000 
48,000 
24,000 
20,000 
9,500 
18,100 
14,800 
16,400 
13,100 
Lease from mfr. (Ex Delta) 
Ex NW 
3 Ex CO " 
Ex SAS 
AIRLINE 
AC 
TYPE 
TTL 
__._ 
# 
IN SER 
Ist YR 
TYPE OPER 
ANY NEW 
PURCH 
AGE 
HIGil YR 
HIGH 
HOUR 
HIGH 
LAND REMARKS 
CONAIR,
DENMARK 720 5 4 
I 
1971 NO 15 38,000 
i 
23,1500 From mfr. (Ex EA) 
CONDOR 
FLUGDIENST 
GERMANY 
747-200B 
707-300B 
727-100 
727-200 
2 
1 
7 
8 
2 
1 
7 
8 
1971 
1969 
1965 
1973 
YES 
NO 
NO 
YES 
5 
12 
12 
3 
15,000 
39,000 
29,000 
8,000 
4,000 
13,P0O 
18,800 
7,B00 
Lease from Lufthansa 
Ex Lufthansa 
CRUZEIRO, 
BRAZIL 
727-100 
737-200 
Caravelle 6 
8 
6 
6 
8 
6 
0 
1971 YES. 12, 32,000 15,0Q 1 Sabena,l Wardair, 
2 Ex EA, 1 Hughes
1971 YES 1 2,000 2,100
May have been traded in70 Boeing for 737s. 
CYPRUS DC-9-10 
HS-121-2E 
BAC-lll-500 
2 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1975 
1969 
.1974 
NO 
YES 
NO 
10 
7 
6 
21,000 23,100 Ex KL 
Lease from Courtline 
G 
0 
DELTA (BELGIUM) 720 
DAN AIR U.K. 727-100 
707-320 
BAC-111-200 
BAC-1ll-300 
"BAC-111-400 
BAC-1I1-500 
Comet 4BK 
1 
5 
2 
2 
2 
3 
4 
16 
1 
5 
2 
2 
2 
3 
4 
9 
? 
1972 
1971 
1975 
1969 
1969 
1971 
1966 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
15 
11 
17 
10 
11 
7 
16 
33,000 
25,000 
54,000 
20,000 
19,800 
19,1100 
May not be operable 
Ex JAL 
Ex PA 
Ex Zambia 
Ex British Eagle
Ex AA, Bauaria 
Lease from mfr. '(Ex Court­
x BOAC line) 
. 
D.E.T.A. 
MOZAMBIQUE 
737-200 
737-200Q 
3 
1 
3 
1 
1970 
1971 
YES 
YES 
6 
5 
13,000 
9,000 
12,500
8,300 
DOMINICANA 727-100 
727-200 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1972 
1975 
YES 
YES 
4 
1 
6,000 
3,000 
3,100 
1,7b0 
AIRLINE 
AC 
TYPE 
TTL I 
IN SER 
1st YR 
TYPE OPER 
ANY NEW 
PURCH 
AGE 
HIGH YR 
HIGH 
HOUR 
HIGH 
LAND REMARKS 
EAST AFRICAN 
AIRWAYS 
707-320C 
DC-9-30 
VC-1O Super 
1 
3 
4 
1 
3 
4 
1974 
1971 
1966 
NO 
YES 
YES 
I! 
5 
10 
29,000 
11,000 
16,300 
11,000 
Ex AA 
ECUATORIAN 7208 
Caravelle 
3 
2 
3 
2 
1974 NO 15 30,000 17,700 Ex PA (May be out 
of service) 
EGYPTAIR 
(UNITEb-ARAB) 
707-320C 
737-200 
Comet 
9 
2/5 
4 
9 
2 
0 
1968 
1974 
1964 
YES 
YES 
NO 
8 
2 
6 
23,000 
13,000 
-
9,600 
-
-
1 Lease 
Ex UAA 
EL AL 747-200B 
747-200C 
720B 
707-320B 
707-320C 
707-420 
3 
1 
2 
3 
2 
3 
3 
1 
2 
3 
2 
3 
1971 
1975 
1962 
1966 
1965 
1961 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
51 
14 
10 
7 
15 
15,000 
-
41,000 
49,000 
25,000 
51,000 
3,000 
17,100 
13,900 
6,100 
15,500 
In 
ETHIOPIAN 
AIRLINES 
720B 
707-320C 
4 
2 
4 
0 
1962 YES 14 
_ 
51,000 
-
32,400 2 Ex CO, AL 
Leased to Saudi 
Arabian Airlines 
FAUCETT, PERUF. 727-100 BAC-111-475 1 2 1 2 1968 1971 YES YES 8 5 
20,000 25,800 
AC TTL # Ist YR ANY NEW AGE HIGH 1!1GM 
AIRLINE TYPE # IN SER TYPE OPER PURCH HIGH YR HOUR UAND 'REMARKS 
FINNAIR DC-8-62 1 1 1975 NO 8 30,000 9,900 Ex UT 
DC-8-62F 2 2 1969 YES 7 26,000 16,500 
DC-9-10 7 7 1969 NO 10 23,000 4,500 Ex Air Canada 
DC-9-10F 2 2 1972 NO 9 20,000 30,000 Ex Texas Int'l 
DC-9-50 3/3 
Caravelle IOB 9 
3 
9 
1976 
1964 
YES 
YES 
-
12 
-
.1 
DC-10-30 2 2 1975 YES 1 5,000- A,600 
GARUDA DCr8-50 3 3 1965 NO 14 54,000 41,600 Ex KLM 
INDONESIAN DC-9-30 12 12 1969 YES 7 17,000 13,300 
DC-10-30 2 2 1973 NO 1 1,000 4,000 Lease KLM (New one 
F-28 16 16 1971 YES 5. this year) 
HAPAG-LLOYD 727-100 8 8 1972 NO 12 24,000 2 ,000 Ex All Nip, Pacific 
FLUG (W.GER)| S.W.,Sabena, TOAJAL 
IBERIA 747-100 2 2 1970 YES 6 16,000 ,400 
747-2008 1 1 1972 YES 4 14,000 2,900 
DC-8-50F 1 1 1968 YES 8 21,000 9,500 
DC-8-63 5 5 1968 YES 8 26,000 6,500 
DC-8-63F 1 1 1968 'YES 8 24,000 6,000 
727-200 29 29 1972 YES 4 9,000 8,800 
DC-9-30 31 31, 1967 YES 9 19,000 20,000 
DC-9-3OF 3 3 1973 YES 3 10,000 1O,5QO 
DC-10-30 6 6 1973 YES 3 ,9,000 2,800 
F-28 2 2 1970 YES 6 
DC-8-50 1 1 1961 YES 10 28,000 12,600 
ICELANDAIR 727-I00Q 2 2 1967 YES 10 20,000 10,900-1 Ex AA 
ICELANDIC DC-8-63F 3' 3 1970 NO 8 37,000 9;300 Lease from SB 
AC TTL # Ist YR ANY NEW AGE HIGH HIGH 
AIRLINE TYPE # IN SER TYPE OPER PURCH HIGH YR HOUR LAND RE ARKS 
INDIAN 
AIRLINES 
737-200 
.A300 
12/1 
0/3 
12 
-
1970 
-1 
YES 
-
6 
-
13,000 
-
13,100 
-
CORP. Caravelle 6 6 8 1963 YES 13 
INER AORIA, DC-9-30 3/1 3 1969 YES 7 12,000 8,500 1 Ex Purdue Fluof Pan Aoria 
YUGOSLAVIA DC-9-30F 2 2 1971 YES 6 18,000 12,800 1 Ex ONA 
INVICTA 720B 2 2 1974 NO 13 35,000 17,500 Ex AA 
(OR BR) 
IRANAIR 747SP 0/3 - - - - -
747-200B 0/2 - - - - -
707-3208 1 1 1975 NO 11 37,000 12,700 Ex PA 
707-320C 5 4 1970 YES 6 34,000 12,300 2 Ex PA 
2 
727-100 
727-200 
4 
5 
4 
5 
1965 
1974 
YES 
YES 
11 
2 
25,000 
5,000 
19,100 
3,900 
1 Ex All Nippon 
737-200 2 2 '1971 YES 5 11,000 18,500 
737-200C/QC 2 2 .197.1 YES 5 10,000 16,500 
IRISH INT'L 707-320C 4 4 1964 YES 12 37,000 13,700 
AER LINGUS 737-200 3 3 1969 YES 7 15,000 16,100 Lease from VA (1) 
737-200C/QC 4 4 1969 YES 7 13,000 38,300 
BAC-ii-200 4 4 1965 YES L t 
747-100 1 0 1970 Lease to Air Siam 
IRAQI 747-200C 0/2 - - - -
707-320C 
727-200 
737-200C/QC 
3 
2/1
1/1 
3 
2 
1 
1974 
1976 
1975 
YES 
YES 
-
1 
3,000 
-
2,000 
2,300 
-
2,400 
HS-121-1E 3 2 1965 YES 11 
AC TTL # Ist YR ANY NEW AGE HIGH HIgH 
AIRLINE TYPE # IN SER TYPE OPER PURCH HIGH YR 'HOUR LAN'D REMARKS 
KOREAN 747-200B 2 2 1973 YES 3 10,O00 2500 
AIRLINES 747-200C 1 1 1974 NO 3 8,060 IS500 Sublease from World 
707-320C 4 4 1971 YES 11 34,000 12,100 2 Leased from World; 1 
DC-8-63F 
727-100 
1 
3 
1 
3 
1972 
1972 
NO 
NO 
7 
10 
24,000 
23,000 
7,200 
22i500
.i 
purchased from World 
Lease from SB 
2 Leased from JAL; 1 
Purchased from JAL 
720 
DC-10-30 
2 
3 
2 
3 
1969 
1975 
NO 
YES 
15 
1 
37,000 
5,000 
25,200 
1,000 
Ex EA 
A300B4 2/4 2 1975 YES 1 -
KUWAIT 707-320C 7, 7 1968 YES 10 22,000 10,500 1 Ex PA 
AIRWAYS 737-200 1 1 1976 YES - -
HS-121-1E 1 1 1966 YES 10 
LAB, BOLIVIA 727-100 
727-0OC/QC 
727-200 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1969 
1974 
1975 
YES 
NO 
YES 
7 
8 
1 
31,000 
16,000 
1,000 
29,600 
10,500 
1,P0 
1 Eg BN 
Ex Trans Int'l 
LAKER AIRWAYS 
U.K. 
707-120B 
DC-10-10 
2 
3 
2 
3 
1969 
1972 
NO 
YES 
16 
4 
48,000 
9,000 
20,800 
2,O00 
Ex Quantas 
BAC-ill-300 5 5 1967 YES 9 
LAN-CHILE 707-320B 
707-320C 
727-100 
727-I0OC/QC
Caravelle 6 
2 
2 
1 
3 
3 
2 
2 
1 
3 
3 
1967 
1969 
1968 
1968 
1964 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
13 
10 
8 
8 
12 
52,000 
27,000 
20,000 
22,000 
16,000 
ll,1O0 
11,600
10,500 
E Lufthansa 
1 Ex NW 
LAV, 
VENEZUELA 
DC-9-10 
DC-9-30 
4 
1 
4 
1 
1968 
1970 
YES 
NO 
9 
9 
20,000 
20,000 
30,000 '3Ex Saudia 
20,600 Ex Pacific Southwest 
AIRLINE 
AC 
TYPE 
TTL 
# 
# 
IN SER 
Ist YR 
TYPE OPER 
ANY NEW 
PURCH 
AGE 
HIGH YR 
HIGH 
HOUR 
HIGH 
LAND REMARXS 
0-0 
LIBYAN ARAB 707.320c 
727-200Caravelle 6 
0/1 
4/23 
-
43 
-
19701965 YESYES 
-
615 
-
12,000 
-
7,500 I Ex UA 
'V S LTU,GERMANY Caravelle 1OR L-1011 
SPEY-JR-F28 
4 
2 
2 
4 
2 
0 
1967 
"1973 
1967 
YES 
YES 
YES 
9 
3 
9 
9,000 4,700 
May have been sold to mfr. 
LUFTHANSA 747.100 ' 
747-200B 
747-200F 
707-320B 
7072320C 
727-100C/QC 
727-200 
737-100 
737-200C/QC 
747-2008 
DC-10-30 
A300 
707-420 
2 
2 
1 
9 
6 
11 
19 
22 
6 
0/1 
10 
2/1 
4 
2 
2 
1 
9 
6 
11 
19 
22 
6 
-
10 
2 
4 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1963 
1965 
1967 
V971 
1967 
1969 
-
1973 
1976 
1960 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
6 
5 
4 
13 
11 
9 
5 
9 
7 
-
3 
-
16 
23,000 
20,000 
18,000 
49,000 
48,000 
24,000 
12,000 
.18,000 
10,000 
-
10,000 
-
61,000 
5,700 
3,900 
3,900 
12,900 
11,500 
27,900 
7,500 
28,200 
13,300 
-
3,000 
-
21,000 
GE engine 
LUXAIR, 
LUXEMBOURG 
707-320C 
Caravelle 6 
1 
4 
1 
4 
1972 
1970 
NO 
NO 
II 
12 
34,000 11,800 Ex Aer Lingis 
Ex'AVA 
MAERSK AIR 
DENMARK 
720B 5 4 1972 NO 15 37,000 23,800 Ex NW (I Lease to Monarch) 
MALAYSIA 707-320C 
737-200 
737-200C/QC 
DC-10-30 
3 
8 
1 
0/2 
3 
8 
1 
-
1972 
1972 
1975 
-. 
NO 
YES 
YES 
12 
4 
1 
35,000 
9,000 
1,000 
13,000 
10,100 
1,000 
Ex Quantas 
AIRLINE 
AC 
TYPE 
TTL 
# 
# 
IN SER 
1st YR 
TYPE OPER 
ANY NEW AGE 
PURCH HIGH YR 
HIGH 
HOUR 
HIGH 
LAND REMARKS 
MARTINAIR, 
NETHERLANDS 
DC-8-50F 
DC-9-30 
DC-9-30F 
DC-IO-3OCF 
SPEY-JR-F28 
2 
1 
2 
2/1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1968 
1971 
1968 
1973 
1969 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES" 
10 
5 
8 
3 
7 
36,000 
13,000 
17,000 
9,000 
9,000 Ex OV Nat'l, Seaboard World 
7,'00 
9,pOo 
2,400 
MEXICANA 727-100 
727-200 
7 
13 
7 
13 
' 1966 
1970 
YES 
YES 
10 
6 
29,000 
17,000 
35,800 
17,400 
MIDDLE EAST, 
LEBANON 
747-200B. 
720B' 
707-320C 
3 
16 
3 
3 
16 
3 
1975 
1965 
1968 
YES 
NO 
YES 
1 
15 
8 
3,000 
41,000 
20,000 
600 
20,900 Ex AA, WA (More WA coming) 
7,900 
MONARCH, 
G. BRITAIN 
720B 
BAC-IlI-500 
4 
2 
4 
2 
1971 
1975 
NO 
NO 
15 
8 
42,000 26,300 Ex NW 
Lease from mfr. (Ex Court- 4-
NEW ZEALAND 
NATIONAL 
737-200 9 9 
-1968 YES 8 17,000 23,3100 2 Ex PSA line) 
NIGERIA 7077320C 
737-200 
SPEY-JR-F28-
2 
2 
5/2 
2 
2 
5 
1970 
1972 
1972 
YES 
YES 
YES' 
5 
4 
4 
14,000, 
5,000 
5,010 
6,900 
OLYMPIC, 
GREECE 
747-200B' 
720B 
707-320B 
707-320C 
727-200 
2 
7 
2 
4 
6 
2 
7 
2 
4 
6 
,1973 
1972 
1968 
1966 
1968 
YES 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
3 
15 
8 
10 
8 
10,000 
38,000 
24,000 
30,000 
17,000 
1,800 
27,000 E NW 
6,900 
9,200 
13,50 
PAKISTAN 7208 
INTERNATIONAL 707-320C 
DC-IC-30' 
5 
6 
3/1 
4 
6 
3 
1961 
1966 
1974 
YES 
YES 
YES 
15 
10 
2 
38,000 
41,000 
8,000 
27,500 1 Lease out; 1 Ex WA 
11,800 
3,260 
AIRLINE 
AC 
TYPE 
TTL 
F 
# 
IN SER 
Ist YR 
TYPE OPER 
ANY NEW AGE 
PURCH HIGH YR 
HIGH 
HOUR 
HIGH 
LAND REMARKS 
PHILIPPINE 
AIRLINES 
DC-8-50 
D0-8-30 
D0-8-63 
DC-10-30 
BAC-111-500 
707-300 
3 
2 
2 
3 
8 
3 
3 
2 
2 
3 
8 
3 
1961 
1970 
1963 
1974 
1971 
-
YES 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
15 
16 
7 
2 
5 
16 
59,000 
49,000 
27,000 
13,000 
44,000 
14,800 1 Ex KLM 
12,300 Ex KLM 
6,800 Lease KLM 
3,900 Lease from KLM 
17,300 Ex PA May not be operable 
QUANTAS, 
AUSTRALIA 
747-200B 
707-320C 
11 
11 
11 
11 
1971 
1965 
YES 
YES 
5 
II 
18,000 
33,000 
6,660 
12,200 
ROYAL AIR 
MAROC, 
MOROCCO 
ROYAL BRUNEI 
727-200 
737-200 
Caravelle 3 
707-300 
737-200 
4 
0/3 
1 
1/1 
4 
4 
1 
1 
-
1970 
1960 
1971 
1975 
-
YES 
YES 
NO 
YES 
6 
-
16 
16 
1 
14,000 
-
38,000 
-
9,900 
-
13,500 Lease from Air France, 
May be grounded 
-
ROYAL NAPAL 727-100 1 1 1972 YES 4 7,000 4,600 
*o 
vi5 
SABENA, 
BELGIUM 
747-100 
707-320C 
727-IOOQC 
'737-200 
737-200X/QC
707-320 
DC-IO-3OCF 
Caravelle 6 
2 
6 
3 
Ii 
a 
6 
3 
4 
2 
6 
3 
11 
4 
6 
3 
4 
1970 
1965 
1967 
1974 
1975 
1959 
1973 
.1961 
YES 
YES 
YES. 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
6 
11 
9 
2 
1 
17 
3 
15 
20,000 
37,000 
17,000 
6,000 
3,000 
54,000 
10,000 
3,900 
9,300 
15,700 
5,700 
3,200 
14,500 
3,100 
b SAIHSA, 
HONDURAS 
737-200 1 1974 YES 2 6,000 6,900 
AIRLINE 
AC 
TYPE 
TTL' 
# 
# 
IN SER 
1st YR 
TYPE OPER 
ANY NEW AGE 
PURCH HIGH YR 
HIGH 
HOUR 
HIGH 
LAND REMARKS 
SAS, 
SCANDINAVIA 
747-200B 
DC-8-50 
DC-8-62 
DC-8-62F 
DC-8-63 
DC-9-20 
DC-9-30F 
DC-9-40 
2 
2 
5 
3 
5 
10 
2 
37/2 
2 
2 
5 
3 
4 
9 
2 
37 
1971 
1965 
1967 
1968 
1968 
1968 
1969 
1968 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
5 
11 
9 
8 
8 
8 
7 
8 
21,000 
43,000 
34,000 
33,000 
31,000 
16,000 
15,000 
20,000 
4,500 
10,800 
8 500 
8,300 
7,800 
240OO 
14 900 
21000 
1 Leased to Thai Airways 
1 grounded 
DC-10-30 4/1 4 1974 YES 2 6,000 2:000 
Caravelle 3 13 3 1960 YES 16 10 Out of service 
SATA, 
SWITZERLAND 
DC-8-63F 
Caravelle 1OR 
1 
4 
1 
4 
1974 
1970 
NO 
YES 
8 
6 
23,000 5,800 Ex Flying Tigers 
SAUDIA 720B 
Caravelle 1OR 
3 
9 
3 
9 
1961 
- 1968 
YES 
YES 
15 
8 
60,000 
48,000 
35100 
1I,i400 1 Ex World; 1 Lease fromEthiopian 
737-200 
737-200C/QC 
LOlOll 
5 
2 
4 
5 
2 
4 
1972 
1972 
1975 
YES 
YES 
YES 
4 
4 
1 
12,000 
11,000 
2,000 
11,A00 
11,100 
l'poo 2 Ex TWA 
SCANAIR, 
SWEDEN 
727-100 
727-I0OC/QC 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1967 
1968 
YES 
YES 
9 
8 
29,000 
27,000 
11,900 
11,200 
SINGAPORE 747-200B 
707-320B 
707-320C 
737-100 
4/1 
3 
7 
5 
4 
3 
7 
5 
1973 
1968 
1971 
1969 
YES 
YES 
NO 
YES 
3 
8 
11 
7 
10,000 
26,000 
34,000 
16,000 
5,400 
11,453 
21,200 
18,400 
Ex SN, CO, Quantas 
AIRLINE 
AC 
TYPE 
TTL 
# 
# 
IN SER 
Ist YR 
TYPE OPER 
ANY NEW 
PURCH 
AGE HIGH 
HIGH YR. HOUR 
HIGH 
LAND REMARKS 
SOUTH AFRICAN 747-SP 
AIRWAYS 747-2008 
707-320B 
707-320C 
0/5 
5 
2 
4 
-
5 
2 
4 
1971 
1965 
1968 
-
YES 
YES 
YES 
-
5 
11 
8 
-
15,000 
33,000 
26,000 
-
4,800 
8,800 
7,100 
727-100 
727-I00C/QC 
737-200 
707-320 
6 
3 
6 
2 
6 
3 
6 
2 
1965 
1967 
1968 
1960 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
11 
9 
8 
16 
23,000 
18,000 
13,000 
43,000 
25,000 
19,100 
17,700 
16,700 
A300B4 0/4 - - - -
SPANTEX, DC-8-61F 2 2 1973 NO 9 28,000 7,000 Lease & Sublease from AA 
SPAIN DC-9-10 
-23-990A 
2 
12 
2. 
12 
1974 
1967 
NO 
NO 
10 
15 
28,000 47,600 Ex Southern 
Ex AA, Modern, Air Trans, 
Swissair 
STERLING, 
DENMARK 
727-200 
Caravelle IOB 
Caravelle 12 
Caravelle 6R 
5 
5 
6 
11. 
5 
5 
6 
5 
1973 
1965 
1971 
'1971 
YES 
YES 
YES 
NO 
3 
11 
5 
15 
9,000 3,200 2 Leased from NALS 
Ex UA (5 leased out) 
SUDAN 707-320C 
737-200C/QC 
Comet All 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
0 
1973 
1975 
1962 
YES 
YES 
YES 
3 
1 
14 
6,000 
1,000 
4,700 
-
Grounded 
SWISSAIR 747-200B 
D0-8-50 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1971 
1963 
YES 
YES 
5 
16 
16,000 
63,000 
3,800 
39,700 Convert from 30 
DC-8-62 5 5 1967 YES 9 37,000 16,700"" 
DC-8-62F 
DC-9-30 
2 
21 
2 
21 
1968 
1967 
YES 
YES 
8 
9 
32,000 
21,000 
14,400 
25,200 
DC-9-30F 
DC-9-50 
DC-10-30 
1 
7/3 
8 
1 
7 
8 
1969 
1975 
1972 
YES 
YES 
YES 
7 
1 
.4 
14,000 
2,000 
14,000 
13,700 
2,000 
4,400 
AIRLINE 
AC 
TYPE 
TTL 
# 
# 
IN SER 
Ist YR 
TYPE OPER 
ANY NEW 
PURCH 
AGE 
HIGH YR 
HIGH 
HOUR 
HIGH 
LAND REMARKS 
SYRIAN ARAB 
TAAG, 
ANGOLA 
747-SP 
727-200 
Caravelle 10B 
707-420 
737-200C/QC 
0/2 
0/3 
4 
.2 
1 
-
-
4 
2 
1 
-
1966 
1974 
1975 
YES 
NO 
YES 
-
10 
16 
1 
-
-
53,000 
1,000 
19'400 Lease from Brit. 
Air Tours 
TAE, SPAIN DC-8-20-30 2 2 1973 NO 16 46,000 II 500 Leased from UT 
TAN, HONDURAS 737-200 1 1 1974 NO 7 10,000 12,100 Ex Pluna I I 
TAP, PORTUGAL 747-200B 
707-320B 
707-320C 
727-100 
727-IOOC/QC 
727-200 
Caravelle 6 
4 
7 
3 
4 
3 
2 
3 
4 
7 
3 
4 
3 
2 
3 
1972 
1966 
1973 
1967 
1968 
-1975 
1962 
YES 
YES 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
4 
10 
12 
9 
8 
1 
14 
13,000 
41,000 
40,000 
21,OQQ 
24,000 
3,000 
4j400
l1800 
10000 
16j500 
16,300 
3,200 
2 Ex B. Cal: 
1 Ex World 
1 Ex Airlift Int'l 
o 
TAROM,
RUMANIA 
707-320C 
BAC-111-400 
BAC-1l1-500 
4 
7 
-
4 
7 
-
1974 
1968 
-
YES 
YES 
2 
8 
-
5,000 2,'500 
1 Ex AA 
Del. 1977 
THAI INT'L DC-8-63 
DC-8-30 
DC-10-30 
3 
6 
2 
3 
6 
2 
1974 
1970 
1975 
NO 
NO 
NO 
8 
16 
3 
32,000 8,000 
54,000 21,0O0 
12,000 3,5oo 
Ex SAS )l leased)
Ek SAS, Ex Atlantis 
1 leased from UTA;
1 leased from GARUDA 
TOA DOMESTIC 
JAPAN 
DC-9-40 14 14 1975 YES 1 3,000 3,OO 
AIRLINE 
AC 
TYPE 
TTL 
# IN SER 
Ist YR 
TYPE OPER 
ANY NEW 
PURCH 
AGE 
HIGH YR 
HIGH 
HOUR 
HIGH 
LAND REMARKS 
TRANS-
AUSTRALIA 
727-100 
727-200 
DC-9-30 
6 
6 
12 
6 
6 
12 
1964 
1972 
1967 
YES 
YES 
YES 
12 
4 
9 
39,000 
12,000 
24,000 
29,100 
9,100 
24,000 
TRANSAVIA 
.(HOLLAND) 
707-120B 
737-200C/QD 
Caravelle 3 
Caravelle 6R 
737-200 
1 
3 
3 
6 
2 
1 
3 
0 
4 
2 
1972 
1974 
1968 
1970 
1974 
NO 
YES 
NO 
NO 
NO 
16 
2 
15 
50,000 
7,000 
13,000 
23,300 
3,800 
16,400 
Ex M' 
3 grounded 
2 grounded Ex UA 
TRANSBRASIL 
TRANS EUROPA(SPAIN) 
727-IOOC/QO 
BAC-111-500 
Caravelle 1OR 
Caravelle 11R 
5 
9 
3 
2 
5 
9 
3 
2 
1974 
1970 
1970 
1969 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
6 
6 
7 
32,000 34,500 Ex PA 
3 Ex Brit, Midland; 
2 Ex Courtline 
1 lease manufacturer;1 Ex Royal Jord, -4 
TRANS EUROPEAN B-720 
(BELGIUM) 707-120 
A300 
2 
3 
2 
1 
3 
2 
1971 
1973 
1974 
NO 
NO 
YES 
14 
17 
2 
32,000 
43,000 
1,500 
15,000 
21,700 
600 
Ex EA, Ex Aer Lingus 
Ex TWA 
TRANS-- 747-100
M4EDITERRANEAN 707-320C 
TREK 707-320 
SOUTH AFRICA 
2 
7 
1 
2 
7 
1 
-
1970 
1969 
NO 
NO 
NO 
-
12 
16 
-
-
45,000 
-
-
13,900 
Ex AA. 
6 Ex SN; ;Ex AA 
Ex So Africa 
TURKISH 
AIRLINES 
707-I00B 
727-200 
DC-9-30 
DCO--1 
F-28 
4 
4 
8 
2 
3 
4 
4 
8 
2 
3 
1974 
1974 
1968 
1972 
1972 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
17 
2 
8 
4 
4 
42,000 
4,000 
8,000 
18,900 
-3,000. 
4,000 
Lease from PA 
AC TTL 1st YR ANY NEW AGE HIGH HIGH 
AIRLINE TYPE #_ IN SER TYPE OPER PURCH HIGH YR HOUR LAND 'REMARKS 
TUNIS AIR 727-200 
Caravelle 3 
5 
5 
5 
4 
1972 
1961 
YES
YES 415 11,000 7,600 
UTA DC-8-50 1 1 1965 YES 16 50,000 12,500 Convert from 30 
(FRANCE) DC-8-50F 
DC-8-62 
3 
3 
3 
3 
1965 
1968 
YES 
YES 
11 
8 
45,000 11,300 
33,000 8,300 
DC-8-63F 2 2 1973 NO 7 22,000 15,500 Ex EA 
Caravelle 1OR 1 1 1966 YES 10 
Caravelle 12 1 1 - -
DC-10-30 4/1 4 1973 YES 3 12,000 14,100 
VARIG AIRLINES 707-320C(BRAZIL ,4
L 727-100 
14 
7 
14 
7 
1965 
1970 
YES 
YES 
14 
12 
43,000 11,300 
24,000 1,5800 
2 Ex SB; 1 Ex BNEx CO; 2 Ex AA2 Ex DL 
727-100C/QC 2 2 .1973 NO 12 25,000 18,400 1 Ex AL; 1 Ex World 
737-200 10 10 1974 YES 2 3,000 4,300 
DC-8-20/30 1 0 "1965 NO 16 38,000 9,500 Ex PA 
DC-1O-30 4 4 1974 YES 2 7,000 1,500 
707-420 2 2 1960 YES 16 49,000 10,900 
VASP 737-200 19/1 19 1969 YES 7 18,000 17,800 
(BRAZIL) 737-200C/QC 1/1 1 1974 YES 2 10,000 1b,600 
VIASA DC-8-50 2 2 1965 NO 15 65,000 1 ,OOO Leased from KL 
(VENEZUELA) DC-8-63 
DC-8-20/30 
DC-10-30 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
1968 
1972 
1974 
YES 
NO 
NO 
8 
15 
2 
27,000 6,800 
55,000 13,800 
9,000 3,200 
Ex KLM 
Lease from KLM 
YUGOSLAV 707-320C 4 4 1974 NO 12 30,000 II,600 Ex NW 
727-200 5 5 1974 YES 2 4,000 4,000 
DC-9-30 12 12 1969 YES 6 13,000 13,000 
Caravelle 6 3 3 1963 YES 13 
AC TTL # 1st YR ANY.NEW AGE HIGH HIGH 
AIRLINE TYPE # IN SER TYPE OPER PURCH HIGH YR HOUR LAND REMARKS 
MODERN 23-990A 6 0 1967 NO Ex AA, Fleet for sale 
AIR GABON SPEY-JR-F-28 2 2 1975 YES 1 
AIR MALAWI BAC-lll-475 2 2 1972 YES 4 
VC-IO Std. 1 1 . 1974 NO Ex B. Cal. 
AIR PACIFIC BAC-111-475 2 
(FIJI) 
AREA Comet All 1 
(ECUADOR) 
AUSTRAL BAC-11-400 4 
(ARGENTINA) BAC-I 1.1-500 4/2 
AVIATECA BAC-111-500 2 2 1971 YES 5 
(GUATEMALA) SPEY"JR-F-28 1 1 1974 NO Lease Transair 
BAHAMASAIR BAC-l1l-400 3 3 1973 NO Ex AA 
BAVARIA BAC-1ll-4DO 4 4 1967 YES 9 
FLUGGESELL- BAC-ll-500 3 3 1970 YES 6 
SCHAFT 
BELGIUM INT;L Caravelle 6 1 
BONAIR SPEY-JR-F-28 4 
(W.GERMANY)Y 
BEA AIRTOURS Comet All 9 
CAMBRIAN BAC-111-400 6 
(U.K.) 
AC TTL # Ist YR ANY NEW AGE HIGH F$JGH 
AIRLINE TYPE IN SER' TYPE OPER PURCH HIGH YR HOUR LAND REMARKS 
CATAIR Caravelle 3 2 2 1971 NO Ex SAS 
(FRANCE) Caravelle 6N 1 1 1974 NO Ex Sobelair 
Caravelle 6R 
Caravelle 12 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1972 
1975 
NO 
NO 
Ex Sterling 
Ex Sterling 
CHANNEL BAC-1I1-400 2 
AIRWAYS HS-121-IE 1 
(U.K.) Comet All 5 
CIMBER AIR VFW-614 0/2 
(DENMARK) 
AURALAIR Caravelle 6 2 2 1971 NO Ex Austrian Al 
(FRANCE) 
FAR EASTERN 
(FORMOSA) 
Caravelle 6 2 2 1973 NO j Ex Iberia 
0 
GERMANAIR A300B 1 1 1975 YES 1, 2,000 Ih000 
BAC-lll-500 6 5 1969 YES 7 
,GHANA SPEY-JR-F28 2 2 1974 YES 2 
VC-10 Std. 1 1 1964 YES 12 
GULF AIR 
(BAHRANU) 
L-1011 
BAC-111-400 
0/4
4 
2 
3 
1976 
1969 
YES 
NO 
1 1,000' :600 
Ex Bahamas, Phil Al 
VC-1O Std. 5 5 1974 NO Ex BA Overseas Div. 
LACSA BAC-111-500 3 3 1971 YES 
(COSTA RICA) 
LADE SPEY-JR-F28' 5 5 1974 YES 2 
(ARGENTINA) Caravelle 6N 3 3 1973 NO Ex Aerolaru 
CINJEFLYG SPEY-JR-F28 3/5 3 1973 YES 3 
(SWEDEN) 
AIRLINE 

NORTHEAST 

(U.K.) (BKS)
 
ORIENTAIR 

(G.BRITAIN)
 
QUEBECAIR 

ROYAL AIR LAO 

SAM(ITALY) 

TACA INTtL 

(EL SALVADOR)
 
TOURAINE 

(FRANCE)
 
TRANSAIR LTD. 

(CANADA)
 
TURAVIA 

(ITALY)
 
AC 
TYPE 

HS'121-1E 

BAC-111-400 

BAC-111-300 

727-100 

Caravelle 3 

Caravelle 6 

BAC-111-400 

SPEY-JR-F28 

SPEY-JR-F28 

SPEY-JR-F28 

TTL I 1st YR ANY NEW AGE HIGH HIGH 
' IN SER TYPE OPER PURCH 'HIGH YR HOUR LAND REMARKS 
4 
1 
3 3 1969 NO Ex British Eagle 
1 I" 1974 NO 14 38,000 31,000 Ex EA 
1 1 1973 NO Lease from Air France 
4 OD 
3 3 1966 YES 
1/1 1 1974 NO From mfr. 
1 
1/1 
Data Source Matrix
 
Any
 
Year of Total First Year Purchased High High High
 
Equipment Type Original Delivery Number Type Operation New Year Hour Landinqs
 
707,720,727
 
737,747 A A C A & C D E E
 
DC-8, DC-9 A A A A A E F
 
DC-IO 	 A A A A A E. E
 
L-lOll 	 A A A A A E E
 
Convair 880 & 990 B C C C .D G G
 
A300B 	 A A A A D E E
 
C B Go
 
BAC-ill, +15 Trident,
 
VC-lO, Comet
 
F28, VFW-614
 
Caravelle, Mecure, B 	 B D G  
Data Source Key
 
A. 	Aircraft manufacture published information. E. Manufacture supplied observation extrapolated
 
forward to be representative of mid year 1976.
 
B. 	"Commercial Aircraft Fleets" Avmark Inc. 
(Original deliveries which were not listed F. Author estimate based oh aircraft flying hours on 
distributed by author.) carrier average hop length for equipment type on 
general operazing charadteristics of equipment
 
00C. "Comercial Aircraft Fleets' Avmark Inc. type.
 
D. Based on year of original delivery either to G. Not estimated because of inadequate data. 
.8~ carrier currently operating or original 
operator.
 
APPENDIX C
 
Sample Interview Questions on Retirement of Commnercial Jet Aircraft
 
1. 	When do you estimate retirement of specific types and why?
 
2. 	What is the limit of use of 707s and DC-8s without further
 
mdintenance modification?
 
3. 	What necessary work has to be done and how extensive is it
 
to reach (a)80,000 hrs., (b) 100,000 hrs?
 
4. 	Will they be scrapped or sold for other operations?
 
5. 	What and where will be the market for used aircraft?
 
6. 	What is the economic efficiency of the narrow bodied planes?
 
i.e. are unit DOC costs rising?
 
7. 	What is the impact of FAR 36 and the'current noise proposal
 
hearings on decisions to retire the older narrow bodies?
 
8. 	Do the current fuel costs and your estimation of future fuel
 
cost-significantly influence your decision as to retiring aircraft?
 
9. 	What is the maximum decrease in direct operating costs that can
 
now be built into new aircraft -- various scenarios?
 
10. 	 For Airlines: How great a decrease in DOC would'be necessary to
 
make you want to purchase a new type or derivativd aircraft?
 
11. 	 What is the capital cost of a fleet reequiltent? 
(a) 	airline views
 
(b) 	manufacturer views
 
12. 	 What is the effect on reliability of new technology?
 
(a) 	airline view
 
(b) 	manufacturer view
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13. 	 On derivative and new-aircraft or engine technology, how much
 
"up front" money is necessary and how can it be financed?
 
14. 	 How can airlines finance replacement aircraft?
 
15. 	 How many separate new types will be built?
 
16. 	 What impact do the deregulation proposals in Washington have on
 
your equipment plans?
 
17. 	 Is there a satisfactory new technology or derivative on the
 
drawing board?
 
(a) manufacturer response

(b) 	airline response
 
18. 	 What is the mission of the type of airplane you desire for
 
replacement?
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INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED DURING STUDY
 
ALLfANCE ONE, STAMFORD, CONNECTICUT 
Harry Kimbriel, Vice President
 
AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.
 
William 0. Becker, Assistant Vice President-Ooerations
 
William M. Hawkins, Assistant Vice President-Economics & Finance
 
K. William Horn, Assistant Vice President-Research
 
Lee R. Howard, Director-Data Systems and Forecasting

George W. James, Vice President-Economics & Finance
 
AMERICAN AIRLINES, TULSA
 
Leo Cody,
 
W.P. Hannon, System Director of Engineering
 
AMERICAN AIRLINES, NEW YORK
 
Earl E. Ditmars, Assistant Vice President-Traffic Analysis & Research
Richard Klaas, Director-Financial Systems Development & Industry Analysis

Franklin N. Kolk, Vice President-Systems Planning
 
Richard Linn
 
Donald Lloyd-Jones, Senior Vice President-Operations

John T. Slavin, Assistant Treasurer
 
BANK OF AMERICA, NEW YORK
 
James B. Murray, Assistant Vice President
 
Sanford Sacks, Vice President
 
BANKERS TRUST COMPANY, NEW YORK
 
Jasper H. Arnold, III, Assistant Treasurer
 
John S. Bliven, First Vice President
 
Don C. Hawley, Senior Financial Analyst

Robert S. Logan, Assistant Vice President
 
BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANE COMPANY, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 
George N. Bower, Manager-Advanced Freighters
James L. Copenhaver, Director-Central Engineering Design
Thomas R. Craig-Market Research
Richard A, Michelson, Assistant Director-Sales Technology
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BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANE COMPANY,-SEATTLE, WASHINGTON
 
Gene A. Pace, Manager-U.S. & Canadian Airline Analysis Marketing
 
Requirements
 
-Gordon Rasmussen, Manager-Sales Technology
 
John E. Steiner, Vice President
 
Robert E. Watson, Chief Engineer-Structures Technology
 
H.W. "Bob" Withington, Vice President-Engineering
 
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, WASHINGTON, D.C.
 
J.C. Constantz, Chief-Economic Analysis Division
 
Roy Pulsifer-Bureau of Operating Rights
 
Arthur Sirms, Director-Bureau of Economics
 
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, NEW YORK
 
Harry Colwell, III, Vice President
 
Raymond V. Nelson, Jt., Vice President
 
CONTINENTAL ILLINOIS NATIONAL BANK, CHICAGO
 
Arthur J. Bruen, Vice President-Transportation Division
 
DELTA AIRLINES, ATLANTA, GEORGIA
 
Cecil 0. Brown, Assistant to Assistant Vice President
 
Arthur C. Ford, Assistant Vice President-Long Range Planning
 
Gerald Mayo, Senior Attorney
 
B.L. Terrell, Chief Engineer-Aircraft
 
EASTERN AIRLINES, MIAMI, FLORIDA
 
Frank Davis, Vice President-Operations Services
 
Morton Ehrlich, Vice President-Planning
 
D. Roger Ferguson, Vice President-Advance Schedule Planning
 
Paul Johnstone, Vice President-Engineering
 
Roy M. Rawls, Asst. Controller, Financial Planning and Analysis
 
Wayne A. Yeoman, Vice President, Finance
 
EQUJiJABLE LIFE INSURANCE, NEW YORK
 
William A. McCurdy, Vice President
 
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON. D.C. 
Joan Reynolds Barriage, Office of Environmental Quality
 
Charles J. Hoch, P.E. Office of Environmental Quality
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FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO
 
Rodney F. Quainton, Vice President
 
FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK, NEW YORK
 
Barnaby C.F. Blatch, Vice President
 
Frederick W. Bradley, Vice President
 
George E. Moyer, Jr., Vice President
 
GENERAL ELECTRIC, CINCINNATI, OHIO
 
John D. Karraker, Manager, Commercial Market Analysis

Karl Riter, Commercial Market Analysis
 
GREYHOUND, PHOENIX, ARIZONA
 
Robert Dell'Artino, Executive Vice President, Lease and Finance
 
LOCKHEED CALIFORNIA CO., BURBANK, CALIFORNIA
 
Richard L. Foss, Department of Engineering, Commercial Advanced Design'

Michael I. Grove, Comnercial Sales Engineering

Henry W. Montgomery, Airline Planning, Comercial Transportation Research
 
Walter Nubel, Advanced Design

George N. Sarames, Manager, Airline Systems Analysis

Joseph A. Schwartz, Division Manager, Market Development
 
Ray A. Tedrick, Market Engineer

O.W. Traber, Product Plans and Applications

William J. Wolff, Division Manager, Technical Sales Support

Duane 0. Wood, President
 
LOCKHEED-GEORGTA CO., MARIETTA, GEORGIA
 
Jys Ruys, Commercial Market Planning
 
MC DONNELL-DOUGLAS, LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA
 
Edward A. Danner, Deputy Manager, Airline Financial Planning
 
B. Frome
 
Sidney J. Griffith, Vice President, Treasurer and Secretary

C.W. Heathco, Deputy Director, Advanced Transportation Concepts

R.C.P. Jackgon, Vice President, Plans
 
R.V. MacGregor
 
R.A. Margulies, Energy Coordinator
 
John F. McGrath, Manager, Airline Analysis

R.P. Milton, Manager, Special Planning Analysis

G.R. Morrissey, Senior Economist, Advanced Design, Commercial System

Carl T. Norris, Economist, Economic Research
 
H.B. Norris, Manager, Airline Fleet Planning
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MC DONNELL-DOUGLAS, LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA (continued)
 
- Bill Richards, Market Research
 
John A. Stern, Manager, Commercial Research
 
John W. Stroup, Manager, Commercial Operations Research
 
Andy Tung
 
June C. Van Abkoude, Airline Systems Analyst, Advanced Design
 
MC DONNELL-DOUGLAS, ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI
 
Kenneth Velten, Section Manager, Comercial Market Analysis
 
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE CO., NEW YORK
 
George M. Crandles, Vice President, Corporate Investments
 
Stuart R. Kennedy, Vice President
 
* NATIONAL AIRCRAFT LEASING, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
 
Eric Anderson
 
NATIONAL AIRLINES, MIAMI, FLORIDA
 
- Fred Luhm, Fleet Planning
 
Robert J. Sherer, Controller
 
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA
 
Donald W. Nyrop, President
 
PAN AMERICAN AIRLINES, NEW YORK
 
Henry P. Hill, Staff Vice President, Schedules
 
J. Weesner, Vice President, Maintenance Operations

John N. Wolgast, Senior Vice President, Technical Operations
 
SALOMON BROTHERS, NEW YORK
 
Julius Maldutis, Vice President, Transportation Group
 
SHIELDS MODEL ROLAND INC., NEW YORK
 
Edmund S. Greenslet, CFA, Vice President, Research Division
 
IRANS WORLD AIRLINES, NEW YORK
 
Melvin Brenner, Vice President, Marketing and Planning

R.A. Garlin, Manager, Fleet Planning
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UNITED AIRLINES, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
 
Edward A. Beamish, Senior Vice President, Corporate Planning
 
Richard M. Brannon, Director of Fleet Planning
 
Andy M. DeVoursney, Group Vice President, Finance and Planning
 
Harry Lehr, Director of Regulatory Affairs
 
Sven E. Madsen, Schedule Research Manager, Schedule and Resource Pl"anning
 
Colin- D. Murray, Vice President, Schedule and Resource Planning
 
Robert A. Ross, Economist
 
Irving Roth, Vice President, Investor Relations
 
UNITED"STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.
 
Don Bliss, Deputy, General Counsel
 
James J. Gansle, Industry Analysis Division, Office of'the Secretary
 
of Transportation
 
Lawrence P. Greene, Assistant for Aeronautical Research and Development,
 
Office of the Secretary of Transportation
 
Dan Maxfield, TPI-12, Transportation Systems Analyst
 
Wynne Teel, Office of General Council
 
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, WASHINGTON, D.C.
 
David L. Mahan, Assistant Counsel (Aviation), Committee of Public Works
 
and Transportation
 
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES, EAST HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT
 
N. George Avram, Manager, Business Planning
 
Frank W. Gobetz, Chief, Systems Performance Evaluation
 
Richard Hoff, Vice President, JT1OD Program
 
Albert A. LeShane, Manager, Systems Evaluation
 
Richard Mulready, General Manager, JTIOD Engine Program
 
S.M. Taylor, Vice President, Marketing U.S..and Canada
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APPENDIX E
 
FAR 36
 
36.1 Effective 12/1/69 	 .-36.2 Effective 12/1/73
 
Sandrs: Aircraft Typeand Airworthiness.Certificationiart . 
Subpart A--General (1) -December 1, 1973, for airplanes with, 
maximum weights greater than 75,000 lbs., 
§36.1 Applicability. 	 except for airplanes that powered byare 
(a) This Part prescribes noise 	 Pratt aid Whitney Turbo Wasp 373D series(a) hisPartprecribs isestandards enns 
engines;for the issue of type certificates, 	and changes 
of cer- () December 31, 1974, for airplanesto those certificates, and for the 	issue 
-
 th-maximm-weigg
-tain-standard-category- -airworthiness -dr ifi 
that are powered by Pratt and cates, for subsonic transport category air- lbs. and 
Whitney Turbo Wasp JT3D series engines;planes, and for subsonic turbojet powered and ­
airplanes regardless of category. 

(3) December .31, 1974, for airplanes(b) Each person who applies under Part 21 
of this chapter for a type certificate must show with maximum weights of 
75,000 lbs. and 
with the applicable requirements less.compliance 

of this.Part, in addition to the applicable air­
worthiness requirements of thischapter. 3 36.2 Special retroactive requlrement.
 
(c)Each person who applies under Part 21 (a) Notwithstanding §21.17 of this chapter, 
irrespective of the date of application,of this chapter for approval of an acoustical 	 and 
each applicant covered by § 36.201(b) and change described in §21.93(b) must show that 
the airplane meets the following requirements (c) (1), and §C36.5(c) of this Part who ap­
in addition to the applicable airworthiness re- plies for a new type certificate, must show 
o

- . ompliance with the applicable provisionsquirements of this chapter: 

in Ap: this( Part.
 The noise limits prescribed 	 this(1) pendxhisPar,Cof fo aiplaes hatcan (b) Notwithstanding §201.101(a) of 
pendx 0 of this Part, for airplanes that can chapter, each person who applies for an acos­
achieve those noise levels, or lower noise tical change to -a type design specified in 
levels, prior to the change in type design. § 21.93 (b) of this chapter must show compli­
(2) The noise levels created by the air- ance with the applicable provisions of this 
plane prior to the change in type design, Part. 
measured and evaluated as prescribed in Ap­
pendixes A and B of this Part, for airplanes S 36.3 Compatibility Mi:h arweorthiness ra­
that cannot achieve the noise limits pre- 'quiremoents. 
scribed in Appendix C of this Part prior It must be shown that the airplane meets 
to the change in type design. the airworthiness regulations constitdting the 
(d) 	 Each' person who applies for the type certification basis of the airplane under A thiess all conditions in which compliance with this 
original issue of Standard .irwor Part is shown, and that all procedures used in 
Certificates under §21.183, must, regardless of complying with this Part, and all procedures 
date of application, show compliance with this and information for the flight crew developed 
Part (including Appendix C), as effective on under this Part, are consistent with the air-
December 1, 1969, for airplanes that have not worthiness regulations constituting the type 
had any flight time before- certification basis of the airplane. 
OF POOR QUALTY 
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1 36.5 LImitation of Part. than those prescribed in Appendix C of this 
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 1431(b) (4), the noise Part. 
levels in this Part have been determined to be (c) For airplanes that do not have tdtibojet 
as low as is economically reasonable, tech- engines with bypass ratio of 2 or more and 
nologically practicable, and appropriate to the for which-- - .. I z I 
type of aircraft to which they apply. No (1) Application was made before flecem­
determinatioi is made, under this Part, that her 1, 1969, it must be shown that the lowest 
these noise levels are or should be acceptable noise levels, reasonably obtainable through 
or unacceptable for operation at, into, or out the use of procedures and information de­
9f,any airport. - vleoped for the flight crew under § 36.1501 
are determined; and 
*" (2) Application was or is made on or after 
Subpart B-Noise Measurement December 1, 1969, it must be shown that the 
and Evaluation noise levels of the airplane are no greater 
§ 36.101 Noise measurement, than those prescribed in Appendix C of this Part.Pa.
The noise generated by the airplane must be 
measured under Appendix A of this Part or (d) For aircraft to which paragraph (b) (1) 
under an approved equivalent procedure. of this section applies and that do not meet 
Appendix C of this Part, a time period will be 
5 36.103 Noise evaluation. . placed on tlke type certificate. The type cer-
Noise measurement information' obtained tificate will specify that, upon the expirationmeasuremen.101mst i uato tained of this time period, the type certificate will be 
under § 36.101 must be evaluated under Ap- subject to suspension or modification under 
pendix B of this Part or under an approved Section 611 of the Federal Aviation Act of 
equivalent procedure. 1958 (49 U.S.C. 1431) unless the type design 
. " of aircraft produced under that type certificate 
on and after the expiration date is modified to 
Subpart C-Nose show compliance with Appendix C. With re­
5 36.201 Noise limits. spect to any possible suspensions or modifica­
(a) Compliance with this section must be tions under this paragraph, the certificate 
shown with noise levels measured and eval- holder shall have the same notice and appeal 
uated as prescribed in Subpart B of this Part, rights as are cotainedin Section 609-of the 
and demonstrated at the measuring points pre- Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. 
scribed in Appendix-C of this Part. 1429). 
(b) For airplanes that have turbojet engines. . 
with bypass ratios, of 2 or more and for Subpart G-Operating lnormation 
which- and Airplane Flight Manual 
(1) Application was made before January
1, 1967, it must be shown that the noise levels § 36.150T Procedures and olher information. 
of the airplane ar no greater than those All prbcedures, any other information for 
prescribed in Appendix C of this Part, or the flight crew, that are employed for obtain­
are reduced to the lowest levels that are ing the noise reductions prescribed in this Part 
economically reasonable, technologically must be developed. This must include noise 
practicable;' and appropriate to the particu- levels achieved during type certification. 
lar type design; and 
"(2) Application was oris made on or after 336.1581 Airplane Flight Manual. 
January 1, 1967, it must be shown that the (a) The approved portion of the Airplane
Iloise levels of the airplane are no greater Flight Manual must contain procedures and 
App. E 
- 194 -
PART 36 NOISE STANDARfDS: AIRCRAF T TYPE AN D AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATION 
other information approved under §36.1501. able for operation at, into, or out of, 
of this any airporL"Except as provided in paragraph (b) 
section, no operating limitations may be fur- (b) If the weight used in meeting the take­
nished under this section. The following state- off or landing -noise requirements of this Part 
ment must be furniqhed near the listed noise is less than the maximum weight or design 
levels: landing weight, respectively, established under 
"No determination has been made by the applicable airworthiness requirements, 
the Federal Aviation Administration those lesser weights must be furnished, as op­
* that the noise levels in this manual are erating.limitations,-in-the operating-limitations­
-or-shtulWit- a-lT r unaccept- section of the Airplane Flight Mlanual. 
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Appendix C 
Noise Levels for Subsonic Transport Category and Turbojet Powered 
-, Airplanes Under Section 36.201 
I C36.1 Noise measurement and evaluation. 
Compliance with this Appendix must lie shown 
with noise levels measured and evaluated as 
prescribed, respectively, by Appendix A and 
Appendix B of this Part, or under approved 
equivalent procedures. ,--
§ C36.3 Noise measuring points. Compliance 
with the noise level standards of § C36.5 must 
be shown--. 
(a) For takeoff, at a point 3.5 nautical 
miles from the start of the takeoff roll.on the 
extended centerline of the runway; 
(b) For approach, at a point 1 nautical 
mile from the threshold on the extended cen-
terline of the runway; and 
(c) For the sideline, at the point, on a line 
parallel to and 0.25 nautical miles from the 
extended centerline of the runway, where the 
noise level after liftoff is greatest, except that, 
for airplanes powered by more than three 
turbojet engines, this distance must be 0.35 
nautical miles. 
§ C36.5 Noise levels. 
(a) General. Except as provided in para-
graphs (b) and (c) of this section, it must be 
shown by flight test that the itoise levels of 
the airplane, at the measuring points described 
in § C36.3, do not exceed the following (with 
appropriate interpolation between weights) 
(1) For approach and sideline, 108 
fPNdB for maximum weights of 600.000 
lbs. or more, less 2 EPNdB per halving 
of the 600,000 lbs. maximum weight down 
to 102 EPNdB for maximum weights of 
75,000 lbs. and under. 
PAIRT 30 
(2) For takeoff, 108 EPNdMB for maxi­
mum weights of 600,000 lbs. or more, less 
5 EPdB per halving of the 600,000 lb. 
maximum weight down to 93 EPNdB for 
maximum weights of 75,000 lbs. and under. 
(b) Tradeoff. The noise levels in paragraph 
(a) may be exceeded at one or two of the 
measuring points prescribed in § C36.3, if- . 
(1) The sum of the exceedance is not 
greater than 3 EPNdB; 
.	 (2) No exceedance is greater than-

EPNdB; and .
 
(3) The exceedances am completely offset 
by reductions at other required measuring 
points. 
(e) Prior applicatios. For applications 
made before December 1, 1969, for airplanes 
powered by more than three turbojet engines 
with bypass ratios of two or more, the value 
prescribed in paragraph (b) (1) of this section 
may not exceed 5 EPNdB and the value pre­
scribed in paragraph (b)(2) of this section 
may not exceed 3 EP-NdB. 
§ C36.7 Takeoff lest conditions. 
(a) This section applies to all takeoffs con­
ducted in showing compliance with this. Part. 
(b) Takeoff power or thrust must be used 
from the'star of the takeoff to the point at 
which an altitude of at least 1,000 feet above 
the runway is reached, except that, for air­
planes powered by more than three turbojet 
engines, this altitude must not be less than 
100 feet. 
(e) Upon reaching the altiude specified in 
paragraph (b) of this sectioA. the power or 
thrust may not be reduced below that power 
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or thrust that will provide level flight with 
-.one-engine -inoperative, -or-below--that -powe 
or thrust that will maintain a climb gradient 
of at least 4 percent, whichever power or thrust 
is greater. 
(d) A speed of at least V±+10 knots must 
be attained as soon as practicable after liftoff, 
and must be maintained throughout the takeoff 
noise test. 
(e) A constant takeoff configuration, 
lected by the applicant, must be maintained 
throughout the takeoff noise test, except that 
the landing gear may be retracted, 
2 C36.9 Approach test conditions. ­
(a) This section applies to all approaches 
conducted in showing compliance with this 
Part. 
(b) The airplanes configuration must be 
that used in showing compliance with the land-
ing requirements in the airwqrthiness regula 
itioIin G titing the type certification basis 
of the airplane. If more than one configura­
tion is used in showing compliance with the 
landing requirements in the airworthiness 
regulations constituting the type certification 
basis of the airplane, the configuration that 
is most critical from a noise standpoint must 
be used. . 
(e) The approaches-must be conducted with 
a steady glide angle of 30±0.50 and must be 
continued to a normal touchdown.with no air­frame configuration change. 
(d) A steady approach speed of not less 
than 1.30 Vs+10 knots must be established 
and maintained over the approach measuring 
point. .­
(e) All engines must be operating at ap­
proximately the same power or thrust. 
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